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Summary of Thesis: 
 
The thesis uses the doctrine of the separation of powers as the conceptual framework to analyse 
the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on EU matters from its early deci-
sions to the latest cases on the European Stability Mechanism. The court’s decisions have been 
widely discussed in terms of the impact of European integration on democracy and democratic 
participation at the national level. The aim of the thesis is to put the court’s jurisprudence into a 
different context by reading it from the perspective of separation of powers in order to assess 
the impact of EU integration on the relationship between national institutions, specifically the 
German Federal government and parliament.  
The analysis will show that while the decisions on the ESM have overall strengthened the posi-
tion of the Federal parliament in the particular subject-matter of those cases (budgetary control), 
this should not necessarily be understood as a re-definition of the relationship between the Fed-
eral government and parliament in the context of EU matters as a whole.  
By using the separation of powers as a framework for analysis, it becomes apparent that while 
the German constitutional system may seem to have acknowledged the different constitutional 
nature of the EU, the political institutions as well as the Federal Constitutional Court have yet to 
draw the necessary consequences for the relationship between the Federal government and 
parliament at national level: by treating EU matters merely as a ‘special kind’ of foreign affairs, 
the fundamental alteration of the balance of power between the executive and the legislative 
caused by European integration has gone unchecked by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court and has led to constitutional practices which arguably undermine not only the democratic 
accountability of the actions of the German Federal government but also the concept of separa-
tion of powers itself. 
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Glossary 
Auswärtige Gewalt The term used in Germany for ‘Foreign Affairs’ - the word 
‘Gewalt’ (= ‘power’) is commonly taken to have no connec-
tions whatsoever to the concept of separation of powers, 
the use is purely traditional  
Bundeskanzler The Federal Chancellor, the head of the German Federal 
Government 
Bundespräsident 
 
The Federal President, elected for five years by the Federal 
Assembly which consists of the members of the Bundestag 
and an equal number of representatives from the parlia-
ments of the Länder (states, cf. below).  
Bundesrat 
 
Federal Council – upper house of the federal parliament, 
members are appointed by the governments (= executives) 
of the German Länder (states, cf. below). 
Bundesregierung Federal Government – appointed by the Federal president 
on the nomination of the Bundeskanzler (= Federal Chancel-
lor, the head of the Federal Government) 
Bundestag Federal Diet – lower house of the federal parliament, direct-
ly elected every four years 
Bundesverfassungs-
gericht  
Federal Constitutional Court 
Gesetzesvorbehalt General statutory reserve: according to the Rechtsstaat 
principle (cf. below), public authorities need a statute/ stat-
utory basis for any and all actions that may impact on hu-
man rights 
Gewaltenteilung The technical term used by German scholars for ‘separation 
of powers’ 
Grundgesetz  
 
Basic Law, the current German Constitution 
Please refer to the Annex for a compilation of provisions of 
the Grundgesetz in German and English as cited in the thesis 
Grundsatz der 
funktionsgerechten 
Organstruktur 
‘principle of the function appropriate institutional structure’ 
- a phrase coined in an attempt to replace the seemingly 
old-fashioned separation of powers.  
Land/ Länder The label used to refer to the federal states comprising the 
German federation. ‘Land’ is the singular, Länder the plural.  
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Rechtsstaat 
principle  
The technical term used in the German legal system for its 
specific conceptualisation of the more general idea of the 
rule of law. As the concept differs substantially from the 
English notion of the ‘rule of law’, the German original will 
be used throughout the thesis. 
 
 
 
Abbreviation  Term 
BVerfG  Bundesverfassungsgericht  
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility 
ESM European Stability Mechanism  
GG Grundgesetz  
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 “… For today there are practical problems of the control of government 
every bit as important and difficult as in the days of Locke, Montesquieu, or 
the Founding Fathers. […] we cannot merely accept without question the 
view that the continued concentration of power into the hands of cabinets 
and presidents is inevitable and cannot be restrained. The concentration of 
more power into such hands, or of certain sorts of power, may be “inevita-
ble”, given certain assumptions about the military, social, and economic 
needs of modern societies, but which powers, how much of them, and how 
they can be effectively limited, are the questions we should be asking. The 
detail of the theories of constitutionalism may be rejected as no longer ap-
plicable, but the ethos of constitutionalism remains; we still believe in “lim-
ited government”, but we do not yet see how the limits are to be applied in 
modern circumstances. …”1 
 
  
                                                     
1
 MJC Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (2nd edn, Liberty Fund 1998) 11–12 empha-
sis in the original. 
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The 2008 financial crisis caught the EU and its members unprepared and tested their 
commitment to the ‘project’ that is European integration at a profound level. It also 
revealed some inherent weaknesses in the set-up of the currency union that the mem-
bers of the Eurozone proceeded to fix. The results of those efforts were initially the so-
called European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF, intended as a temporary relief) and 
then subsequently the so called European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal 
Treaty. In particular the latter was controversial, as many Member States felt that it in-
terfered greatly with their budgetary autonomy.  
In Germany, the EURO crisis and the creation of the above mentioned mechanism has 
given rise since 2010 to a series of so far more than eleven decisions that, for the first 
time, show a marked focus on the Bundestag2 and its role and responsibilities when it 
comes to decision-making in the European context. The seven decisions that are the 
particular focus of this thesis were issued between September 2011 and March 2014 
and dealt with the challenges brought partly against the ratification of the treaties in 
questions (in the tradition of the decisions on the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties) and 
partly against decisions of the Bundestag under the EFSF and the ESM, against the 
statute detailing the procedure as to how the Bundestag would be involved in decision 
making in this context as well as against the activities of the Bundesregierung3 in the 
run-up to the ratification of the ESM and the Fiscal Treaties. Taken together, the deci-
sions provide a unique opportunity to track within the same treaty/ treaty system the 
impact of the Court’s approach to the relationship between the Bundesregierung and 
the Bundestag in EU matters along the whole possible range of interaction:  
 the behaviour in particular of the Bundesregierung during the negotiations prior to 
the ratification of a treaty,  
 the content of the treaty - its compatibility with the Grundgesetz4 reviewed at the 
stage of ratification,  
                                                     
2
 Federal Diet, the elected lower house of the German federal parliament. 
3
 The German Federal Government. 
4
 The German Federal Constitution, the ‘Basic Law’ of 1949 
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 review of the domestic legislation providing the procedure to enable the imple-
mentation of the obligations arising from the treaty, 
 and, lastly, the practice arising from the use of the Bundestag’s new participation 
rights laid down in that legislation in the ‘day-to-day’ activities of the international 
institutions created.  
After the decision of September 2011 was issued, the Bundestag convened in order re-
vise the statutes concerning German participation in the EFSF framework. The leader 
of the CDU party group5, Volker Kauder, opened the debate by hailing the decision as a 
‘paradigm shift’ in the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag in 
matters of parliamentary scrutiny.6 And indeed, at first glance these cases appear to 
recast the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag: the new par-
liamentary ‘reserve’ on matters of budgetary responsibility created by the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht requires the Bundestag to have a rather active role in the decision-
making processes, something that the Court had so far considered as contrary to the 
intentions of the Grundgesetz regarding European matters and Foreign Affairs. For 
once, effective ex ante decision-making power in the European context seems to be 
within its reach.  
A. Relevance of the thesis 
This thesis will investigate whether the ESM cases of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
constitute a shift in the Court’s approach as to how it defines the relationship of the 
Bundestag and the Bundesregierung in the European context by using separation of 
powers as the analytical framework. This investigation will be valuable for the follow-
ing three reasons. 
                                                     
5
 Then as now the majority member of the government coalition. 
6
 debate of 29 September 2011; Gregor Gysi (then leader of the opposition party ‘Die Linke’) on the 
other hand heavily criticised the level of secrecy still involved under the new regime. Deutscher Bun-
destag, ‘Protocol of the 130. plenary session of the 17th Bundestag’ (2011) Plenary Protocol 17/130 
15204 and 15213 respectively 
<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/searchDocuments/plpr_search_result.do?selId=448&method
=select&offset=0&anzahl=100&sort=4&direction=desc> accessed 30 May 2015. 
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1. A fresh outlook at the decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
the European context 
Firstly, this analysis will contribute to the debate on the impact of European integra-
tion on the legal and constitutional systems of the Member States by providing a fresh 
outlook on the cases of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
Cases of the Bundesverfassungsgericht have always solicited the attention of academ-
ics dealing with European integration. In the past, that attention has primarily been fo-
cused on the Court's comments regarding the principle of democracy, sovereignty, lim-
its to European integration and the Court’s conceptualisation of the relationship be-
tween the European Union and its Member States, specifically Germany and its consti-
tution. Those cases have contributed sometimes profoundly, sometimes provocatively, 
to the debate among academics. Most recently however, arguments have been made 
that the focus on democracy and sovereignty deadlocks the debate because it forces 
the participants to classify themselves along labels they may not subscribe to.7 
Moreover, the ESM cases deal primarily with the relationship of the Bundesregierung 
and the Bundestag at the domestic level. In particular they deal with how much in-
volvement the Bundestag, a.k.a. the parliament, should have. This points towards us-
ing the separation of powers as the framework for analysis, a theory that is embedded 
in the constitutional make-up of all Member States but has been neglected so far, in 
particular by lawyers.8 Using the separation of powers as the analytical framework will 
highlight that an important element of the impact of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
previous as well as the most recent jurisprudence has been neglected and underesti-
mated so far: the repercussions European integration has had on the relationship of 
the national parliaments and governments at the stage prior to EU level decision-
making. The analysis here will thus complement the analyses already conducted with a 
view on democracy by enabling an analysis of the situation in one particular Member 
State and within the decision-making framework created by its particular constitution. 
                                                     
7
 Anneli Albi, ‘Erosion of Constitutional Rights in EU Law: A Call for “substantive Co-Operative Constitu-
tionalism” - Part 2’ (2015) 9 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law 291, 308 and 313. 
8
 Anneli Albi, ‘From the Banana Saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond: Could the Post-Communist Constitu-
tional Courts Teach the EU a Lesson in the Rule of Law?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 791, 
793. 
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This in turn will enable a more detailed analysis of the role of the legislative and the 
executive, how they cooperate, how they may or may not compensate for the impact 
of European integration, and in particular how national constitutional courts influence 
and shape that relationship through their jurisprudence. This analysis will also reveal 
whether the principle of the separation of powers – considered a cornerstone of the 
constitutions of all Member States – should follow suit in the development already un-
dertaken for the notions of democracy and sovereignty and be adapted to the particu-
lar institutional and organisational framework that is the European Union. 
2. A legal analysis of the separation of powers  
Secondly, the analysis in this thesis will be conducted deliberately from a legal per-
spective and with a particular focus on the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht. While political scientists have considered the separation of powers in the 
European context to a considerable degree, investigations by lawyers have been no-
ticeably absent. As will be noted in Chapter II of this thesis, the impression for example 
among present-day German legal scholars is that the separation of powers may be a 
valuable subject to pursue as a theoretical exercise, but that it has very little impact in 
practice.9 However, by conducting an investigation into the jurisprudence of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht within traditional contexts (cf. Chapters III and IV), it will be-
come apparent that this negative impression is not borne out in practice. Quite the 
opposite: the principle has had considerable practical impact on the jurisprudence of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht and decisively shapes the relationship of the Bundestag 
and the Bundesregierung also in the European context. The cases surveyed demon-
strate that the use the Bundesverfassungsgericht makes of the principle of the separa-
tion of powers provides answers a number of crucial, practically important questions 
which in turn have wider impact, for example on the realisation of the principle of de-
mocracy, the rule of law and human rights protection. In that, the separation of pow-
                                                     
9
 Cf. i.a. Fritz Ossenbühl, ‘Aktuelle Probleme Der Gewaltenteilung’ (1980) 33 Die Öffentliche Verwal-
tung 545, 545; Walter Leisner, ‘Die Quantitative Gewaltenteilung’ (1969) 22 Die Öffentliche Verwal-
tung 405, 405; NW Barber, ‘Prelude to the Separation of Powers’ (2001) 60 The Cambridge Law Jour-
nal 59, 59; Eric Barendt, ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’ [1995] Public Law 
599, 600. 
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ers proves its value as an institutional theory and provides a further argument for an 
investigation into its potential uses in the European context. 
The particular emphasis on the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is due 
for once to the fact already pointed out above that the Court’s contributions to the 
debate on European integration have so far been very fruitful. It is therefore worth ex-
ploring what contribution decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht may make to oth-
er aspects of the debate. Furthermore, an analysis of the jurisprudence of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht is pivotal within the confines of a legal analysis of the German 
constitutional system. As in all constitutional systems with a constitutional Court, the 
text of the Grundgesetz by itself is only of limited use – one needs to analyse the juris-
prudence to get an accurate impression of what the legal framework for the interac-
tion of the institutions actually is and how it shapes the behaviour of those institutions 
and the political actors involved. In Germany, the impact of the decisions of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht on the German constitutional system and the political process 
are particularly strong. This is usually attributed to the powerful position the Court has 
in the constitutional system and to the broad range of remedies that give access to the 
Court. 
Roughly speaking, the remedies allowing access to the Bundesverfassungsgericht fall 
into two categories: those that are similar to judicial review in that they review the 
‘products’ of the activities of the constitutional institutions and those where the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht is asked to act as a neutral arbiter to resolve disputes among 
the constitutional institutions. The remedies in the first category allow the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht to review the constitutionality of statutes, individual administrative 
decisions as well as Court decisions on the application of the executive of both the 
federal and Land10 level, members of the Bundestag, courts and individuals in varying 
degrees.11 
                                                     
10
 The German regions/ states are referred to as Länder (plural) or one Land in the singular.  
11
 Abstract and concrete review of statutes, constitutional complaints, inter-institution-disputes, Article 
93 and 100 (1) Grundgesetz. 
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As an arbiter, the Bundesverfassungsgericht mediates disputes between the federal 
level and individual Länder and between federal constitutional institutions.12 From the 
perspective of the opposition in the Bundestag, this represents a veritable plethora of 
options with which to have the actions of the executive and the Bundestag majority 
reviewed, in particular if it can rely on the support of a Land executive due to party al-
legiances. Actions may be brought against statutes adopted against the strong views of 
the opposition,13 specific actions of the members of the other institutions, e.g. the 
Bundeskanzler,14 Bundesregierung15 or Bundespräsident,16 or even against the Bundes-
tag itself by one of its members.17 And it is not only the members of the opposition 
who make use of these remedies. Most of the ESM cases have been brought by indi-
vidual members of the Bundestag from across the benches and concerned citizens.  
Due to the availability of so many remedies to so many potential applicants every sin-
gle major, and most of the minor, political decision in the history of post-war Germany 
has been reviewed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht – and sometimes the results have 
been very controversial and not necessarily to the liking of the applicant, the respond-
ent, the public or neither party.18 However, the result was a thorough constitutionali-
sation of the German legal system, down to the darkest recesses of the administrative 
sphere, even if compliance was only offered out of fear of being publicly humiliated by 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
Unfortunately, a very regrettable downside of this process has been the ‘juridification’ 
of a considerable range of political processes that in other countries would be firmly in 
the hands of the political institutions. Moreover, it is by now a well-established pattern 
                                                     
12
 Especially the  so-called Federation-Land dispute (Bund-Länderstreit) and the inter-institutional dis-
pute (Organstreit), Article 93 Grundgesetz. 
13
 Cf. e.g. the Bavarian application against the Civil Partnership Act pushed through by the Social-
Democrat/ Green party government in: BVerfG, ‘Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz’ [2002] BVerfGE 105, 
313. 
14
 Federal Chancellor, the head of the Federal Government. 
15
 BVerfG, ‘Duty to Inform the Bundestag (ESM)’ [2012] BVerfGE 131, 152. 
16
 Federal President 
17
 Cf. e.g. the inter-institution dispute brought by a single MP against the Bundestag’s decision to re-
move him from his committee BVerfG, ‘Wüppesahl’ [1989] BVerfGE 80, 188. 
18
 Hans Vorländer, ‘Regiert Karlsruhe Mit? Das Bundesverfassungsgericht Zwischen Recht Und Politik’ 
(2011) 61 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen 15. 
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of behaviour of political actors to use the remedies extensively – the proverbial ‘Gang 
nach Karlsruhe’/ ‘trip to Karlsruhe’ (the town in which the seat of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht is located) has become the method of choice of German politicians for 
the settlement of political disagreements and politicians rather wait for the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht’s decision than to dare propose a non-judicial resolution. Indeed, in 
quite a few cases a politically ‘hot’ question was shifted to the Court which was then in 
the unenviable position to have to take the blame for the inability of the politicians to 
make a decision themselves.  
The repercussions for the constitutional system are even more profound. With every 
decision, the political room to manoeuvre becomes smaller and smaller as the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht – unlike the US Supreme Court – does not subscribe to a ‘politi-
cal question’ doctrine. Instead, the Court uses the doctrine of separation of powers in 
order to define the line between acceptable exercise of its review powers under the 
Grundgesetz and unacceptable encroachment onto the legislative’s or the executive’s 
sphere of decision-making. As with all good intentions, however, this does not always 
work out in practice and the Court has been heavily criticised for being inappropriately 
activist or for not being activist enough – sometimes even in the same case.19 The 
drawback for the political institutions is that, whichever side of the line they consider 
the decision to have ended up on, it binds them and defines the parameters for their 
future actions.  
For the present context however, these considerable disadvantages add value to the 
analysis conducted here as it enables an evaluation of the Court’s own contribution to 
the situation at hand. Indeed, the Court may turn out to be a far more determined ob-
stacle to the Bundestag getting more involved than the Bundesregierung.  
                                                     
19
 Cf. e.g. the decisions on abortion, the crucifix in classrooms, the civil partnership act, the headscarf 
decision, to name but a few -BVerfG, ‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch I’ [1975] BVerfGE 39, 1; BVerfG, 
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3. The wider contribution 
The thesis also connects to the wider debate on the role of national parliaments in Eu-
ropean level decision-making processes. For a considerable time, academics have ex-
pressed concern that the impact of European decision-making has had a particularly 
negative impact on the level of influence national parliaments have managed to re-
tain.20 Once decisions have been taken at European level, national parliaments have 
very few options for the preservation of national values.21 Hence, the focus has shifted 
to decision-making at European level. The Lisbon treaty represented the culmination of 
years of effort aiming to increase the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s 
own decision-making processes. However, it is equally, if not more, important to in-
volve the national parliaments also at the stage prior to that, i.e. in the decision-
making processes at national level. However, research conducted in particular by polit-
ical scientists revealed that the effectiveness of such ex ante rights depends on an in-
tensive cooperation between the national parliament and government as the latter 
tends to be in a ‘gatekeeper’ position, partly because it still largely controls the flow of 
information to the parliament,22 partly because it largely controls the parliament’s 
agenda: for example in March 2015, the UK House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Committee published a report that heavily criticised the British government for i.a. re-
fusing to schedule debates on controversial European issues:  
“… It was particularly ironic […] that at the same time as treating the House's EU 
scrutiny process in such a cavalier way UK Ministers were speaking across the EU 
extolling the importance of national parliaments in providing democratic legitimacy 
for the EU. …”23  
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In light of the efforts made with the Lisbon treaty to involve national parliaments more 
in the process of European decision-making, these findings are particularly disappoint-
ing. While a lot of effort has been made to raise the ‘democratic credentials’ of the Eu-
ropean Union, the governments of the Member States have neglected to maintain 
their previously high standards at domestic level. As the HC Committee pointed out, 
this endangers the legitimacy of decision making not only in the national context, but 
also at European level. This is made even more disappointing by the fact that this is an 
issue where the blame cannot be laid at the door of the European Union: the Member 
States are entirely in control of their national decision-making processes and of how 
they shape the relationship between the government and the parliament.  
It is at this stage where the particular combination of a legal analysis conducted within 
the framework of the separation of powers and with a particular view to the practical 
implementation and application by national constitutional courts as conducted in this 
thesis will make a valuable contribution to the already existing debate and provide 
practical solutions that neither violate the obligations of the Member States under EU 
law - nor fundamental precepts of their national constitutional systems that are very 
much worth preserving.24 
B. Methodology 
The thesis will adopt a positivist approach to the analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the relating academic literature, strongly influenced by 
the methodological approach prevalent in the German civil law tradition of so-called 
‘juristic hermeneutics’ (Juristische Methodenlehre) in order to enable an evaluation 
from ‘within the system’.25 The analysis will explore the research question raised above 
inductively by first establishing the theoretical background and the particular context 
of German constitutional law for the interaction of the Bundestag and the Bundesre-
gierung (Chapters I-IV) before proceeding to the evaluation of how the ESM cases fit 
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into the existing conceptual framework as created by the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
jurisprudence (Chapters V-VII).  
C. Chapter outline 
The thesis is divided into three parts:  
Part I will look at the historical and theoretical roots of the German constitutional tra-
dition with regard to the separation of powers. The idea to divide state power is as old 
as organised civilisation. Already Aristotle pondered the question on how to organise 
the activities of government. His approach was largely descriptive in nature, reflecting 
the practical examples he saw around him. To him, it was more a question of a sensible 
and efficient allocation of functions that had to be fulfilled in every state – with the di-
vision being based on reasons like geography, expertise, or indeed religion or political 
division.26 His allocation of various tasks to specific decision-making bodies did not fol-
low a consistent and systematic theory. However, once he integrated this concept with 
the theory on mixed constitutions, it gained momentum for the purposes of distrib-
uting power among classes. The intended objective was to create a stable system of 
government as well as allocate functions and tasks to those best suited for them. The 
integration of classes, i.e. social power, resulted in a practically effective system of mu-
tual checks and balances in very literal sense.27 
Over the course of subsequent centuries, Aquinas, Grotius, Bodin, Hobbes and Pufen-
dorf among others commented on how to organise state power, in particular with re-
spect to dividing it.28 What changed was the cultural and historical context as well as 
the nature of the ‘sphere’ within which the theory was intended to operate: the sepa-
ration of church and state, the detachment of secular power from its supposedly divine 
origin, the emergence of the concept of the ‘state’, the notion of popular sovereignty 
and the differentiation between the constituent power of the people and the consti-
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tuted power of the monarch are only a few of the fundamental upheavals theorists 
had to cope with over time.29  
Chapter I will Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des 
lois and the Federalist Papers by Hamilton, Madison and Jay.30 These writings repre-
sent the transition from mediaeval systems of government towards modern ones 
based on constitutions. To this day the writings of Locke, Montesquieu and the Feder-
alists are credited with being the theoretical foundation for any modern theory on the 
separation of powers and its practical interpretation and application within present-
day constitutional systems.31 As Chapters III and IV will demonstrate, this is also true 
for the current German system.  
With the French and American revolutions, concepts like the system of mixed constitu-
tions, the notion of a social contract, etc. that had constituted a common theoretical 
foundation for the constitution of the relationship between state and society were 
swept away.32 Written constitutions introduced values like democracy and rule of law 
and became the textural foundation for the institutional framework. As of that point, 
in particular the separation of powers was interpreted and conceptualised in the light 
of the respective constitutional system the scholar worked with.  
Chapter II will therefore explore the reception of the separation of powers in the Ger-
man constitutional tradition from the 19th century through to present-day conceptuali-
sations. German scholars of the 19th century were rather critical vis-a-vis the separa-
tion of powers, largely because the pursuit of national unity impeded the reception of 
the separation of powers as it seemed to threaten the unity of the state they were 
hoping to create.33 Instead, they favoured concepts like absolute (monarchical) and 
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then people's sovereignty and either rejected the separation of powers or tried to re-
conceptualise it to integrate it into their notions of nature and purpose of a state and 
its constitution.34 In combination with a methodological shift towards positivism, this 
resulted in a theoretical and conceptual crisis of German constitutional law thinking 
during the Weimar Republic. The fundamental reorientation of the discipline as a 
whole had major repercussions for constitutional law as it is theorised and practised 
under the Grundgesetz.35  
In order to provide the background for the analysis of the implementation and en-
forcement of the separation of powers within the current constitutional system by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Chapter III and IV), Chapter I will establish the common 
themes in the works of Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists in order to explore in 
Chapter II how they were carried forward, amended or changed after the reception of 
the separation of powers by the German constitutional tradition of the 19th century 
through to present-day conceptualisations. 
 
Part II will investigate how the theory as explored in Part I has been implemented into, 
and applied in, the Grundgesetz’s system of constitutional government. As could be 
seen in Chapter II Section C, present-day German authors commonly perceive the the-
ory to be of little practical use. The aim of this Part is to investigate whether that is 
true and thus to evaluate the theory’s practical impact on the German constitutional 
system firstly with regard to the general domestic context (Chapter III) and then with 
regard to the area of Foreign Affairs (Chapter IV).  
The thesis will continue to pursue the questions set out for the investigation in Part I in 
order to evaluate the practical implications of the theoretical differences. The analysis 
will review the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in order to establish 
whether the shifting values that drive the theory are mirrored in the Court’s approach 
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and the solutions it finds for the conflicts arising among the powers. As could be seen 
in Part I, the theoretical conceptualisation of the separation of powers informs the par-
ticular solutions it offers. It will therefore be crucial to establish what theoretical ap-
proach the Bundesverfassungsgericht pursues: whether it has adopted one suggested 
by the literature, whether it has designed its own by merging several approaches or 
whether it has developed its own ideas, e.g. due to the much more practical context it 
finds itself in. In that context, the questions of how the Court defines ‘power’ and what 
it considers to be the primary objective of the separation of powers within a constitu-
tional system are of paramount importance. For example, with regard to that latter 
point, the literature oscillates between liberty and efficiency and, with that, comes to 
different conclusions as to how one should resolve particular conflicts among powers. 
Moreover, it will be interesting to see whether potential dangers foreseen in the litera-
ture materialised in practice, for example, the fear that the legislative would become 
too powerful and usurp the other two powers.  
The particular focus of this part of the investigation will be the jurisprudence of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht with regard to the general domestic context as well as For-
eign Affairs in order to establish the parameters for the ‘typical’ interaction between 
the Bundesregierung and Bundestag. Those will serve as comparators for the evalua-
tion of the Court’s jurisprudence with regard to European matters and the implications 
it has for the relationship between the two institutions in Part III. 
 
Part III will explore how the framework as established in Part I and II was applied in the 
European context. After the ratification of the Treaty of Rome up to the treaty of 
Maastricht, it is well-known that the focus of the Bundesverfassungsgericht was on the 
promotion of the human rights protection provided by the European communities. Its 
famous Solange I, Solange II and Bananas decisions36 are still highly influential for the 
question of implementation of European law into the national legal system and its 
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compatibility with national systems of human rights protection.37 Following on from 
there, the period between the ratification of the treaty of Maastricht and the treaty of 
Lisbon was dominated by several enlargements which raised the question of how the 
European integration process should proceed at a fundamental level. Again, decisions 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, this time Maastricht and Lisbon38, developed into 
landmark decisions, partly despite and partly precisely because they provided a differ-
ent view on the future of the integration process compared to that favoured by the 
government is in the European Member States.  
However, over the course of all of those decades very little attention has been given by 
the Court to the impact the European integration process has on the relationship be-
tween the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung, specifically in the phase prior to deci-
sion-making at European level, i.e. at that point in time when national parliaments 
have the greatest chance to influence the position of their own government and thus 
law-making at European level.  
In the final part of the thesis, the analysis will therefore focus on seven decisions of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the EU context and analyse them not from the perspec-
tive of the principle of democracy or with an eye to maximising human rights protec-
tion. Instead, the analysis will focus on drawing out the implications for the separation 
of powers as conceptualised by the Bundesverfassungsgericht and for the relationship 
between Bundestag and Bundesregierung. In order to track the changes in the Court’s 
approach across time, the investigation will proceed chronologically, starting in Chap-
ter V with the earliest cases after the ratification of the Treaty of Rome up to the ratifi-
cation of the treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Following on from there, Chapter VI will provide 
an outline of the so-called ESM cases and Chapter VII will evaluate the potential impact 
of those cases on the conceptual approach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht with re-
gard to the relationship of the Bundestag and Bundesregierung in the EU context.  
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The thesis will focus on three major strands for the investigation: firstly, how the Ger-
man constitutional tradition conceptualises the separation of powers, secondly how 
this theoretical conceptualisation is carried into the practical application by way of the 
jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and thirdly how the approach devel-
oped by the Bundesverfassungsgericht for the domestic and Foreign Affairs context is 
transferred to the European context. 
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Part I: Theoretical and historical influences  
The idea to divide state power is as old as organised civilisation. Already Aristotle pon-
dered the question on how to organise the activities of government. His approach was 
largely descriptive in nature, reflecting the practical examples he saw around him. To 
him, it was more a question of a sensible and efficient allocation of functions that had 
to be fulfilled in every state – with the division being based on reasons like geography, 
expertise, or indeed religion or political division.39 His allocation of various tasks to 
specific decision-making bodies did not follow a consistent or systematic theory. How-
ever, once he integrated this concept with the theory on mixed constitutions, it gained 
momentum for the purposes of distributing power among classes. The intended objec-
tive was to create a stable system of government as well as allocate functions and 
tasks to those best suited for them. The integration of classes, i.e. social power, result-
ed in a practically effective system of mutual checks and balances in very literal 
sense.40 
Over the course of subsequent centuries, Aquinas, Grotius, Bodin, Hobbes and Pufen-
dorf among others commented on how to organise state power, in particular with re-
spect to dividing it.41 What changed was the cultural and historical context as well as 
the nature of the ‘sphere’ within which the theory was intended to operate: the sepa-
ration of church and state, the detachment of secular power from its supposedly divine 
origin, the emergence of the concept of the ‘state’, the notion of popular sovereignty 
and the differentiation between the constituent power of the people and the consti-
tuted power of the monarch are only a few of the fundamental upheavals theorists 
had to cope with over time.42  
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Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois and the Fed-
eralist Papers by Hamilton, Madison and Jay43 represent the transition from mediaeval 
systems of government towards modern ones based on constitutions. To this day, 
these writings are credited with being the theoretical foundation for any modern theo-
ry on the separation of powers and its practical interpretation and application within 
present-day constitutional systems.44 As Chapters III and IV will demonstrate, this is al-
so true for the Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
 
With the French and American revolutions, concepts like the system of mixed constitu-
tions, the notion of a social contract, etc. that had constituted a common theoretical 
foundation for the constitution of the relationship between state and society were 
swept away.45 Written constitutions introduced values like democracy and the rule of 
law and became the textural foundation for the institutional framework. As of that 
point, in particular the separation of powers was interpreted and conceptualised in the 
light of the respective constitutional system the scholar worked with.  
The reception of the separation of powers in the German constitutional tradition from 
the 19th century through to present-day conceptualisations was rather critical vis-à-vis 
the separation of powers, largely because the pursuit of national unity impeded the 
reception of the separation of powers as it seemed to threaten the unity of the state 
they were hoping to create.46 Instead, they favoured concepts like absolute (monar-
chical) and then people's sovereignty and either rejected the separation of powers or 
tried to reconceptualise it to integrate it into their notions of nature and purpose of a 
state and its constitution.47 In combination with a methodological shift towards posi-
tivism, this resulted in a theoretical and conceptual crisis of German constitutional law 
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thinking during the Weimar Republic.48 The fundamental reorientation of the discipline 
as a whole had major repercussions for constitutional law as it is theorised and prac-
tised under the Grundgesetz.  
 
In order to provide the background for the analysis of the implementation and en-
forcement of the separation of powers within the current constitutional system by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Chapter III and IV), Chapter I will establish the common 
themes in the works of Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists in order to explore in 
Chapter II how they were carried forward, amended or changed after the reception of 
the separation of powers by the German constitutional tradition of the 19th century 
through to present-day conceptualisations. 
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CHAPTER I: Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists - the separation 
of powers as a political concept 
In contrast to the more contractarian literature of the time,49 Locke, Montesquieu and 
the Federalists went beyond the idea of the legitimacy of state power simply being de-
rived from the social contract and focused on how the exercise of that power could be 
controlled or restricted. Moreover, they aimed to base the existing (Locke, Montes-
quieu) or to be created (the Federalists) constitutional structures on a coherent theo-
retical basis that would provide a consistent justification for structural and institutional 
choices made by a given constitutional system. In short, they aimed for normative con-
tent and thus transformed the separation of powers into a formative concept for mod-
ern constitutions and a tool for the resolution of practical conflicts among the three 
powers. Even though Montesquieu has been heavily criticised since, especially by his-
torians, his formulation of the theory of the separation of powers has been highly in-
fluential, in particular with regard to the role of the judiciary.50 
This Chapter will explore how Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists have conceptu-
alised the separation of powers, how they integrated it into their overarching frame-
work of a social contract (Locke), a system of mixed constitution (Montesquieu) and a 
written constitution (Federalists). In light of the overarching theme of the thesis, par-
ticular attention will be given to the construction of the relationship between the ex-
ecutive and the legislative as ‘powers’ and the government and the parliament as ‘in-
stitutions’ respectively.  
A. John Locke’s bi-polar model 
In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke created a theoretical foundation for a sys-
tem of lawful government by using the social contract as a framework and the notion 
of liberty as an anchor.51 He argued that humans formed communities to escape the 
state of ‘nature’ – a state in which every man had complete freedom but was also lia-
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ble to be attacked by other free men at any given moment.52 Therefore, men consent-
ed to give up their freedom to create a more secure way of living together peacefully, 
in Locke’s words to protect their ‘… lives, liberties and […] property…’.53 To Locke, this 
was the most important purpose of the social contract made between the people and 
the ruler and the consent of the governed was both the foundation and the limit of the 
ruler’s powers.54 As a consequence, Locke’s ruler never was absolute, but from the 
very beginning limited and directed in the use of the power transferred to him by the 
people: all the measures furthering this stated aim were legitimate; those that did not 
had to be considered as an abuse of the trust of the people.55 Due to weaknesses of 
human nature, he considered such an abuse not unlikely56 which led him to the con-
clusion that a state’s power needed to be divided so that legislative and executive 
powers were not held by the same body.57  
This construction was in stark contrast to Hobbes’s absolutist approach where all exer-
cise of state power was deemed legitimate per se.58 To Locke, separation of the vari-
ous state powers served as a means to a clear end: if all state power were concentrat-
ed in one hand or in one institution, then no one would have the power to control its 
use or prevent abuse, i.e. make sure that the state’s institutions acted to realise the 
social contract, fulfil the very reason they were created for.59  
Locke differentiated four powers: the legislative, the executive, the federative and the 
prerogative power.60 The judiciary was not separated out, but an element of the exec-
utive power to enforce the laws of the land.61 Following the differentiation developed 
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by John Bodin62, Locke distinguished between holding power and exercising it: to him, 
original sovereignty lay with the people and was considered to be indivisible and inal-
ienable. The people then transferred its exercise to another entity which became the 
legislative, ranking supreme among all government powers.63 This constituted legisla-
tive could not transfer its power on to another body and neither was any other power 
allowed to usurp it.64 The recipient of this supreme power could be an individual, a 
group of people or everyone – the people were free to choose whichever entity they 
preferred. As such, Locke was open to all possible combinations within the framework 
of the traditional system of mixed constitution, except that he rejected any form of ab-
solutist government – be it by an individual or the people – as it would not necessarily 
be conducive to safeguarding the aims of the social contract as it allowed for limited 
control options.65 In his opinion, a constitutional monarchy would be the best option. 
In a system where legislative power was jointly held by the representatives of the peo-
ple and an individual (the monarch), both parties would have the power to veto the ac-
tions of the other and thus have a means for control.66  
Through the act of appointing the legislative, the people had exercised their freedom 
and had provided their consent to be subjected to the rules decided on by this body. In 
turn, the institution being appointed and thus receiving their power had a duty to work 
for the public good and to ensure that the members of the society did not end up in a 
worse state than they would have been in a state of nature.67 At the same time, there 
were no systemic limitations on the legislative’s power as it was derived directly from 
the members of the society.68 Therefore Locke strongly recommended to make it a 
non-permanent body and considered it to have the obligation to dissolve itself once it 
had enacted the statutes required by the executive.69 If allowed to be in session on a 
permanent basis, the members could potentially develop into a separate ‘society’ 
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whose interests were no longer aligned with the rest of it and who would thus be liable 
to act for its good rather than that of the society they originated from.70  
In contrast, the executive was meant to be in session permanently as statutes needed 
executing on a permanent basis. To Locke, this was the main reason that the executive 
and the legislative needed to be separated as only then a permanent government 
could be set in place.71 
In keeping with his belief in the weakness of human nature, Locke introduced various 
mechanisms for interaction between the legislative and the executive power in order 
to prevent abuses of power. In the first instance, he saw the executive subjected to a 
systemic limitation in the sense that it needed statutes to execute. This created the 
need for cooperation with the legislative and thus an element of mutual control. Com-
plementary to the duty of the legislative to dissolve itself, he suggested that the execu-
tive should be provided with the right to assemble and dissolve the legislative. This was 
meant to ensure that it was only convened if and when needed. However, he hastened 
to add that this right of the executive was not meant to be discretionary but had to be 
exercised for the public good so as to avoid a subordination of the legislative to the ex-
ecutive.72 In turn, the legislative was called upon to control the executive and its im-
plementation of the statutes. In case it found the performance of the executive to be 
lacking, the legislative could go as far as to dismiss the executive entirely and thus pun-
ish it for ‘mal-administration’.73  
In addition to the above, Locke separated out what he labelled the federative power 
which were the powers relating to Foreign Affairs and allocated to the monarch, i.e. 
the executive in his preferred model of a constitutional monarchy. Interestingly, Locke 
assumed that in this area, the legislative should have far less influence and far fewer 
control options due to the different nature of Foreign Affairs.74  
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The prerogative power was the fourth power identified by Locke and another one 
which he allocated to the executive. It referred to the right of the monarch to act 
without statutory basis for the public good.75 This could be necessary in cases where 
the legislative would be too slow to assemble or where the application of the law 
needed moderation to ensure justice was served. This power provided the monarch 
with a great deal of discretion and moreover, was ‘never questioned’.76 In case of 
abuse, the only available remedy was an ‘appeal to Heaven’ as there could be no judge 
on earth to rule on such a case.77 At the same time, the legislative could create laws 
that would regulate the use of the prerogative in specific cases.78  
B. Montesquieu: focus on executive and legislative 
Montesquieu is generally credited79 with providing the classic account of the separa-
tion of powers that divides the state’s sovereign powers horizontally into executive, 
legislative and judiciary. Like Locke, he considered the crucial purpose of this separa-
tion to be the protection of the political liberty of the people which he defined as the 
power to behave as one may want within the framework of the law, i.e. to be protect-
ed from being subjugated to someone else’s will.80 To him, this liberty did not simply 
exist in the absence of any abuse of power. Therefore, a constitutional system should 
be designed in such a fashion that it would actively promote liberty, not just prevent 
abuse. As he agreed with Locke that human beings had an innate tendency to abuse 
power given to them, he required the constitutional framework to ensure that the var-
ious powers were able to keep each other in check: ‘…que le pouvoir arête the pou-
voir…’81. Only by dividing up the state’s power and organizing it in a way that required 
cooperation among the created institutions as well as allowed for mutual control, 
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Montesquieu concluded, could the political liberty of the people be protected. While 
e.g. Locke or Rousseau posited a hierarchical relationship among the powers with the 
legislative at the top82, Montesquieu constructed them to be at the same level: each 
power held only some of the sovereign rights within the state, so all powers had to co-
operate with each other in order to create one coherent whole.83  
In contrast to Locke, Montesquieu based his theory less on philosophical considera-
tions but rather on the empirical and sociological context of the law, in particular the 
class system. He acknowledged the very real power of these social forces (the people, 
the nobility and the monarch) and the fact that without due consideration of their re-
spective interests, no constitutional framework would be able to function successful-
ly.84 Hence, he integrated these social forces into his model in such a way that they 
would end up controlling each other through the political process but were at the 
same time dependent on each other for the realisation and protection of their inter-
ests.85 He considered the interests of each individual class as ‘naturally’ unaligned or 
even in opposition to those of the other two. By incorporating that social tension into 
the constitutional framework, he aimed to ensure that the various institutions did not 
only have the social standing to stand up to each other but also the political will to do 
so.86 Montesquieu stressed that a key element of an effective system of separated 
powers was that the membership of the institutions they represented was also kept 
strictly separate in order to maintain the tension between the classes. In contrast, the 
functions, e.g. legislating, were deliberately allocated to more than one institution, and 
thus more than one social class, to enable mutual control. Only if the interests of more 
than one class could be reconciled, would the act of legislating be successful. 87 
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According to Montesquieu, those powers were the legislative as the prince’s power to 
make laws, the executive as ‘it related to the rights of nations’ which included i.a the 
Prince’s power to make peace or war, and the executive ‘as it related to civil law’ 
which was a Prince’s power to punish crimes and adjudicate conflicts. That latter, 
Montesquieu decided to refer to as the judiciary.88 These powers were the ones that 
needed to be kept separate in order to achieve political liberty. He posited that if even 
only two of those powers were to combine in one hand – and any two would do - liber-
ty would be under threat. For example, a combination of the legislative power with the 
executive or judicial power would result in the executive or the judges being able to 
pass and enforce any and all statutes they desired to have. Combining the executive 
and the judiciary would lead to the judges becoming persecutors or the monarch per-
secuting his opponents by wilfully applying the statutes given to him by the legislative 
without the latter being able to control the application. Combining all three in one 
hand or one institution would lead to utter despotism with the individuals at the mercy 
of the ruler.89  
He allocated the legislative power to the people – or its representatives – so that it 
would be able to govern itself. Thus, it should be the one vested with the power to 
make laws applicable to everyone and to supervise their implementation by the execu-
tive.90 It consisted of two chambers, one for the representatives of the commoners 
and one for those of the nobility, thus importing the tension between the two classes 
into the constitutional context where either chamber could exercise a restraining in-
fluence on the other during the legislative process.91  
Like Locke, Montesquieu considered the legislative to be the greater threat to the 
people’s liberty due to its unlimited power. Therefore the parliament was not to be 
convened on a permanent basis but rather if and as necessary. A non-permanent as-
sembly would also relieve the executive from the pressure of having to defend itself 
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against attempts of the legislative to interfere with its rights.92 In addition to this, the 
legislative had no right to convene itself as that would allow it to undermine its non-
permanent character. Montesquieu left this at the discretion of the executive who 
would know best if and when the legislative needed to convene.93  
As for the executive power, it should rest with one person, rather than a group of peo-
ple or the people as a whole. This was based on the more practical reason that one 
person would be more efficient at executing statutes, but also the result of Montes-
quieu’s insistence that the members of the institutions be kept completely separated 
along class lines: he argued that drawing on the people itself or the members of the 
legislative to create the executive would put legislative and executive powers into the 
same hands and thus lead to tyranny.94 The executive was charged with the execution 
of statutes independently from the legislative. The latter was allowed to control the 
execution after the fact but not to interfere with the daily running of affairs. To ensure 
that this remained the case, the executive had several options to defend itself against 
usurpation by the legislative. In addition to the power to assemble and dissolve par-
liament (cf. above), the executive, unlike the legislative, was to be in office permanent-
ly in order to effectively implement the statutes. But since its power was ‘naturally’ 
limited due to its dependence on those statutes, the legislative still had a measure of 
influence over its activities. Thus, Montesquieu reasoned, it did not leave the executive 
out of control. Moreover, the executive was allocated a negative veto in the legislating 
process meant to enable it to stop statutes that aimed to interfere with its rights. 
Overall, these mechanisms were to create a system of mutual control between the leg-
islative and the executive: the latter needed statutes as a basis for its actions and the 
former was controlled by the executive as it could not pass statues against the latter’s 
veto.95  
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In contrast to Locke, Montesquieu explicitly separated out the judiciary from the exec-
utive and stressed the need to regulate it, given its profound impact on people’s 
lives.96 He aimed at deliberately minimizing its impact – to paraphrase a famous quote: 
he made it ‘null’ so that it could not become a tool for oppression.97 The judges for the 
ordinary courts were to be drawn from the people and they should not be in session 
on a permanent basis, but only for as long as was necessary for the case. That way, the 
judiciary would be rendered more or less ‘invisible’ so that the people did not end up 
fearing the person of individual judge, but rather the punishment as such.98 Moreover, 
Montesquieu allocated jurisdiction over specific issues to the nobility’s chamber in par-
liament, i.e. away from the ordinary courts: for trials against nobles, cases where the 
application of the statutes needed to be moderated to ensure it was not too rigid and 
cases concerning crimes against the people’s rights committed by public officials.99 As 
a result, the membership of the judiciary reached across classes and was at the same 
time class-focused in terms of its function: the ordinary courts would try the common 
people, the nobility would try its peers and the monarch remained sacrosanct.100  
The resulting constitutional framework, Montesquieu concluded, should be one where 
the separated powers are forced to coordinate their activities and to cooperate in or-
der to accomplish affairs of state and thus create a constitutional framework suited to 
realising and protecting the citizens’ political liberty.101  
C. The Federalist papers: the rise of the judiciary 
In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay provided a 
detailed commentary on the draft for the then new US Federal constitution. The au-
thors not only countered the arguments offered against the draft especially by the so 
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called anti-Federalists,102 but also explained in great detail the theoretical concepts 
underlying the draft and arguments in favour of the solutions adopted. One of the 
greatest challenges for the Federalists in this respect was that the revolution had 
seemingly swept away a large number of the foundations of the very concepts they in-
tended to rely on, in particular the replacement of the class-based system of mixed 
constitutions by a seemingly monolithic group of ‘one’ people and the rising emphasis 
on ideas like democracy and the rule of law in the wake of written constitutions.103 As 
a consequence, the social and the political sphere had become separated and needed 
to be reconnected.104 Thus, the Federalists faced considerable theoretical difficulties as 
they aimed to adapt existing concepts to their hitherto unheard of circumstances. 
Their insightful discussions resulted in the Federalist Papers becoming one of the most 
ground-breaking works of American political theory and are considered essential for 
the interpretation of the US American Constitution to this day.105 
Letters 47-51, written by James Madison, focus on the separation of powers as a theo-
ry. Read in conjunction with the letters on the individual powers106 and those on fac-
tions,107 they illustrate that the Federalists considered the entire constitutional frame-
work as being constructed around that concept – a theory they saw as an ‘essential 
precaution in favor of liberty.’108 Despite the fundamental changes that had occurred in 
society and related to the very tenets of the separation of powers doctrine, Madison 
still considered it a crucial element of a constitutional system and any constitutional 
framework that did not adhere to this maxim could only be called tyrannical.109 To him, 
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the critics had misunderstood Montesquieu if they assumed that he had intended a 
complete and total separation of the state’s powers. He had used the British Constitu-
tion as the template, and since it clearly did not adhere to such a strict separation, his 
model could not possibly require it either. However, while a partial overlap could be 
acceptable, a total overlap between two or three of the powers would not be. Madison 
then clarified how this would be implemented into the US Constitution: it would allow 
for cooperation among the three powers as long as each power involved was prevent-
ed from usurping one or both of the other powers in their entirety. The separate pow-
ers would each be able to veto essential activities of the other powers and thus create 
a system of checks and balances were no one single power would be able to gain a 
dominant influence in one particular area, as realised for example in the presidential 
veto against legislative bills or the requirement for senate approval for judicial ap-
pointments by the president.110 
Overall, he considered the crucial question to be how one could ‘maintain [] in practice 
the separation delineated on paper’.111 In particular the legislative was deemed in need 
of being controlled as it had a tendency to expand its reach into the remit of the other 
powers112 and based on practical experience drawn from the states of the Union so far, 
one needed more than a paper outlining the limits of each power to ensure that no 
usurpation would happen in practice.113 Like Montesquieu, he came to the conclusion 
that the very structure of the constitutional framework itself had to provide the neces-
sary means for mutual control so that the powers divided on paper did actually stay 
separate in practice.114 Here, however, Madison was faced with an obstacle: Montes-
quieu had achieved such control by relying on the very class system the revolutionaries 
had just abolished. Instead of the people, the nobility and the monarch who would 
balance each other due to their ‘naturally opposing interests’, there was now only one 
group – the ‘people’ – to supply the personnel for all three powers. However, there 
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was still some common ground: like Locke and Montesquieu, the Federalists were con-
vinced of the inherent fallibility of human nature: 
‘… But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers 
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each depart-
ment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroach-
ments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be 
made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counter-
act ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place. …’115 
By deliberately promoting rivalling interests and tension among the members of the 
various ‘departments’, Madison aimed to ensure that each would control the other at 
least for their own gain, if they did not do so for the public good. There would always 
be rivalling factions in society since the abolition of the class system would never lead 
to a removal of any and all differences among the people.116 In the context of the con-
stitution, this factionalism could be very useful as it provided the necessary tension 
among the powers. Indeed, the greater the diversity of the various political factions in 
the population, the better for the political process and thus for the protection of the 
freedom of people, especially the minority.117  
 
After settling this matter of principle, the authors reviewed the overall set-up and the 
relationship of the powers as created by the proposed constitution in detail. The legis-
lative was to consist of a two-house Parliament comprising representatives of the 
people (House of Representative) and of each state (Senate). This division would lead 
to each house relating its mandate back to a different ‘constituency’ and a different 
election process, providing them with an independent power base and thus independ-
ent political standing within the constitutional framework. Also, by having the states 
form part of the federal legislative, the set-up mirrored Montesquieu’s split legislative 
by pitting groups with potentially opposing interests against each other within one 
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function. Hamilton assumed that the natural dissention existing among the members 
even within each house would be an advantage as it prevented them from colluding 
with each other to reach agreements serving their own interests.118 Where the pro-
posed constitution followed Montesquieu’s model very closely was the strict separa-
tion of personnel: members of the legislative were precluded from being members of 
the executive and vice versa. And like Locke and Montesquieu, the Federalists consid-
ered the legislative the power most in need of being controlled. As will be shown be-
low, both the executive and the judiciary were provided with the means to provide 
that control, sometimes in a very confrontational fashion. 
The executive was allocated to one person, an elected president with a limited term of 
office to prevent abuse of power. He was allowed ‘assistants or deputies’ for the ad-
ministration of government, but they were wholly dependent on him.119 This prima fa-
cie rather monarchical set-up was considered justified as one person was not only far 
more efficient but also far easier to control as responsibilities were clear.120 Among his 
various powers was to be a veto against bills passed by the legislative. As Hamilton 
hastened to clarify, this was not an absolute veto, but a qualified one – the president 
could only send bills back for reconsideration, he could not stop them permanently.121 
However, considering that such a veto had to be overcome with a two-thirds majority 
in both houses, it could in practice have the same effect as an absolute veto. Hamilton 
considered it necessary for the president to have this right so that he would be able to 
defend the executive against attempts at usurpation by the legislative by way of 
changes in legislation and to stop statutes that would violate the constitution.122 In 
turn, the executive was dependent on the cooperation of part of the legislative, specif-
ically the Senate, in two areas: the appointment of i.a. Supreme Court judges was sub-
ject to its consent and the ratification of international treaties required a two-thirds 
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majority.123 That way, crucial activities of the executive that could potentially have a 
major impact on the people were made subject to the control of another power.  
A distinct difference to both Locke and Montesquieu is the construction of the judici-
ary: it is established very much as an equal to the other two powers, just as strong as 
the legislative or the executive. This rise of the judiciary was seen a natural conse-
quence of a system of government using a written constitution as its foundation. As 
that constitution set out the rules as agreed by the people, it bound in particular the 
legislative and executive.124 While Locke and Montesquieu had relied on those two 
powers to keep each other in check, the Federalists gave this task also to the judiciary 
– and thus introduced for the first time the notion that the solution to a conflict should 
not be a political compromise but a solution based on an objective standard in the 
guise of the constitution. Hamilton countered the severe criticisms by arguing that 
firstly to allocate the power to review statutes to the legislative would make them 
judges in their own cause and that secondly it was after all the ‘natural province’ of 
judges to interpret laws. Therefore, they should have jurisdiction to interpret also the 
constitution and to be able to check ordinary statutes for their compliance.125 This was 
not seen as setting up the judiciary to be superior to the other two powers but rather 
to ensure that the other two respected the will of the people as expressed in the con-
stitution. Like Locke and Montesquieu, the Federalists clearly distinguished between 
the original power of the people and the power of the institutions created based on 
their will: the people had created the constitution, the institutions created by it only 
possessed ‘delegated’ authority. Hence, any act issued by them that was contrary to 
the constitution was automatically void.126 Thus, in order to preserve and protect the 
will of the people as embodied in the constitution, the judges of the Supreme Court 
had not only the last word on the interpretation of the constitution, they also had the 
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right to repeal any and all legislative or executive action violating the constitution, 
which could concern the institutional set-up as well as unjust laws.127  
D. From social contract to constitution: a successful transition 
As indicated in the introduction, the purpose of this Chapter is to draw out the threads 
that connect the ‘classic’ rendition of the separation of powers by Locke, Montesquieu 
and the Federalists with the 19th and 20th century German tradition (Chapter II).  
If one looks for common base lines or rules to draw from those writings that will allow 
one to pin down the specific content of the theory, one will find surprisingly few. They 
can be summed up with the need for 1) separation of, and 2) cooperation among the 
powers.128 This means that the separated powers needed to be independent (enough) 
from each other so that they may be strong (enough) to defend their position against 
attempts at usurpation by the other two powers. At the same time, all three sets of 
writings emphasize that separating out the powers is not going to achieve effective 
control all by itself. Therefore, the second requirement - the need for cooperation – re-
fers to the need to ensure that each power can contribute to controlling the other two, 
either by providing a crucial element to activities of the other powers or by being pro-
vided with options to prevent certain actions of the other powers.  
However, practical problems start if one tries to implement these ‘simple’ criteria into 
a constitutional system due to the fact that there is great terminological confusion as 
to what ‘power’ actually refers to. As Vile has pointed out, that term has been used to 
refer to i.a.  
“… the possession of the ability through force or persuasion to attain certain 
ends, the legal authority to do certain acts, the “function” of legislating, executing, 
or judging, the agencies or branches of government, or the persons who compose 
these agencies. …”129 
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For modern constitutionalist states, one could add to that list the responsibility for cer-
tain policy areas or tasks that do not fit into the neat tripartite division of legislating, 
executing or judging, strictly speaking – for example Foreign Affairs, as will be explored 
later. 
If one considers the three sets of writings outlined above, what they insist on separat-
ing appears to be the ‘legal authority’ to do certain acts: in Locke’s model, the people 
create the social contract expressing their authority to determine their life, that au-
thority is then transferred to the legislative as an institution; Montesquieu expressly 
defines the legislative power as the power of the “Prince or the magistrate [to make] 
laws for a time of always and correct or abrogate those that have been made”130; and 
to Madison, similarly to Locke, the creation of the “three great departments of pow-
er”131 is based on the constitution as an expression of the supreme will of the people. 
However, all three authors then proceed to connect the authority to act in a specific 
way to specific ‘agencies’ – or institutions – and their personnel: the legislative is con-
nected to the parliament, the executive is connected to the monarch/ president and 
his advisers (a.k.a. the ‘government’) and the judiciary is connected to the courts and 
judges. Those institutions in turn are connected to a specific way of acting: the legisla-
tive acts by way of statute, the executive by way of individual decisions and the judici-
ary by way of Court decisions.  
This is where the actual separation comes to the fore: what all three writers very much 
insist on keeping separate are the institutions and their members. Montesquieu in par-
ticular is very insistent on the fact that membership of either house of parliament and 
of the executive may not overlap. In that sense, one could argue that for Montesquieu, 
‘power’ equates to social power, i.e. the classes.132 Even though Locke and the Federal-
ists focus more on the separation of the institutions, they also conclude that member-
ship may not overlap. The reasons for this are twofold: for Montesquieu, this would 
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undermine his class-based mechanism for mutual control among the powers as it 
would lead to the representation of class interests becoming fragmented. The other 
reason is that all three writings allocate a different basis for legitimacy to each institu-
tion. For the Federalists, for example, the Congress and the president are the result of 
two separate acts of election, i.e. derived from a different constituency. For both Locke 
and Montesquieu, each class has a different method of choosing its representatives – 
elections for the members of the Commons, hereditary succession for the mobility and 
the monarch, temporary nomination for the judges.133  
In contrast, none of them seem to equate ‘power’ with ‘function’. Quite the opposite 
in fact: all of them deliberately require that the function of ‘legislating’ is shared be-
tween the legislative and the executive, either by way of joint decision-making (Locke, 
Montesquieu) or by providing one power with a veto to block the activities of the oth-
er (Federalists).134 The result of those shared activities is still a statute, something only 
the ‘legislative’ is able to create. One may tentatively conclude that ‘functions’ seem to 
be allocated as a core activity to one specific institution and its personnel who has the 
authority to act in a specific way, while the activities comprising that ‘function’ may be 
shared. In other words: the ‘function’ legislating is the core activity of the institution 
‘parliament’ who has the legal authority to act by way of statute – hence, it is referred 
to as the ‘legislative’. It is submitted in conclusion that the term ‘power’ is taken to 
have been understood by Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists as referring to the 
‘legal authority’ to do certain acts. This will be important to take forward into Chapter 
II to compare it to the 19th and 20th century German tradition. 
An area where all three writings agree is the justification for introducing the separa-
tion of powers into a constitutional system. Even though the phrasing varies slightly, 
overall, they aim for the same: to protect the rights and political liberty of the individ-
ual members of society from potential abuse by the powerful ruler or instituted pow-
ers respectively of their state. Interestingly, this threat is considered to come primarily 
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not from the monarch or the executive – after all, it had been ‘tamed’ by the introduc-
tion of the separation of powers in the first place. Instead, the power that is now 
feared is the legislative. After providing it with (supreme) authority from the people, all 
authors hastened to point out that due to the unspecified remit of the legislative’s 
competences, it was the likeliest candidate for expanding its powers beyond what was 
acceptable and thus had to be under strict control by either the executive or the judi-
ciary.  
With regard to the relationship between the legislative and the executive, the differ-
ent nature of the control mechanisms stands out. The legislative controls the executive 
mainly through her ‘product’, i.e. the need of the executive to act based on statutes. 
The executive on the other hand controls the legislative mainly through procedural 
mechanisms: its right to convene and dissolve the legislative and especially its veto. 
With the Federalists, this changes considerably: they highlight that the only tool left to 
the executive is the veto. Congress decides itself on the timing, duration, etc. of its ses-
sions. Overall, this means that the legislative is mostly relegated to an ex post control 
with no right to interfere in the daily business of the executive. At the same time, all 
models allow for the removal of an executive that does not fulfil its duties, in the case 
of the Federalists through the very obvious method of regular elections. And even 
though Montesquieu’s monarch is sacrosanct, his ministers are not, and they can be 
tried before the nobility’s chamber.135  
Incidentally, both Montesquieu and the Federalists favour a model where the tension 
used for effective control plays out within the legislative136, not merely between the 
legislative and the executive, by deliberately choosing to have different classes (Mon-
tesquieu) or nation-wide and regional representation (Federalists) confront each oth-
er.137 While one may argue that this creates the risk of a deadlock if the interests of 
those two groupings on one particular issue are truly in opposition, it is in fact true to 
the spirit of the separation of powers: if the two houses do not agree and thus the bill 
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never becomes law, the state will be without a statute to execute and thus unable to 
restrict the people’s liberty on this particular issue.  
One particular area all authors consider of paramount importance in this context is the 
budget.138 Levying taxes without the consent of the parliament or granting too far-
sweeping an authorisation to the executive is seen as tantamount to losing control of 
the ‘purse strings’ and all practical control over the executive and thus to losing all lib-
erty.139 In short, budgetary control was the legislative’s most important right. This very 
powerful position is counteracted in Locke’s and Montesquieu’s model by the right of 
the executive to convene and dissolve the legislative. To Montesquieu, this was an ex-
ample for how the need for cooperation could be practically enforced: even though he 
posited that the executive enjoyed discretion as to when and how often the legislative 
was to convene, he considered it the executive’s duty to convene the legislative on a 
regular basis, at least once a year, to decide on the budget.140  
Lastly, the changes regarding the status and nature of Foreign Affairs should be high-
lighted. Interestingly, both Locke and Montesquieu singled it out not merely as a task 
or a policy area allocated to one of the powers, but as a separate ‘power’ allocated 
specifically to the executive – Locke calls it the ‘federative’ power, Montesquieu the 
executive power ‘regarding the rights of nations’. Locke expressly posited that much 
less supervision by, and overall participation of, the legislative was expected or even 
possible in this context.141 He saw this as a natural consequence of the social contract: 
its strictures could only apply to its members, i.e. on the ‘inside’. The ‘outside’ was not 
subject to the rules agreed by the members of a particular society and thus not bound 
by them. In order to deal with these outsiders, the executive needed more room to 
manoeuvre in order to protect the interests of those people who had concluded the 
social contract in order to protect their liberty.142 Therefore, it was given the power to 
declare war or peace and to command the armed forces. Beyond that, both Locke and 
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Montesquieu were silent on the matter as if the separation of powers were only an is-
sue for the regulation for the interaction of the institutions on the ‘inside’. In particu-
lar, the references to the legislative’s supervision rights only referred to ‘statutes’ and 
not to ‘treaties’.  
In contrast, the Federalists labelled as ‘powers’ only those within the domestic system. 
They conceptualised the competence to handle Foreign Affairs as a ‘task’ which had to 
be carried out by one or more of the ‘powers’.143 They found it surprisingly difficult to 
allocate Foreign Affairs to any one power and ended up allocating it to the executive 
and part of the legislative: as mentioned above, the draft constitution provided that 
the executive needed the approval of two thirds of the Senate for the ratification of 
treaties. In defending this solution, the Federalists referred to the hybrid nature of 
Foreign Affairs: the executive would be best suited to handle the negotiations, but the 
legislative needed to be involved due to the potential impact on the lives of the peo-
ple.144  
E. Conclusion  
The outlines provided above illustrate the development the theory of the separation of 
powers has undergone from Locke to the Federalist Papers. While Locke still argued on 
the basis of a social contract as the key reference point for the will of the people, the 
Federalists saw it embodied in a written constitution. Locke’s concept of the separa-
tion of powers introduced a crucial element into the debate – separating the state’s 
powers and providing each power with individual competences and influence so that 
all needed each other’s cooperation to be able to function properly.145 He aimed to 
create a balanced system of government by dividing power and creating interdepend-
encies and control mechanisms between the powers in addition to the limits stemming 
from the social contract. Montesquieu is often both heralded for having developed the 
classic account of the horizontal the separation of powers and criticised for basing his 
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model on a rather skewed version of the English constitutional system of the time.146 
Either way, compared to Locke’s model, his conceptualisation represented a qualita-
tive step forward towards a system of democratic governance and proved inspirational 
not only to the drafters of the U.S. American Constitution.  
 
The Federalists represent another step toward the tripartite model favoured by pre-
sent-day constitutions. They provided the judiciary with an equal footing vis-à-vis the 
legislative and the executive. They also adapted the theory to a major shift in the fac-
tual, social, political and legal framework within which it operated: the move away 
from a monarchical state conceptualised through a social contract and determined by 
a class system towards a society nominally without classes and founded by a constitu-
tion. To them, the crucial point was that despite those changes the very heart of the 
theory had not changed: it was still an ‘essential precaution in favor of liberty’147 and in 
order for it to fulfil that purpose, the Federalists had the constitution stand as the em-
bodiment of the people’s will which – similar to Locke’s social contract – provided very 
tangible limits to the actions of the institutions. Together with the powers of judicial 
review, this approach paved the way towards present-day constitutional systems of 
government where the ‘people’ are ‘citizens’, where the ‘governed’ have become ac-
tive participants in the political process.148 By putting forward persuasive arguments as 
to why citizens should have the power to challenge decisions made by their own gov-
ernment, the Federalists provided an alternative means to control the political process 
and the institutions in it and thus allowed the system of checks and balances to reach 
beyond the constitutional and political sphere into society.149  
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What should be taken forward from this Chapter for the exploration of the 19th and 
20th century German tradition are firstly the two fundamental criteria for a system of 
the separation of powers: separation and cooperation of ‘powers’; secondly, the varie-
ty of connotations that the term ‘power’ may encompass; thirdly, whether the authors 
continue to see liberty as the foundation and justification for the implementation of a 
system of the separation of powers; and lastly, how the authors conceptualised the re-
lationship between the legislative and the executive, in particular with regard to the 
budget and Foreign Affairs, should they offer such clarification. 
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CHAPTER II: The German tradition: the separation of powers as 
‘Ordnungsidee’ 
As could be seen in the previous Chapter, the transition from Locke and Montesquieu 
to the Federalists was in many ways less radical than one may have expected consider-
ing the substantial change to the political and social framework within which the sepa-
ration of powers operated. In contrast, the reception of the theory by German scholars 
in the 19th century and the early 20th century could be described as conflicted. It was 
informed by four circumstances already existing, or developing in parallel to, the re-
ception of the separation of powers, namely the traditional distinction between ‘state 
law’ and ‘constitutional law’; the achievement of German national unity; the rise of the 
rule of law and a fundamental shift in methodology towards positivism. 
In the German public law tradition, one distinguishes between Staatsrecht/ 'state law' 
and Verfassungsrecht/ constitutional law. This is largely due to the fact that, in the 
German context, the ‘state’ as a separate entity from society was recognised before 
the advent of constitutions in the legal system. Therefore, scholars focused on that ra-
ther than the nature and role of constitutions, sovereignty or ‘the people’: 
“… the state produced the articles of the Constitution and statutory law but the 
former were logically no 'higher' or better protected than the latter. […] State pow-
er was pre-constitutional that was only limited, and not constituted, by law. (em-
phasis added) […] This explains why Imperial Staatsrecht had […] no theory of the 
primacy of the constitution…”150 
In other words, the ‘subject’ of research was not a constitution and its effect on the le-
gal system but rather the conceptualisation of the ‘state’. This provided a different 
perspective for the reception of the separation of powers in the sense that the consti-
tution was merely seen as a limitation to the state’s pre-existing powers instead of the 
constitutive foundation of the state’s powers in the first place.151 The perception that 
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the existence of the state was the foundation of the monarch's rights persisted until 
1949. Only with adoption of the Grundgesetz, it was the constitution that was seen as 
– quite literally – constituting the legal foundation of the state.152  
This fixation on the concept of the ‘state’ may have been due in part to the fact that a 
state called ‘Germany’ did not exist for most of the 19th century. After the collapse of 
the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, there were merely numerous principalities, cities and 
countries – until national unity was finally achieved in 1871 with the foundation of the 
German Empire. However, there was a strong popular movement for national unity, so 
any theory that would endanger the realisation of that goal or threatened to reverse 
the process once that unity was achieved could hardly be looked on favourably.  
The pursuit of national unity favoured a focus on concepts like absolute (monarchical) 
and the people's sovereignty. Moreover, German state law scholars had embraced 
Bodin's theory of unified absolute sovereignty. According to the previously dominant 
mediaeval tradition, a state's 'power' was in actual fact a bundle of sovereign rights.153 
To consider dividing those rights up among several bearers would not have been prob-
lematic from a conceptual perspective. However, once the idea of a unified, single 
'sovereignty' had been accepted, it seemed counterintuitive to attempt to divide it up 
again. Critics put forward that an actual distribution of the state's power to several in-
dependent bearers was bound to lead to the state tearing itself apart due to power 
struggles among those bearers. Hence, they put forward the assumption that there 
was only one 'power' which was exercised in three different ways ('functions') and 
those were allocated to institutions which were suitable to exercise them.154 
After the failed revolution of 1848, a timely implementation of a democratic system of 
government in a united German state seemed unlikely. As a reaction, German 
state/constitutional lawyers turned to the idea of a state bound by the rule of law, the 
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Rechtsstaat and the role of the courts in this context. The term ‘rule of law’ is used 
here not in reference to a specific legal concept, but rather in a more literal sense as 
the basic idea that state power is meant to be subject to rules that are intended to 
bind everyone equally, including the government.155 Over the course of the 19th centu-
ry, German scholars develop this notion into a fully-fledged justification for a compre-
hensive system of judicial review were all state action that interfered with rights of the 
citizens – as far as they were recognised – was deemed to need a statutory basis and 
where the interpretation and application of those statutes was subject to a full review 
by the courts. Thus, the notion of the Rechtsstaat developed into a powerful tool for 
the regulation of the activities of the state’s institutions.156 At the same time, it was 
still a formalistic view – any activity of the executive not regulated by statute was not 
subject to judicial review and thus favoured the traditional allocation of responsibilities 
to the executive.157  
 
The methodological shift towards positivism occurred slowly over the course of the 
19th century. Up to the end of the 18th century, research and teaching relating to the 
'state' was by no means limited to the legal appreciation of its nature, its institutions, 
functions or structure. It also encompassed the exploration of its philosophical, politi-
cal and historical roots and the analysis of the reality of state and society.158 Over the 
course of the 19th century, however, this multidisciplinary approach was rejected and 
all non-legal considerations excluded. This move towards legal positivism established 
'state law' as an autonomous academic, purely legal discipline159 and reached its cul-
mination with Kelsen's pure theory of law.160  
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At the beginning of the 20th century, however, this newly designed legal discipline was 
considered to be in crisis:  "… The political neutralisation of constitutional law, that was 
after all the outcome of political will and determination, could only lead to its fossilisa-
tion …"161 Critics put forward that state law conceived in a purely legal way could not 
account for the phenomenon of the 'state' in its complex reality and that the very ele-
ments that had been stripped from it, namely i.a. political sciences, sociology, history 
and comparative law, were necessary for a meaningful analysis.162 Moreover, the de-
velopments up to the First World War put serious pressure on the mainstream opinion 
as the practical importance of the national parliament and the changing role of politi-
cal parties within the constitutional system outgrew the role they had been assigned 
by those theories.163 The tension between the theory and the political reality led to the 
development of new theories and the reconsideration of the complete separation of 
legal sciences in general and state/ constitutional law in particular from social and po-
litical sciences. This led straight into the so-called ‘controversy over methodology and 
objectives’ that was the defining feature of state/ constitutional theory in the Weimar 
Republic (cf. below Section B).164 
The combined effect of the four characteristics sketched out above on the reception of 
the separation of powers resulted in the theory being transformed into what among 
German lawyers is referred to as a so-called ‘Ordnungsidee’:  
“… a [legal] concept […] which should, time and again in a larger context, con-
tribute towards ensuring a continuous course of development and adequacy of sys-
tematization among different legal institutions. …”165  
In other words, the separation of powers came to be perceived very much as an organ-
isational principle, threaded through, and underlying, a constitutional system – a prin-
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ciple meant to ensure efficiency of the institutional organisation of the state and of the 
exercise of its power.166 With that transformation, it lost the purpose that Locke, Mon-
tesquieu and the Federalists had ascribed to it – to be an indispensable means to en-
sure the liberty of the individual citizen.  
Bearing in mind the above historical context, this Chapter will now explore how the 
separation of powers was received and conceptualised by German scholars in the 19th 
and 20th century. Particular reference will be given to carrying forward the findings 
from the previous Chapter, i.e. to bringing out how the models designed by the schol-
ars realise the two fundamental criteria of ‘separation’ and ‘cooperation’; what defini-
tion the scholars use for the term ‘power’ and how they conceptualise the relationship 
between the legislative and the executive. One of the questions has already been an-
swered: the 19th and 20th century German tradition did no longer focus on liberty as 
the foundation of the separation of powers. Instead, they saw efficiency at the heart of 
the theory’s value for a constitutional system. This Chapter will therefore explore the 
repercussions of such a shift for the conceptualisation of the separation of powers and 
its potential effects within a constitutional system. The investigation in this Chapter 
will proceed in a chronological order, starting with the earliest receptions at the begin-
ning of the 19th century through to the days of the Weimar Republic and present day 
writings. 
A. Reception in the 19th century: The separation of powers as a 
threat to unified sovereignty? 
In order to illustrate how state theorists and constitutional lawyers approached the 
theory of the separation of powers, this Section will look at two scholars that strongly 
influenced later work and whose effect can still be traced in the jurisprudence of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht today.  
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1. Johann Christoph von Aretin: representation of interests 
In his 1824 monograph called ‘Staatsrecht der konstitutionellen Monarchie’ (State law 
in constitutional monarchies), Johann Christoph von Aretin provided a commentary on 
the theory of the separation of powers. He used the model of a social contract in order 
to explain the problems he foresaw if one were to truly separate the sovereign rights 
existing within a state. He posited that with the social contract the people had trans-
ferred all state power to the monarch. Hence, in order for that power to be able to be 
separated, some of it had to have remained with the people since ‘power’ in this con-
text should be deemed as a combination of will and the ‘might’ to enforce one’s will - 
which required independent social powers as illustrated by Montesquieu.167 As a con-
sequence, neither the legislative nor the judiciary (lacking might), nor the executive 
(without independent will) could be considered "powers" for the purposes of Montes-
quieu's theory. In conclusion, Aretin rejected the separation of powers as conceptual-
ised by Locke, Montesquieu or the Federalists as not capable of limiting a monarch's 
power effectively.168  
Returning to the notion of the social contract, he proceeded to outline his approach. 
His starting point was that, with such a contract, people transferred all state power to 
the monarch. The monarch in turn was meant to use that power in order to fulfil the 
purpose the state was created for (Staatszweck): maintaining the government of laws 
and securing safety and liberty. To Aretin, the social contract provided both the foun-
dation as well as an outline of the inherent limits the monarch was subject to. In order 
to implement the element of cooperation effectively, Aretin identified ‘interests’ of the 
monarchy, the nobility and the people, stressing that he did not mean to have them 
simply identified with social powers a.k.a. the classes they took their labels from. In-
stead, he defined them as follows: the monarchy was meant to stand for a strong state 
power and thus for the state as a whole, the nobility for continuity of the policies and 
thus for the continued development of the state and the people stood the democratic 
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interest in terms of the civil and political liberties and thus for the dynamic political el-
ement.169 This list was not exhaustive and should new interests worthy of being repre-
sented be identified, they would be allocated to the group best suited to represent 
them. In this, Aretin rejected Montesquieu's argument that each class could only ever 
represent its own interests which had grown over time. Instead, he created a direct 
link between the characteristics of a particular group of representatives and the inter-
ests they were allocated to represent.170 In other words, the question was no longer 
how well the allocation of a particular task or function would enable that power to 
promote liberty, but rather how ‘efficient’ that power could promote the interests 
(whatever they may be). That provided the separation of powers with a much stronger 
organisational directive than before. 
At first glance, this seems merely to create a system of the separation of powers under 
a different heading – instead of separating sovereign rights, Aretin divided up the exer-
cise of that power in his unique way. Different to Locke, Montesquieu and the Federal-
ists is his understanding that while the possible number of groups of representatives 
may be set at three, the interests each group can represent vary and depend on the 
individual suitability to represent them.171  
2. Immanuel Kant: separation of powers as a question of justice 
Kant built on Aristotle’s division of ‘usual’ state activities172 and postulated that there 
were three functions that a state had to exercise itself in order to be called a ‘state’– 
i.e. if any one of them would be transferred to private individuals, the state would 
cease to be a 'state'. These three functions were the power to rule ('Herrschergewalt'/ 
sovereignty) by way of adopting general rules - the legislative; the power to govern 
('vollziehende Gewalt') in obedience to statute - the executive; and the power to judge 
('rechtsprechende Gewalt') as adjudication to each individual what they were due ac-
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cording to statute - the judiciary.173 Stressing the indivisible nature of sovereignty, Kant 
argued that that each of these three functions represented a facet of the general will 
of the political entity that was the state.  
Kant constructed the relationship among those three functions along the lines of a 
classic philosophical syllogism: abstract/generic rules represented the major premise 
and corresponded to the legislative's activity; relating everyday situations to those ge-
neric rules was the minor premise and corresponded to the executive; the definitive al-
location of what was due in a given situation, i.e. the conclusion, corresponded to the 
judiciary.174 That way, Kant arrived at deducing three distinct ‘powers’ that represent-
ed specific necessary functions that every state needed to fulfil.  
Those functions he then allocated to specific institutions within the state. Like Locke, 
Kant saw a social contract as the foundation of the state which had been agreed by the 
individuals in order to preserve their freedom. The continued existence of this freedom 
in undiminished form could only be maintained if the people themselves held supreme 
power within the state and with it legislative authority: true freedom meant that no 
individual could be allowed to coerce another - therefore the people itself needed to 
make the decision of what was to be 'law' - only then would there be no coercion as 
each individual shared in the decision over her/his own situation.175 This would also 
lead to all statutes being 'just' as, philosophically speaking, injustice can only be done 
to someone by someone else, not by oneself to oneself.176 In that, Kant created a legis-
lator that 'can do no wrong'.177  
Following on from the assumption that freedom could only be maintained if the peo-
ple decided together and without coercion, the people could not be the ones who en-
forced those rules on each other or adjudicated in case of disputes as either type of ac-
tion required the power to coerce or carried the danger of making mistakes, i.e. being 
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'unjust'.178 The executive and judiciary in turn were being given the duty to implement 
those choices and thus needed to be able to coerce - which precluded them to act via 
statute and in turn precluded the legislative from acting by way of individual decisions 
as those constituted 'coercion'. In short, each power was ‘unsuitable’ to use the type 
of action that any of the other part two powers did.179  
On the one hand, he saw these three powers as separate and independent from each 
other as they each fulfilled a specific function. On the other hand, they were depend-
ent and subordinate to each other in that they each could only fulfil their own function 
properly if the other two fulfilled theirs properly. This, according to Kant, meant that 
each power was prohibited from usurping the other as that would prevent either pow-
er from functioning properly. This combination of separation and subordination was 
the construction that guaranteed the citizens' rights.180  
Using the terminology identified in Chapter I, Kant posited a model where not only the 
institutions and the personnel, but also very specifically the type of action each ‘pow-
er’ could take as well as the function were to be kept truly separate. In other words, he 
complied with the criterion ‘separation’, but created only extremely limited options for 
‘cooperation’. Indeed, the latter seems to consist of each power respecting the sphere 
of the other and allowing it to exercise its function to the fullest extent. Given the ex-
amples provided by Madison in the Federalist Papers181, such a model does not seem 
to work very well in practice. The strong connection Kant created between an institu-
tion, its function and the type of action it may take, to the exclusion of the other two 
‘powers’ due to their lack of ‘suitability’, brings the notion of organisational efficiency 
to the fore. Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists had already stressed that efficient 
decision-making was a desired outcome, but Kant took this a step further by relying on 
a theoretical syllogism instead of historically grown characteristics for the allocation of 
'power'. The disadvantage was that it was no longer possible to use opposing class in-
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terests to create a system of interwoven decision making and veto powers (as done by 
Montesquieu) where effective control was exercised from within the system.  
This enabled the shift of the role of the separation of powers within a constitutional 
system from a political concept that protected liberty to a legal concept that focused 
on organisational efficiency. As will be seen in Section C below, this particular ap-
proach can be traced to present day German scholars who see the separation of pow-
ers merely as a 'convenient' organisational tool even though they emphasise the fun-
damental importance for a constitutional framework. 
3. Conclusion  
The two models outlined above illustrate how difficult it was to redesign the classic 
version of the separation of powers in order to reflect the transition towards sover-
eignty as an indivisible power and the shift towards efficiency while trying to maintain 
the unique contribution the separation of powers could make to a constitutional sys-
tem. It is questionable whether these attempts were truly successful. As will become 
apparent in the approaches designed by present day German authors, one particular 
weakness in the construction is the deliberate dissociation of social power (be it ex-
pressed as class or factions) from the institutions. Precisely the element that made the 
separation of powers such an effective tool in the eyes of Locke, Montesquieu and the 
Federalists was taken out of the equation and since then a continuous criticism has 
been that it was this that considerably diminished the practical impact of the separa-
tion of powers within a constitutional system (cf. below Section C).182 
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B. The Weimar days: the state in crisis  
The early 20th century tradition built on the theories developed in the 19th century and 
adapted them to new realities: after the First World War, the Constitution of the Wei-
mar Republic was the first democratic German constitution to enter into force. This 
caused a considerable methodological and existential crisis for state/ constitutional 
law scholars who felt that the very foundations of their discipline had been shaken - 
the major research ‘subject’ of the 19th century, the ‘state’, its conceptualisation, its re-
lationship to society and the nature and role of written constitutions were all called in-
to question. This led them to re-evaluate the entire discipline at a fundamental level in 
the so-called ‘Methoden- und Richtungsstreit’/ ‘controversy over methodology and ob-
jectives’.183 One side argued that positivism, the methodology of choice of the whole 
discipline (law), should continue to apply also in the area of state/ constitutional law. 
Their opponents criticised that this would result in the methodology defining the re-
search ‘subject’ (a.k.a. the state, the constitution, etc.) which was not acceptable. In-
stead, they suggested that the approach usually adopted in the humanities should be 
followed here as well, i.e. the research ‘subject’ should determine the methodology. 
Since it had changed so fundamentally, the choice of methodology needed to be re-
considered as well.184  
This controversy strongly influenced the conceptualisation of the separation of powers 
as well. Interestingly, it was not the changeover from monarchical to popular sover-
eignty that led to differences of opinion. The underlying premise developed in the 19th 
century was considered to have remained the same: sovereignty was indivisible. 
Hence, it was again only the exercise of its various facets that needed to be consid-
ered. What did cause a fundamental re-evaluation, however, was how scholars 
thought about the role of the constitution as this informed how they saw the role of 
constitutional principles, i.a. the separation of powers. The two authors explored in 
this Section illustrate the two sides of the divide: Richard Thoma (subsection 1) adopt-
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ed a positivist approach and considered the constitution as a regulatory framework for 
the interaction of the state’s institutions. As a consequence, he considered the separa-
tion of powers as an organisational tool promoting efficient decision-making. In con-
trast, Rudolf Smend (subsection 2) saw the constitution as the means to achieve the 
continuously ongoing integration between state and society which led to the develop-
ment of a rather unique approach to the separation of powers.  
1. Richard Thoma: a positivist understanding 
In the Handbook on State law (‘Handbuch des Staatsrechts’), one of the most eminent 
contemporaneous commentaries on the Weimar constitutional system, Richard Thoma 
comments on the role of the separation of powers within the newly created constitu-
tional framework.185 Quite tellingly, the Section is not headed 'the separation of pow-
ers' but rather ‘theory on the functions of the state’ (Staatsfunktionenlehre). This very 
expressly drew attention to the conceptual shift the theory had undergone during the 
19th century and what expectations it was expected to meet.  
Even though Thoma stressed the importance of the separation of powers for modern 
constitution building, he considered its contribution to be purely theoretical and not 
intended to lead to any constitutional claims.186 To him, Montesquieu’s tripartite setup 
seemed more of a sensible suggestion rather than a normative demand. Despite that, 
he still took it as the starting point for his analysis of the institutional framework un-
derlying the Weimar Constitution. The constitution followed the by then traditional di-
vision into legislative, executive and judiciary and identified one institution as the pri-
mary bearer of each function. However, it also included what Thoma considered tradi-
tional derogations to that principle by allocating responsibility for the determination of 
the budget, warfare and peace agreements as well as enquiry committees to the legis-
lative.187 Interestingly, he did not connect the allocation of responsibility for Foreign 
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Affairs and warfare to the executive as following that traditional pattern. Rather he 
thought this to be the result of an application of the separation of powers: all exercise 
of state power that could not be categorised as ‘legislative’ or ‘judicial’ activity de-
pending on the defining nature of each power had to be seen as allocated to the com-
prehensive 'function' of administering, i.e. the executive.188 Since Foreign Affairs and 
warfare could not be considered to be either of the former two, it was logical to task 
the executive with that responsibility. 
As regards the interaction between legislative and executive in particular, Thoma was 
rather critical as the Weimar Constitution, unlike the 1871 Constitution, was built on a 
parliamentary system. He pointed out that due to the complexities of the legal and 
economic system of the time, it could be argued that all important decisions were ac-
tually not taken by the executive, but rather by the legislative due to the fact that the 
executive needed statutes in order to govern.189 He expressed concern that such a de-
pendence could lead to what he called a ‘power monism’ of the legislative. The consti-
tution did not contain any express limitation on its competences, but in turn did con-
tain options for the legislative to gain control of the executive indirectly through its 
control of the legislative process and directly by way of no-confidence votes against 
individual members of the government or the government as a whole.190  
2. Rudolf Smend: the separation of powers as a means to integration 
Rudolf Smend developed his so-called integration theory as a deliberate counter model 
to the 1920s positivist mainstream in general and Kelsen’s pure theory of law in partic-
ular. He proposed to reintegrate political, sociological and historical considerations in-
to the legal assessment of the constitution.191 He posited that the role of the constitu-
tion was to mediate between society and the state, in other words the integration of 
society’s interests and the state’s objectives.192 Thus, its purpose was to provide the 
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normative framework for the integration process which was meant to be harmonious, 
uniting and non-confrontational.193 This meant that a constitution was not set in stone 
but part of the continuous process of integration that had to happen again and again in 
view of the developments in society. As a consequence of this constant renewal, the 
constitutional institutions could deviate, if necessary, from the pathways set out in the 
written constitution as long as this did not violate its spirit. That way, the institutions 
were able to adapt to the changes brought about by the ongoing process of ‘integra-
tion’.194 
He distinguished among three ‘factors’ of integration: personal – especially the head of 
the state (president or monarch) should have an ‘integrative effect’; functional – all the 
procedures that mediate between state and society, i.a. elections, law-making, deci-
sions of courts; and substantive - the goals, values and symbols of a state that help the 
people identify with it and provide identifiable markers for the integration process, 
among them were e.g. the flag, a state’s territory or its history, but in particular the 
constitution as the embodiment of fundamental value decisions made by the people in 
question - in this respect the provisions on fundamental rights were of central im-
portance.195 
In this setup, the separation of powers unfolded as an element of the functional factor 
of integration. Smend did distinguish among legislative, executive and judicial proce-
dures, but derived their legitimacy not from a particular mode of nomination or partic-
ular suitability to fulfil the function at hand, but rather from a power’s ‘effectiveness as 
tools of integration’.196 This meant that the legislative was responsible for creating 
statutes because its specific decision-making processes were the most suitable to 
achieve a result that would further the integration process, e.g. by providing a plat-
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form for the discussion of all the interests at stake in a given situation and by subse-
quently providing the agreed-upon solution in form of a statute.197  
3. Conclusion  
The approaches of Thoma and Smend emphasize how the conceptualisation of the 
context within which the separation of powers is designated to work may in turn influ-
ence the conceptualisation of the separation of powers itself. Locke, Montesquieu as 
well as the Federalists had considered the whole purpose of the social contract, and 
the constitution respectively, to be the promotion and preservation of the liberty of 
the people involved and they deemed the separation of powers to have that same in-
herent purpose. Over the course of the 19th century, however, the separation of pow-
ers was dissociated from its political and social roots and turned into a legal principle 
that was considered to serve the purpose of the state or the constitution, whatever it 
may be. Thoma and Smend demonstrated how making the separation of powers de-
pendent on external values shifts the evaluation of its usefulness to the question of 
how successful it realises those values. In short, organisational efficiency became the 
key objective.198  
Of further interest for the investigation is in particular Thoma’s approach to both 
budgetary responsibility and Foreign Affairs. His reasoning that the allocation of the 
former to the legislative is due to traditional reasons, while the allocation of the latter 
to the executive is due solely to a consistent application of the separation of powers 
appears historically inaccurate and logically flawed, if one considers the developments 
of the preceding decades of German history as well as the arguments put forward by 
the Federalists as well as Kant. Foreign Affairs engendered the need for legislation as 
well as the judicial resolution of conflicts in the same way as domestic matters – to 
blindly allocate this whole area of policy making to the executive based on the argu-
ment that Foreign Affairs do not contain legislative or judicial elements is unconvinc-
ing. 
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C. Present-day approaches: the separation of powers in crisis?  
With the entry into force of the Grundgesetz in 1949, the political, social and legal 
turmoil of the preceding three decades seemed overcome. The new constitution not 
only introduced a different system of government, but also changed things at a con-
ceptual level. The Grundgesetz turned the relationship between state and constitution 
on its head: instead of considering the constitution as an after-the-fact introduced limi-
tation on the state’s powers, the Grundgesetz was meant to be the document that – 
quite literally – constituted their foundation.199  
With that, also the crisis of state/ constitutional law as a discipline was resolved. The 
main focus was now on realising the intentions of the Grundgesetz, in particular with 
respect to the human rights guarantees. As a consequence, rather little attention was 
given to the separation of powers. Those German scholars that did engage with it ex-
pressed their frustration, like their English speaking colleagues, at the contrast be-
tween the theory’s eminence in the theoretical debate and its apparently (very) lim-
ited practical impact.200 It was hailed variably as ‘central concept in modern constitu-
tionalism’201, fundamental constitutional principle202 and the unshakeable foundation 
of liberal constitutionalist states.203 With the same breath, authors deplored that in 
light of the plethora of different constitutional systems existing in practice it seemed 
nearly impossible to pin down the theory’s normative content.204 This was mostly at-
tributed to the juridification of the theory: now that it was subject to legal interpreta-
tion based on a constitution which was intent on creating a democratic system of gov-
ernment, it seemed that it had lost most of its effect and appeal as a ‘tamer’ of state 
power.205 This led some authors to question the usefulness of the separation of pow-
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ers as a matter of principle.206 Overall, it seemed that it was now the separation of 
powers itself that was in crisis and had to prove whether it was indeed a constitutional 
corner stone or merely a decorative remnant of days long past. 
This Section will explore in chronological order contributions by three authors that are 
to this day considered seminal contributions to the German language debate on the 
separation of powers. The authors all agree that the theory’s real objective was to cre-
ate an efficient institutional set-up capable of fulfilling its allocated duties,207 but ap-
proached the above conundrum from three different angles. Leisner (Subsection 1) at-
tempted to draw the focus of the German language discussion away from the question 
of how to best protect the individual sphere of responsibility of legislative and execu-
tive respectively and towards the question of how to balance the influence of either 
power on a particular decision. Ossenbühl (Subsection 2) explored how the separation 
of powers could be used to delineate precisely the spheres of responsibility of the leg-
islative and the executive in a practical context. His solution focused strongly on the 
specific characteristics of the decision-making processes of each power and the legiti-
macy they provided the decision with the result. Finally, Danwitz (Subsection 3) con-
sidered whether a reformulation that focused very much on the efficiency of decision-
making could provide the separation of powers with the desired normative force.  
 
In keeping with the course of the investigation so far, the analysis will focus on how 
the authors realise the two fundamental criteria of ‘separation’ and ‘cooperation’, how 
they define ‘power’, how they conceptualise the relationship between the legislative 
and the executive and what the repercussions are of using efficiency as key objective 
as opposed to liberty.208  
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1. Walter Leisner (1969): The emphasis on balance  
In his article ‘Die quantitative Gewaltenteilung,’209 Leisner posited that the two key ob-
jectives of the classic approach - ensuring that each power maintained its independ-
ence and to create balance among powers - were actually not compatible with each 
other in the same context, i.e. one could not achieve both at the same time: consist-
ently applied, any notion of independence of a power had to rely on there being cer-
tain areas, competences or functions that could not be interfered with by the other 
powers. However, if one took the notion of balance seriously, there could not be any-
thing untouchable because there would be situations where deep interference would 
be necessary in order to create the desired balance.210 As a consequence, he consid-
ered it impossible to do both notions justice at the same time. Moreover, the practical 
reality had to be taken into account and with reference to parliamentary democracies 
like Germany, these notions were based more on fictitious aspirations than realistic 
options for implementing the theory of the separation of powers. Indeed, the legisla-
tive and the executive were so interwoven that any separation had practically ceased 
to exist beyond the nominal level.211 From an individual’s perspective, it was not nec-
essarily transparent what act was attributable to which power. So the best protection 
of the interests of individuals during the decision-making process was to introduce col-
lective responsibility of the legislative and executive for actions which in reality they 
took together anyway. 
He therefore suggested to prioritise the second objective –  balance – and to look at it 
not in the way it had been done so far where a qualitative understanding had prevailed 
– in the sense that each power has a unique contribution to make. Instead, he pro-
posed a quantitative approach where the differing weight of each power’s influence 
would be factored in for each step of the decision-making process. Since this required 
one to abandon traditional notions of separate competences and responsibilities, it 
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changed the existing overlap between the legislative and the executive from being a 
problem into part of the solution.212  
At first glance, Leisner’s approach may appear to follow in the tradition of the Federal-
ists with the notion of checks and balances. However, it is submitted that the Federal-
ists’ notion of ‘balance’ was rather the opposite of the one proposed by Leisner. The 
Federalists considered balance in the context of one power cancelling out the influ-
ence of the other due to the fact that the function in question could not be fulfilled by 
one power alone. In contrast, Leisner suggested to consider the activities of the legisla-
tive and the executive as one process. This removes any possibility to delineate which 
power should decide what, in how much detail and when.  
He was rightfully criticised for this lack of a clear or even identifiable pattern for the 
resolution of arising conflicts, as it was precisely what the separation of powers had 
been designed to prevent.213 A definitive allocation of responsibilities and thus clarity 
and transparency of who took ultimate responsibility for the resulting act was neces-
sary as otherwise citizens would be unable to identify clearly the institution that had 
issued the act violating their rights and decide on the appropriate judicial remedies to 
use.214 
2. Fritz Ossenbühl (1980): Legitimacy of decision-making as the key 
objective 
Ossenbühl’s contribution revolves around the question of how the separation of pow-
ers could provide guidance for the determination of what decisions the legislative 
should take itself and which ones could be left to the administration as well as what 
level of scrutiny the administrative courts should apply. 
He preceded his analysis by pointing out that the circumstances that had informed the 
formulation of the separation of powers by Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists 
had changed considerably since then which had repercussions for the application of 
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the separation of powers to present day situations. To him, these repercussions affect-
ed in particular the question of the preparedness and suitability of a particular institu-
tion for the responsibilities it had been tasked with.215 Like Kant, he placed a strong 
emphasis on the nature and format of the decision-making process associated with a 
particular institution and the consequences those had for the legitimacy of the deci-
sion taken by the institution. He posited that one needed to evaluate what kind of le-
gitimacy a particular question required in order to allocate it to either the legislative or 
the executive. For example if the decision required an extensive and in-depth debate 
of the various options available, required access for the public and transparency, re-
quired that the proponents publicly defended their choices, etc. then the legislative 
would be the right forum to take that decision. In contrast, if none of the above was 
important, but rather that the decision be taken fairly quickly and with due considera-
tion for individual circumstances, then the executive was the appropriate choice.216 
The requirements in each situation were determined by the interests of the individuals 
involved. Here, Ossenbühl created a very strong link to the overarching purpose of the 
separation of powers – to protect the liberty of the people. His particular contribution 
is that he connects that purpose to the question of efficiency and legitimacy of the de-
cision-making process.  
The second problem he addressed was the question not of whether the legislative had 
to get involved, but rather how far it could get involved in policy areas that were heavi-
ly ‘saturated’ with technology. As example he drew on the regulation of the peaceful 
use of nuclear power. The respective statute used the device of introducing a generic 
duty on the owners of a nuclear power station to keep reactor security and other 
technological necessities “… updated to the latest standards…”. Ossenbühl argued that 
this was an example for the legislative deliberately leaving the statutory basis fairly 
vague so as to enable the executive to implement that duty effectively without having 
to request repeated updates of the statute whenever technological advancements 
were made. Critics suggested that the legislative had violated its responsibilities to 
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regulate the necessary detail itself. However, Ossenbühl pointed out that in this situa-
tion the legislative was simply too slow to keep up with the advancements in the field 
and a deliberate move to leave matters to the executive was the far more appropriate 
choice as that would ensure timely and adequate decisions.217 He concluded that the 
separation of powers could provide valuable arguments for both of the problematic 
areas pointed out above if one focused on its capabilities to support the allocation of 
responsibilities to those institutions that were functionally the most capable of han-
dling them. To him that would lead to the best possible decision and thus promote the 
protection of liberty of the individual.218  
Ossenbühl’s approach reached beyond the simple question of whether a particular de-
cision appears to be ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ in nature. He connected an institution’s 
designated decision-making process to the question of allocation of the authority to 
take that decision and illustrates how this may contribute to, or indeed diminish, the 
decision taken in a particular situation. In short, he asked not merely who ‘should’ take 
a particular decision, but also whether that power actually ‘could’ take that decision. 
His emphasis is very much on the latter and he derived the legitimacy to allocate par-
ticular responsibilities largely on account of already existing decision-making struc-
tures. What he did not ask was whether a particular institution who ‘could not’ take a 
decision, but ‘should’, had a duty to adapt its decision-making processes to make itself 
capable of taking the decision in question. Neither did he ask whether a Court had the 
authority to review such matters. Those and other follow-up questions were posed 
and answered by Danwitz about 15 years later. 
3. Thomas von Danwitz (1996): The Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten 
Organstruktur  
Danwitz fleshed out Ossenbühl’s approach and took over his phrase ‘Grundsatz der 
funktionsgerechten Organstruktur’ – fairly literally translated it means ‘principle of the 
function-appropriate institutional structure’. This phrase was meant to capture the 
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idea that functions and responsibilities should be exercised by those institutions that 
were – based on their internal structure, composition, working methods and decision-
making processes – best equipped to handle them.219 And since each power held a dis-
tinct and unique weight and legitimacy within the state organisation, the question of 
who had what competence carried great meaning for the achievement of ‘Entschei-
dungsgerechtigkeit’ (roughly translates as ‘decisional justice/ fairness’).220  
The supporters of the Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur argued that in 
order to resolve practical questions such as how to determine what issues should be 
dealt with by the administration and which ones to reserve to the legislative, a bal-
ance-focused approach like Leisner’s would review only whether the institution who 
decided did upset the balance among the powers, not necessarily whether that institu-
tion should have the competence to decide in the first place. The Grundsatz der funk-
tionsgerechten Organstruktur, on the other hand, aimed to ensure that each decision 
was taken by the ‘right’ institution – one that had the appropriate means to do justice 
to all concerns involved.221 Therefore, one would first consider the internal structure 
and decision-making processes of each of the potentially appropriate institutions and 
consider the resulting weight and legitimacy of the decision were the respective insti-
tution to take it. Where the Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur reaches 
beyond the classic rendition of the theory of the separation of powers is its ability to 
pursue these questions not just between two powers but also inside of just one power, 
i.e. it carried the notion of the separation of powers into the heart of e.g. an adminis-
trative body and then reviewed that body with regard to two issues: the allocation of 
functions and the institutional structure. The outcome of such a review could be that 
the institution was indeed the one who ‘should’ have the responsibility in question, 
but that the institutional structures left something to be desired and so needed to be 
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amended in order to ensure the appropriate level of legitimacy for the taking of that 
decision.222  
Unlike Leisner’s approach, the Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur leads 
to clear allocations of competences and functions and thus transparency. However, as 
with the former, taken by itself it cannot justify whether a particular issue needs to be 
factored in or how individual interests should be taken into account in a given situation 
in order to determine which institution would achieve a ‘just’ decision. The answers to 
those questions are far more dependent on how the constitutional system in question 
conceptualised the role and influence of other values, in particular democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights protection, etc. In other words, the question of which power 
should fulfil a given function was strongly influenced by how the constitutional system 
aimed to protect the interests of the individuals involved in, and affected by, it. In con-
clusion, it is submitted that the Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur does 
have an advantage over Leisner’s approach in that it makes the resulting allocation of 
functions less unpredictable, but, like Leisner’s, it does not provide the theory of the 
separation of powers with normative content all by itself. For the present context it is 
also worth noting that in the case of administrative bodies, Danwitz had no compunc-
tion to demand the adaptation of the decision-making processes should they be defi-
cient to the responsibility the respective body was to receive. However, he refused to 
draw similar consequences for the constitutional context. As a consequence, constitu-
tional institutions are ‘frozen’ within the structures and decision-making processes the 
constitution provides them with. Therefore, the only question asked under the Grund-
satz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur is whether a power ‘as is’ may be suitable 
for a particular responsibility, not whether it should carry or participate in that respon-
sibility with the result that its structures and decision-making processes may need to 
be adapted. 
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D. Conclusion  
This Chapter explored how the theory of the separation of powers was received in 
Germany over the course of the 19th and 20th century, what developments it under-
went in the process and what the repercussions of those developments are for the 
formulation of the theory compared to its classic modern rendition provided by Locke, 
Montesquieu and the Federalists (cf. Chapter I).  
 
The reception of the theory into the German constitutional tradition highlighted how 
general constitutional developments, the values embodied in constitutions, but also 
the legal tradition as such influence the role and status of the separation of powers. It 
was explored how the meaning of ‘power’ shifted from ‘having the authority to do’ 
more towards ‘function’ due to the fact that German state law tradition adopted the 
concept of indivisibility of sovereignty as posited by Bodin. With that and due to the 
rise of the notion of Rechtsstaat and the successful implementation of a democratic 
system of government, the purpose of the separation of powers as a protector of liber-
ty lost much of its significance and was replaced by the focus on efficient decision-
making. However, this shifted the focus of the analysis, and depending on one’s defini-
tion of ‘efficiency’, almost entirely in favour of the executive. For example, when it 
comes to fast and decisive action, any legislative will likely have to be considered ‘inef-
ficient’ and thus be dismissed as unsuitable. In contrast, if one were to ask in the same 
context what institution may be best suited to protect the people’s liberties, the deci-
sion would not be as straightforward. It is therefore submitted that any attempt to re-
define the separation of powers as being based on efficiency would have to provide a 
definition of ‘efficiency’ that did not disadvantage either of the three powers due to 
their inherent organisational structures – in particular since they apparently cannot be 
adapted if one follows Danwitz’s line of argument that the decision-making structures 
of constitutional institutions cannot be made suitable for purpose.  
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Part I: Conclusion 
Part I investigated the role and status of the theory of the separation of powers in con-
stitutional systems with particular reference to German legal scholarship.  
Chapter I concluded that for Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists the separation of 
powers constituted an indispensable element of a constitutional system in order to 
avoid the establishment of a tyrannical regime. The separation of powers enabled the 
three powers to influence and control each other from within the political process, 
thus preventing any one power from becoming too dominant. These authors used the 
social power embodied in the classes (Locke, Montesquieu) or in the diverse factions 
existing in the population (the Federalists) in order to provide the institutions those 
groupings constituted with the necessary standing and ambition to exercise the de-
sired control. Additionally, this made the people, or rather their representatives, part 
of the constitutional process and thus provided them with a direct conduit to the exer-
cise of state power and with the means to controlling it. Chapter II explored how gen-
eral constitutional developments, the values embodied in constitutions, but also the 
German legal tradition as such and philosophical traditions on the nature and role of 
the state and the constitution itself influence the conceptualisation of the role and sta-
tus of the separation of powers within the German constitutional system. As a conse-
quence, present-day approaches of German legal scholars accord the separation of 
powers a high status for theoretical discussions but see its value as negligible for the 
resolution of practical conflicts.  
Part II will now turn to the current German constitutional system in order to investi-
gate whether the perception of the legal scholars regarding the relative uselessness of 
the separation of powers for the resolution of practical conflicts holds true. To that 
end, the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht will be examined in detail in 
order to establish the impact of the separation of powers in the context of domestic 
decision making as well in the area of Foreign Affairs. The jurisprudence will be evalu-
ated with particular regard to the relationship it creates between the Bundestag and 
the Bundesregierung.   
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Part II: The separation of powers and the 
Grundgesetz  
This Part will investigate how the theory as explored in Part I has been implemented 
into, and applied in, the Grundgesetz’s system of constitutional government. As could 
be seen in Chapter II Section C, present-day German legal scholars commonly perceive 
the theory to be of little practical use. The aim of this Part is to investigate whether 
that is true and thus to evaluate the theory’s practical impact on the German constitu-
tional system firstly with regard to the general domestic context (Chapter III) and then 
with regard to the area of Foreign Affairs (Chapter IV).  
 
The thesis will continue to pursue the questions set out for the investigation in Part I in 
order to evaluate the practical implications of the theoretical differences. The analysis 
will review the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in order to establish 
whether the shifting values that drive the theory are mirrored in the Court’s approach 
and in the solutions it finds for the conflicts arising among the powers. As could be 
seen in Part I, the theoretical conceptualisation of the separation of powers informs 
the particular solutions it offers. It will therefore be crucial to establish what theoreti-
cal approach the Bundesverfassungsgericht pursues: whether it has adopted one sug-
gested by the literature, whether it has designed its own by merging several approach-
es or whether it has developed its own ideas, e.g. due to the much more practical con-
text it finds itself in. In that context, the questions of how the Court defines ‘power’ 
and what it considers to be the primary objective of the separation of powers within a 
constitutional system are of paramount importance. For example, with regard to that 
latter point, the literature oscillates between liberty and efficiency and, with that, 
comes to different conclusions as to how one should resolve particular conflicts among 
powers. Moreover, it will be interesting to see whether potential dangers foreseen in 
the literature materialised in practice, for example, the fear that the legislative would 
become too powerful and usurp the other two powers.  
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The particular focus of this part of the investigation will be the jurisprudence of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht with regard to the general domestic context as well as For-
eign Affairs in order to establish the parameters for the ‘typical’ interaction between 
the Bundesregierung and Bundestag. Those will serve as comparators for the evalua-
tion of the Court’s jurisprudence with regard to European matters and the implications 
it has for the relationship between the two institutions in Part III. 
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CHAPTER III: from theory to practice: implementation of the 
separation of powers into the Grundgesetz  
Since its creation, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and its jurisprudence have had a pro-
found impact on the German legal system as a whole, and on constitutional law in par-
ticular. Any investigation into how the separation of powers works in practice will have 
to consider how the Court’s decisions frame the choices open to the political institu-
tions and other actors within the constitutional system. The focus of this Chapter is to 
connect the theory of the separation of powers as laid out in Part I to that practice and 
to evaluate its impact on the resolution of practical conflicts arising before the Court. 
This Chapter will first explore what the Court considers the theory’s role and status 
within the constitutional system to be, before analysing how the Court realised its de-
mands within the context of conflict resolution. The analysis will use the two criteria 
identified in the literature – separation and cooperation – in order to establish a com-
mon terminology as the basis for the comparison between the literature and the 
Court’s approach. Section B will focus on the efforts of the Court to ensure that the 
powers remain separate, followed by Section C for the mechanisms for cooperation 
provided by the Grundgesetz will be reviewed.  
A. The separation of powers as an organisational principle 
1. The separation of powers as a fundamental principle  
Starting with the earliest cases in the 1950s, the Court has repeatedly had the oppor-
tunity to comment on what it saw as the role and status of the separation of powers 
within the German constitutional system. In one of its earliest decisions, the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht considered the separation of powers to be “… ein tragendes Or-
ganisationsprinzip des Grundgesetzes…”/ “… a fundamental organisational principle of 
the Grundgesetz…”223.  
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According to German constitutional doctrine, the five principles referred to in especial-
ly Article 20 (2) and (3) Grundgesetz224 are the so-called structural constitutional prin-
ciples of the Grundgesetz, namely federalism, democracy, the ‘Rechtsstaat’, republi-
canism and social justice. Following Smend’s approach to see the constitution as an 
embodied objective value system, these principles are taken to express the fundamen-
tal value decisions that form the basis for legitimate exercise of state authority in Ger-
many. Therefore, they are considered to provide the theoretical framework for the 
German constitutional system and e.g. to provide primary normative guidelines for the 
interpretation and application of individual constitutional provisions.225 As some of the 
decisions discussed in this thesis will illustrate, their role goes beyond that and they 
are used by the Court to reinforce a claimant’s individual rights, for the current context 
the Court’s decisions on the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties are the most famous ex-
amples.226 The principles form part of the constitutional core that is protected by the 
so-called ‘eternity clause’ in Article 79 (3) Grundgesetz from being altered or abolished 
even by way of constitutional amendment.  
 
For this investigation, the principles of democracy and Rechtsstaat are of particular 
relevance as they provide the theoretical framework for the interaction of the Bun-
desregierung and the Bundestag. Broadly speaking, their respective areas of applica-
tion may be distinguished as follows: with the principle of democracy, the emphasis is 
on the realisation of the exercise of sovereign power by the people and how to estab-
lish democratic legitimacy for the actions of the state’s institutions while the 
Rechtsstaat principle comprises various concepts and mechanisms that control and 
limit the exercise of state power by the institutions in any given situation. Together, 
they provide the means to allow the institutions to aspire to what the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht refers to as the ‘demokratische Rechtsstaat’ – a system of government 
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founded on strong democratic ideals where the exercise of all state power is compre-
hensively bound by law and justice and informed by a deep respect for human digni-
ty.227  
The principle of democracy serves to delineate the powers and remit of the individual 
constitutional institutions within the Grundgesetz’s system of parliamentary democra-
cy: since the almost only instance228 of exercise of sovereign power directly by the 
people at federal level is the general parliamentary election, this act is seen as carrying 
very great meaning. As a consequence, the Bundestag’s position as the ‘only directly 
elected federal institution’ is seen as pivotal for the provision of democratic legitimacy 
to the other constitutional institutions. The Bundesverfassungsgericht developed the 
concept of the so-called ‘chain of democratic legitimacy’ where every single decision 
taken by a public body – be it legislative, executive or judicial in nature – has to be part 
of a continuous ‘chain’ that in an unbroken line leads directly back to the Bundestag – 
and thus to the people. For example, a decision taken by cabinet minister is linked to 
the Bundespräsident who was the one who appointed the minister. The Bundespräsi-
dent in turn was elected by Federal Assembly and the Federal Assembly comprises all 
of the members of the Bundestag. That way all the civil servants working in that minis-
try are linked up to the Bundestag as well. As will be explored further in Chapter V, this 
concept is one of the underlying threads in the Maastricht decision. There, the Court’s 
concern was whether by transferring too many competences to the European Com-
munities, this chain may be broken as decisions could no longer be traced back to the 
Bundestag as the elected representative of the German people.229  
The Rechtsstaat principle is commonly seen as embodied especially in Article 1 (1) and 
Article 20 (3) Grundgesetz.230 The concept is fairly often simply translated as ‘rule of 
law’ but according to German constitutional doctrine a state needs much more than 
what the rule of law e.g. in English constitutional law connotes in order to be a 
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Rechtsstaat – a ‘state under the rule of law’– which has led some English scholars to 
posit that ‘…the UK is hardly a Rechtsstaat …’.231 The Rechtsstaat principle provides the 
conceptual framework for a number of procedural as well as substantive concepts 
which taken together aim to provide comprehensive control of the exercise of state 
power in various contexts. The notion of constitutional sovereignty, the Grundgesetz’s 
system of human rights protection, the right to access to effective judicial remedies, 
non-retroactivity, the principle of proportionality and the general statutory reserve, to 
name only a few, all form part of the Rechtsstaat principle. The separation of powers is 
considered to be part of it as well.232 Indeed, it is often described as the indispensable 
core of the modern Rechtsstaat which in turn is inextricably linked to the modern con-
stitutionalist state with its strong system of human rights protection.233 
This ‘classification’ of the separation of powers as part of the Rechtsstaat principle 
places a strong emphasis on its role in controlling the exercise of state power, very 
much in keeping with Locke and the Federalists. At first glance, therefore, notions of 
efficiency, legitimacy of decision-making or even integration as were developed in the 
19th and 20th century literature seem to be much less important in practice. The next 
Section will now turn to the more specific definition of the separation of powers as de-
veloped by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
2. Separating and ‘interlacing’ powers: Gewaltenteilung in the 
Grundgesetz 
Article 20 (2) explicitly differentiates out that state power is exercised by “… besondere 
Organe der Gesetzgebung, der vollziehenden Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung …” / “… 
through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies …”234 Even though the 
Grundgesetz uses here the classic tripartite construction, the provisions dealing with 
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the various institutions in detail do not allocate any institution explicitly to one of 
those ‘powers’ or detail their specific function and responsibilities in the constitutional 
system with respect to the ‘power’ they may belong to.  The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, however, was a bit more forthcoming. After establishing the separation 
of powers as a fundamental principle, the Court proceeded to clarify its role and pur-
pose:  
“… dass die Organe der Legislati-
ve, Exekutive und Justiz sich gegen-
seitig kontrollieren und begrenzen, 
damit die Staatsmacht gemäßigt und 
die Freiheit des Einzelnen geschützt 
wird. …“ 
“… that the organs of the legislative, 
executive and judiciary control and lim-
it each other, so that state power may 
be moderated and the freedom of the 
individual be protected…”235 
By 1972, the following paragraph had become a well-established formula: 
“… Das Grundgesetz will die politi-
sche Machtverteilung, das Ineinan-
dergreifen der drei Gewalten und die 
daraus sich ergebende Mäßigung der 
Staatsherrschaft. Das Prinzip der 
Gewaltenteilung ist für den Bereich 
des Bundes jedoch nicht rein verwirk-
licht. Es bestehen zahlreiche Ge-
waltenverschränkungen und –balan-
cierungen. Nicht absolute Trennung, 
sondern gegenseitige Kontrolle, 
Hemmung und Mäßigung der Ge-
walten ist dem Verfassungsaufbau 
des Grundgesetzes zu entnehmen…”   
“… The Grundgesetz aims for the 
distribution of political power, the in-
terlacing of the three powers and the 
resulting moderation of state authori-
ty. However, for the domain of the 
Federation the principle of the separa-
tion of powers has not been realised in 
a ‘pure’ fashion. There exist numerous 
instances where the powers are inter-
laced and balanced in a specific way. 
Not absolute separation, but mutual 
control, limitation and moderation of 
the powers can be identified from the 
structure of the Grundgesetz…”236 
After clarifying its purpose and its understanding of the criteria ‘separation’ and ‘coop-
eration’, the Court established its own list of criteria that would allow it to resolve con-
flicts among the powers: 
                                                     
235
 BVerfG, ‘Bremer Personalvertretung’ [1959] BVerfGE 9, 268, 279, as translated by author. 
236
 BVerfG, ‘Hessisches Richtergesetz’ [1972] BVerfGE 34, 52, 59 [emphasis added], as translated by au-
thor . 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Part II: The separation of powers and the Grundgesetz 
 
 
83 
“… so muß doch andererseits die in der 
Verfassung vorgenommene Verteilung 
der Gewichte zwischen den drei Gewalten 
bestehen bleiben. Keine Gewalt darf ein 
von der Verfassung nicht vorgesehenes 
Übergewicht über eine andere Gewalt 
erhalten. Keine Gewalt darf der für die Er-
füllung ihrer verfassungsmäßigen Aufga-
ben erforderlichen Zuständigkeiten be-
raubt werden. Der Kernbereich der ver-
schiedenen Gewalten ist unveränderbar. 
Damit ist ausgeschlossen, daß eine der 
Gewalten die ihr von der Verfassung zu-
geschriebenen typischen Aufgaben preis-
gibt…”   
“… The balance of power among 
the three powers as created by the 
constitution has to be preserved. No 
power may acquire a predominant 
position over another power that 
was not intended by the constitu-
tion. No power may be deprived of 
the competences necessary for the 
carrying out of its responsibilities as 
allocated by the constitution. That 
way it is precluded that one of the 
powers relinquishes the typical re-
sponsibilities ascribed to it by the 
constitution…”237 
A later addition was an explicit reference to the Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Or-
ganstruktur as developed by Ossenbühl and Danwitz that all decisions should be taken 
by the institution or the power most capable and best equipped to do so.238 However, 
while prominent in the area of Foreign Affairs (as will be discussed in Chapter IV), that 
particular approach did not feature highly in the jurisprudence of the Court with regard 
to the domestic context. 
Based on the above statements, it becomes clear that the Court emphasises the need 
for separation much more than the need for cooperation. Most of the formulations 
quoted above phrase things in a way that allow the power to defend itself against at-
tempts at usurpation by one of the other powers. What is also striking are the refer-
ences to the ‘intentions’ of the constitution, for example ‘the balance as intended by 
the constitution’, ‘a predominance not intended by the constitution’ or ‘the responsi-
bilities allocated by the constitution’. The implication seems to be that the constitution 
as the definitive guide for establishing what the relationship among the powers in a 
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given situation should be like. Formulated differently: not the theory as developed by 
legal scholars, but the constitution as the embodiment of the will of the people deter-
mines how the institutions should interact, regardless of the imbalance this may create 
among the powers or potentially even regardless of whether the allocation of a specif-
ic task or function would be considered ‘appropriate’ for the power in question. And 
indeed the Court has expressly pointed out that the people have the power to create 
exceptions to the general rules on the relationship among the powers – it is part of its 
prerogative to make decisions about how to balance e.g. legal certainty and material 
justice in a given situation.239 
B. Maintaining ‘separateness’  
The drafters of the Grundgesetz opted for a parliamentary democracy as a constitu-
tional model which from the perspective of the separation of powers may be charac-
terized as a constitutional system where the separation of the legislative and the exec-
utive is not maintained with regard to the personnel of the institutions – usually the 
members of the government are also members of the parliament. In this model, the 
government is on the one hand dependent on the confidence of the parliament for its 
continuance in office, but on the other capable of controlling the parliament by way of 
its control over the majority of the House. If one looks at the text of the Grundgesetz, 
one does find the matching institutional set-up:  
The Bundestag, the elected lower house of the Federal Parliament forms the federal 
legislative together with the Bundesrat, the upper house of the Federal Parliament. It 
is elected based on a mixed-member electoral system for four years and, in a deliber-
ate reaction to Weimar, the Bundestag may not be dissolved prematurely unless in 
very few situations and under strict conditions. In particular, the Grundgesetz does not 
provide the Bundestag with the right to dissolve itself, nor does it allow the executive 
to initiate a dissolution on its own accord.240 The Bundesrat is the institution that rep-
resents the interests of the Länder at federal level. Unlike the US American Senate, the 
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members of the Bundesrat are not elected, but appointed by the respective Land gov-
ernment, i.e. technically speaking, they represent only the parliamentary majority in 
the respective Land and not the people of the respective Land as such.241 Moreover, it 
is a permanent institution, i.e. it does not dissolve on a regular basis but rather its 
composition changes constantly in consequence of elections in the Länder. Among 
other things, this has led to the Bundesrat becoming a platform of party politics, since 
the political parties in power in the Länder are often not the same ones as those that 
support the Bundesregierung. This has implications for the practical control powers 
available to the Bundestag which will be discussed below in Section C 2.  
The federal executive consists of the Bundesregierung and the Bundespräsident with 
the actual political decision-making power of the executive vested in the Bun-
deskanzler as head of the Bundesregierung.242 The Bundestag elects the Bun-
deskanzler, and may overthrow the whole Bundesregierung by electing a new Bun-
deskanzler by way of a constructive vote of no confidence.243 Neither the Bun-
deskanzler nor the members of the cabinet have to be members of the Bundestag.244 
Interestingly however, ever since 1949, the Bundeskanzler as well as all the members 
of the Bundesregierung have always also been members of the Bundestag.245 In other 
words: the standard constitutional practice ‘interlaces’ the personnel of the key part of 
the executive with that part of the legislative that is directly elected by the people. This 
means that the Bundesregierung theoretically has the power to use its controlling ma-
jority in the Bundestag to undermine that institution’s independent decision-making 
power and thus to subvert its options to control the activities of the Bundesregierung. 
Whether this theoretical danger is realised in practice, will be explored in Section C be-
low.  
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Going forward, it is  tentatively concluded that the Grundgesetz’s institutional setup 
point towards an understanding of ‘power’ in terms of ‘legal authority to act’ with a 
strong emphasis on formally separating functions, although as will be demonstrated in 
Section C 1 below, the executive is considerably involved in the process of legislation.  
1. The nature of the function 
The guidance from the Court looks at first glance as a statement of the obvious: the 
legislative creates statutes by way of legislating, the judiciary adjudicates conflicts and 
the executive is defined negatively as everything that is not part of the other two.246 
This is supplemented via the typical ‘product’ of the power’s activities – a statute, an 
individual decision or a judgment – by attaching specific and distinct value to the re-
spective decision-making process. As Ossenbühl outlined, the purpose of the legislative 
process may be seen in providing a public forum for the discussion of questions of fun-
damental importance whereas the advantage of executive decisions lies in their speed 
and adaptability. Hence, the different processes carry a different kind of democratic 
legitimacy which impacts on the resulting ‘product’.247 The Court maintains that both 
the legislative and the executive carry their own democratic legitimacy and that the 
mere fact that the Bundestag was directly elected and the Bundesregierung was not, 
does not affect the latter’s democratic ‘credentials’ and does not create a generic pre-
sumption to act in favour of the former.248 Indeed, the Bundesverfassungsgericht ex-
pressly rejected the notion of using the principle of democracy to enable the legislative 
to override the allocation of functions and tasks to the executive as set out by the 
Grundgesetz in favour of a general presumption of competences in favour of the par-
liament.249 However, when it comes to one power controlling the activities of the oth-
er, the legislative’s more direct democratic credentials do carry more weight: be it en-
quiry committees, questions about the budget or activities affecting the independence 
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of the members of Bundestag,250 to name only a few, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
regularly stresses that in this context the Bundestag represents the people and has a 
duty to make sure that the executive acts within the bounds provided by the Grundge-
setz.251  
Clearly inspired by the Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur, the Court’s 
general approach is to focus on what kind of ‘resolution’ a particular political issue re-
quires, i.e. whether it should be decided via statute or may be decided via individual 
decisions.252 For example, the question whether Germany should make peaceful use of 
nuclear energy was deemed to have such a profound impact on the lives of the citizens 
that it could not be left to the executive to decide if and under what conditions this 
would happen.253 Thus, the Court aims to provide a clear answer to the competence is-
sue arising without having to delineate a precise range of competences for each pow-
er. This flexibility comes at the price of predictability in the sense that the institutions 
involved in the daily political activities may find it difficult to predict the Court’s stance 
on a particular issue. 
In a case where the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to review proceedings created to 
establish the constitutionality of election results, the legal issue was how such deci-
sions should be made. The parliament of Hessen had decided to give this task to a par-
liamentary committee and to provide its decisions with ‘the force of law’.254 The Bun-
desverfassungsgericht reasoned that as such the parliament of Hessen had been free 
to decide on the nature of the remedy as it was well-established parliamentary tradi-
tion to leave such decisions to a parliamentary committee and not to refer them to the 
judiciary. However, the Court took exception to attaching consequences to the deci-
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sions of this parliamentary body which were inherently judicial in nature.255 The Court 
rejected the argument that the process could not be considered ‘judicial’ since it was 
executed by a legislative body. It considered the intentions of the legislative as to what 
kind of procedure it had aimed to adopt to be secondary. If the mechanism had to be 
considered judicial from an objective perspective, it was not something a legislative 
body could do.256 In short, the legislative had to make a choice which power it wanted 
to task with the review of election results and was then restricted to the means availa-
ble to that power for the design of the decision-making process as well as the status of 
the resulting decisions.  
In cases where the Court does not consider the nature of the activity under review to 
be clearly attributable to one power, it can be surprisingly generous regarding the ac-
tivities of the legislative and the executive. For example, when the Bundesregierung 
decided to have the Bundestag and Bundesrat adopt a planning decision directly via 
statute instead of using the existing planning laws, the Court argued that since ‘plan-
ning’ was neither clearly an executive nor clearly a legislative activity, the parliament 
was free to decide the issue itself and not to leave it to the executive.257 Considering 
that the actual decision to have parliament pass a statute was taken by the govern-
ment – i.e. the executive – and not the parliament and that this course of action was 
adopted deliberately to circumvent the options for judicial review embedded in the 
planning laws, the decision seems to run contrary to the courts usual efforts to main-
tain a high standard of fundamental rights protection. It also illustrates the potential 
dangers that lie in the institutional overlap between the Bundesregierung and the 
Bundestag. Those will be explored further in Section C. 
2. Protecting the core: the ultimate limit to usurpation 
With regard to the Court’s original definition of the boundaries within which non-
separateness between powers may be tolerated, the criteria have been drawn togeth-
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er into the notion that a power’s ‘core’ must be protected. This idea was developed in 
the area of fundamental rights protection and tries to convey the image that while lim-
itations (there: to a right’s sphere of protection) were as such possible, they must not 
reach into the very heart, i.e. the ‘core’, of what the right was all about as that would 
turn the idea of fundamental rights protection into a hollow promise.258  
In the present context, the use of this notion allowed the Bundesverfassungsgericht to 
determine whether a particular action constituted a ‘still acceptable’ overlap between 
powers or indeed an unacceptable usurpation. An approach followed by the US courts 
is to start with the theory and to attempt to characterize the activity or task in ques-
tion as being legislative, executive or judicial in nature so that one may establish who 
‘should’ be fulfilling it – which can then be checked against who is doing it in a specific 
case.259 In contrast, the Bundesverfassungsgericht favoured what one could label a 
more textual approach. Specifically, the Court looks to the text of the constitution first 
to establish whether it contains an express or implied allocation of the function or task 
in question. If so, that power has the right to fulfil that function, irrespective of the po-
tential imbalance this may cause. The limits to this constitutional sovereignty may be 
found in overriding considerations based on the Rechtsstaat principle and the citizens’ 
fundamental rights.  
The wiretapping decision of 1970 provides an illustration of how the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht handles this in practice.260 The case concerned a challenge against an 
amendment to Article 10 Grundgesetz (right to privacy of correspondence, post and 
telecommunications) that was meant to enable the secret services to monitor, inter-
cept, wire-tap, etc. such forms of private communication. Contentious was that the 
system for reviewing the actions of the secret services was set up by way of a parlia-
mentary committee instead of the usual judicial review. The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht’s very pragmatic response was that the Grundgesetz expressly allowed 
the legislative the option to create such a replacement mechanism. So making use of 
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that option could not be considered per se a violation of the separation of powers. 
However, since the provision in question clearly stated that the parliamentary proce-
dure was to ‘replace’ the judicial one, the system created had to be the latter’s equiva-
lent in terms of the procedural and substantive characteristics, its effectiveness as well 
as the level of control exercised over the secret services.261 The Court argued that such 
a replacement was justified in this particular case by national security considerations, 
so derogations from the Grundgesetz’s usual requirements with regard to judicial re-
view standards were acceptable. Overall, this derogation did not touch the judicial 
power in its core since the ratio underlying the separation of powers – mutual limita-
tion and control of the powers – was still achieved as the activities of the executive 
were reviewed by another power, the legislative.262 The interesting result of the 
Court’s reasoning is that now the legislative exercises a function that the Court itself 
would consider judicial in nature. The clear impetus behind this reasoning was of 
course the Court’s concerns for the fundamental rights of the individuals involved. In 
that sense, its solution is a rather creative reversal of the intentions of the amend-
ment: the Bundesverfassungsgericht allowed the legislative and the executive to cir-
cumvent the normal judicial review processes in the first instance, only to recreate the 
effect as much as possible in the second step by forcing the respective parliamentary 
committee to act as much as a judicial tribunal as possible.  
One of its earliest cases concerned the protection of the executive against organisa-
tional restructuring efforts of the legislative. The case concerned a statute enacted by 
the Bremen parliament that aimed to transfer final decision-making power for person-
nel decisions relating to civil servants away from the Bremen government to a newly 
created body chaired by the president of the Bremen parliament. The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considered this to be unconstitutional as it violated the executive’s power 
in its core. While there was as such flexibility as to how to arrange the administrative 
setup, the organisational structures had to ensure that the executive was still able to 
fulfil its tasks independently and in a manner that allowed them to carry the political 
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responsibility for its decisions. This newly created body would take final decision-
making power over personnel decisions away from the executive which would lead to 
the unacceptable situation that the executive had to take responsibility for the actions 
of employees they had not appointed to the position in the first place. This case illus-
trates how the Court sees the duty to fulfil a certain function as corresponding to the 
power to do so, i.e. it creates a direct link to the criterion mentioned by the Court that 
‘No power may be deprived of the competences necessary for the fulfilment of its re-
sponsibilities’.263 It also illustrates the great variety in which one power may attempt to 
usurp another. 
With regard to the latter, a recent series of decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
proved cases in point: The cases concerned the observation of elected members of the 
Bundestag or a Land legislature by the federal secret services. The Bundesregierung 
had used the secret services to spy in a fairly general fashion on several parliamentari-
ans of the LINKE party (the successor of the GDR’s socialist party). The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht dealt with this fairly harshly. It held that such activities constituted an in-
terference with the parliamentarians’ rights i.a. to political freedom of expression and 
to pursue their office without hindrance. In a very real sense, it impeded the work of 
the Bundestag as a whole as it could lead to an atmosphere of intimidation.264 All in all, 
it created the false image of the members of the legislative being accountable to the 
executive while only the reverse was true.265 Thus, the Court reasoned, such observa-
tions could only be constitutional for ‘imperative reasons of national security’ and had 
to be based on concrete allegations of wrongdoing. It could not ordered merely for the 
sake of membership in a particular party that may, or may not, have political convic-
tions the current Bundesregierung did not like. 
 
The cases outlined above illustrate that the protection of the core is not done merely 
for the sake of preserving a power’s independence or for the sake of it being able to 
                                                     
263
 BVerfG, ‘Hessisches Richtergesetz’ (n 236) 59. 
264
 BVerfG, ‘Überwachung von Bundestagsabgeordneten’ (n 250) 195. 
265
 BVerfG, ‘Abgeordnetenbeobachtung’ (n 251) 100–101. 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Part II: The separation of powers and the Grundgesetz 
 
 
92 
control other powers in turn. Instead, the Court’s arguments emphasise that the core 
of each power is immutable because each power has been given specific tasks and 
functions by the constitution. In this, the separation of powers is supplemented by the 
Rechtsstaat principle in that the latter requires that the institutions fulfilling these 
tasks and functions have to be accountable to the democratically elected parliament. 
However, this is only possible if the actions taken by those institutions are their own in 
the first place – i.e. if they cannot decide independently, then one cannot in all honesty 
claim that those decisions were their ‘own’ and accountability is impossible.266 It is 
concluded that the Bundesverfassungsgericht may be considered as generous in situa-
tions where the legislative and the executive re-allocate functions and tasks not specif-
ically provided for in the Grundgesetz – provided they stay away from the core.267 
C. The need for cooperation 
‘Cooperation’ is the second criterion identified in the literature as required for a func-
tioning system of the separation of powers. Its realisation is less straightforward than 
that of the notion of separateness as the exact nature of the control and cooperation 
mechanisms will largely depend on the nature of the constitutional system in question. 
For example in a presidential system like the United States, where especially institu-
tions and personnel are kept strictly separate, cooperation and control mechanisms 
will have to provide access to the activities of one power from the outside, as it were, 
as the other powers are deliberately not part of its decision-making process. For ex-
ample in the field of legislation, Congress is more or less solely in control, apart from 
the veto of the president. That veto does not make the president part of the delibera-
tions on the bill, it just allows the executive to control the activities of the legislative 
from the ‘outside’. Overall, cooperation and control mechanisms in presidential sys-
tems will likely be fairly confrontational, pitting power against power. 
In contrast, in a parliamentary democracy the mechanisms for cooperation and control 
between the legislative and the executive are largely political and procedural in nature 
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as the powers’ overlap with regard to personnel allows in particular the executive to 
participate in the activities of the legislative by right of membership. As a result, those 
mechanisms are built around options to influence the process of decision-making itself 
within the institution rather than controlling the actual decision at the end of the pro-
cess.  
With regard to maintaining the separateness of the powers involved, this leads to a 
situation where one power – the executive in form of the government – becomes so 
much part of another power – the legislative – so that it can influence or even domi-
nate its decision-making. As a result, the powers are no longer required to cooperate 
with each other and thus one cannot rely on the tension between them for mutual 
control. Montesquieu considered this to be one of the dangers of ‘unified’ government 
and thus a violation of the very notion of the separation of powers.268 Thoma, faced 
with a similar institutional setup in the Weimar Constitution, was less severe, but was 
still rather concerned about the potential ‘power monism’ where the executive was in 
danger of becoming nothing more than an executive committee of the legislative. In 
contrast, others considered precisely the political means of control to be an effective 
compensation.269 
This section will explore precisely how that institutional overlap impacts on the ability 
of each power to exercise effective control over the other. The first ‘mechanism’ to be 
reviewed will be the legislative process (Sub-section 1). In that context, the impact of 
constitutional practice with regard to party political influences on the process and on 
the institutions’ behaviour will be of particular importance (Sub-section 2). The last 
two mechanisms reviewed here are the budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag and 
the right of the Bundestag to instate enquiry committees (Sub-section 3). 
1. Cooperation through joint allocation of responsibilities 
German constitutional law scholars describe the responsibilities of the Bundestag and 
the Bundesregierung in the domestic context as ‘Staatsleitung zur gesamten Hand’/ 
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‘joint state leadership’.270 This means that, in theory, the Bundestag and the Bundesre-
gierung share the rights and responsibilities that are part of governing a state as equal 
partners which each have a unique contribution to make. Traditionally, the Bundesre-
gierung is seen to be in charge of setting the political agenda whereas the Bundestag is 
seen as the forum for debate on the adoption of the legislation the government needs 
to implement its agenda – an allocation of roles which is seen as corresponding to their 
nature as executive and legislative respectively.  
As far as the legislative process as designed by the Grundgesetz goes, the Bundesre-
gierung’s influence is very noticeable throughout: it has the right to introduce legisla-
tive bills into the Bundestag271 and votes on ordinary bills only require a simple majori-
ty272 for the adoption. As members of the Bundestag, the members of the Bundesre-
gierung together with the members of the government coalition have a controlling in-
fluence on the work in the committees and can thus support a bill at every stage of the 
way. This procedural influence is combined with the Bundesregierung’s advantage in 
terms of information and expertise which results in the fact that in practice the Bun-
desregierung provides ca. 60% of all bills deliberated in the Bundestag. On the surface, 
this provides the Bundesregierung with a comprehensive set of mechanisms to exert 
control over the Bundestag. This raises the question as to how much independent de-
cision-making power the Bundestag has truly left, considering that the executive may 
reach into its very heart.  
However, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has developed two reserves that provide the 
Bundestag as a whole, but also the opposition parties, with options for recourse to 
prevent the Bundesregierung from abusing its practical dominance – and thus prevent 
the usurpation of the legislative by the executive. Derived from the Rechtsstaat princi-
ple, the general statutory reserve (Gesetzesvorbehalt) requires the executive to have a 
statutory basis for any action that impacts on the fundamental rights of an individual. 
This would indicate that, as such, the executive is very much dependent on the legisla-
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tive for every single action relating to the implementation of its political agenda. How-
ever, the Bundesregierung could easily circumvent these strictures by way of using its 
majority in the Bundestag to pass any statute it wished or even to pass legislation that 
empowered it to adopt far-reaching delegated legislation, thus making the Bundestag 
redundant. However, as the Bundesverfassungsgericht made clear, such a move would 
be a violation of the allocation of tasks and functions as created by the Grundgesetz, 
i.e. of the separation of powers as well the Rechtsstaat principle.273 According to the 
so-called ‘Wesentlichkeitstheorie’, the Grundgesetz contains a so-called parliamentary 
reserve (Parlamentsvorbehalt) that all ‘fundamental’ decisions have to be taken by the 
legislative itself. In other words, the Bundestag is prevented from delegating away its 
power to make decisions for the people who elected it. In the jurisprudence of the 
Court, this theory has been of particular relevance in the area of human rights. For ex-
ample, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the question whether a teacher in a 
public school may or may not wear a headscarf could not be left to administrative dis-
cretion but had to be settled directly by statute.274 Considered through the lens of the 
separation of powers, this reserve shows a strong connection to Kant’s idea of the 
people having the right to decide themselves what limitations they wished to be sub-
ject to. From a practical point of view, this reserve prevents the Bundesregierung from 
using its control over the political parties supporting it to abuse their dominance over 
the Bundestag in order to delegate legislative power to the Bundesregierung. In es-
sence, this reserve protects the core of the Bundestag’s legislative function against it 
being undermined ‘from the inside’. 
Beyond these two reserves, the division of labour between the executive and the legis-
lative is left to a large extent to the institutions involved. For example while the politi-
cal decision as such about the peaceful use of nuclear energy had to be taken by the 
parliament,275 it was perfectly acceptable for it to regulate the matter through the use 
of vague legal terms that by their very nature transferred a lot of actual decision-
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making power to the executive during the implementation. Without expressly referring 
to it, the Bundesverfassungsgericht relied on notions developed later by Ossenbühl 
with his Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur276 when it argued that in an 
area of law so dependent on staying on top of fast-moving technological progress, any 
legislator would be hard-pressed to keep a statute properly updated – and concluded 
that it was no violation of the Wesentlichkeitstheorie if the executive was provided 
with a considerable amount of discretion if that discretion was guided by a statute 
providing the necessary basic framework.277  
2. Cooperation as part of the political process 
The overview in the previous Section may have created the impression of an almost 
overpowering influence of the executive over the legislative. While this matches the 
constitutional reality to some extent, there are two factors in particular that temper 
the overall independence of the Bundeskanzler and the Bundesregierung and thus pre-
vent the executive from simply usurping the Bundestag. One such factor is the influ-
ence of party politics that limit in particular the Bundeskanzler’s political room to ma-
noeuvre, the other is the rather unexpected emergence of the Bundesrat as a platform 
for party political power play.  
As could be seen in the previous Section, at first glance the existence of political par-
ties has led to a situation where the competences and rights that the Grundgesetz offi-
cially allocates to the Bundestag are in reality controlled by the Bundesregierung. Since 
1949, all but one government have enjoyed the very stable support of the political par-
ties supporting the government coalition. This could lead one to conclude that the 
Grundgesetz’s version of a parliamentary democracy lends itself very well to a domina-
tion by the executive: the nominal need for the confidence of the Bundestag into the 
Bundesregierung is in practice reduced to the government having to make sure of the 
support of the coalition parties who in turn have a vested interest to provide stable 
support to the government. In short, the ‘natural’ tension Montesquieu envisaged be-
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tween two opposing powers has been replaced by a seemingly total alignment of the 
interests involved. If one then considers that the Grundgesetz provides the Bun-
deskanzler with i.a. total control over the composition of the Bundesregierung and the 
political agenda (Article 65), it seems that the Grundgesetz’s very structures allow the 
convergence of all political decision-making power onto one office and person: that of 
the Bundeskanzler.  
The political reality, however, is different. The Bundeskanzler’s competences on paper 
are severely limited in practice by precisely the same forces that seem to empower 
her/ him beyond what the drafters of the Grundgesetz may have intended. The mixed-
member-based electoral system allows a larger number of parties to enter the Bundes-
tag. One of the consequences is that it is very difficult for one party to achieve an ab-
solute majority. Since 1949, the Bundesregierung always consisted of a coalition of at 
least two parties, even in 1957, when the conservatives did gain an absolute majority. 
This led to the development of a political culture dominated by the search for com-
promise and where pre-election electoral manifestos have very little influence on the 
voters since they know that the parties will have to compromise on their political ob-
jectives in the post-election negotiations leading to the so-called coalition agreement.  
The coalition agreement is a contract between the parties of the intended coalition 
that sets out the general conditions and goals of their proposed cooperation for the 
coming parliamentary term. It seriously limits the Bundeskanzler’s power to ‘deter-
mine’ the political agenda independently as it would likely lead to the break-up of the 
coalition if the Bundeskanzler went against it.278 Another important part of the coali-
tion negotiations is the agreement on the composition of the Bundesregierung – down 
to what party will be allowed to fill how many and which posts and who from each par-
ty will fill which post. Without an agreement on this, no party will sign the coalition 
agreement. Thus, a practice like the ‘reshuffle’ so common in English constitutional 
politics is an entirely foreign notion in the German system as it is politically almost im-
possible for the Bundeskanzler to reassign the members of the cabinet to different 
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posts or actually to get rid of one. Even if one were to resign, the decision about who 
will succeed in office is again taken in agreement among the coalition parties, even 
though the Grundgesetz officially allocates this power to the Bundeskanzler alone.279 
As a consequence, it is very important for the Bundesregierung to secure the continu-
ous support of the members of the government coalition. As Sprungk280 has investigat-
ed, one way of doing so are weekly meetings where a considerable amount of infor-
mation flows from the government to the members of the coalition parties. This does 
provide the majority of the Bundestag with influence on the Bundesregierung, howev-
er it undermines the position of the whole house since the opposition parties are left 
out. The effect this has in the area of Foreign Affairs will be explored in the next Chap-
ter. 
Another factor that has proven to exert a strong counter influence to the Bundesre-
gierung’s dominance of the Bundestag is the Bundesrat (Federal Council). The drafters 
of the Grundgesetz intended it to be the institutional representation of the interests of 
the Länder at federal level, but over time the Bundesrat has turned out to be far more 
often a platform for party political manoeuvring and an effective veto player.281  
As the Federalists explained, a federal state structure leads to decision-making power 
being divided not only in a horizontal dimension among legislative, executive and judi-
ciary, but also in a vertical dimension between the federal level and the Land level. An 
institution like the US Senate or the Bundesrat provides the connection between the 
levels and allows the states/ Länder a direct route into the decision-making process at 
federal level in order to make sure that their rights are not infringed. How much this 
underlying rationale determines the position and role of the Bundesrat in Germany’s 
federal constitutional system is evident in the specific rights and responsibilities the 
Bundesrat is provided with. It has the right to request the presence of (members of) 
the Bundesregierung at its sessions and its members have the right to access all ses-
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sions of the Bundestag.282 Most importantly, as the upper house of the federal parlia-
ment, the Bundesrat is involved in the legislative process: Generally, it has the right to 
object to a bill passed by the Bundestag; in instances expressly specified by the 
Grundgesetz, bills require the express consent of the Bundesrat.283 Those instances 
usually concern situations where sensitive interests of the Länder are at stake,284 so in 
and by itself a seemingly reasonable compromise between the interests of the federal 
level and those of the Länder. Unfortunately for the Bundesregierung, these instances 
turned out to be the rule and not the exception and thus the main reason why the 
Bundesrat gained so much power: by the mid-2000’s more than 60% of all federal bills 
were subject to the consent of the Bundesrat which provided its members with a lot of 
political leverage to ‘reopen’ negotiations with the Bundesregierung and the majority 
in the Bundestag about the content of the statute.  
This situation is exacerbated by the specific institutional structures of the Bundesrat 
and the resulting influence of party politics. The members of the Bundesrat are not 
elected by the people of the Land in question but appointed by its executive.285 In 
practice, the appointees are usually members of the Land’s government, including its 
head of government. Unlike the Bundestag, the Bundesrat does not have a fixed term. 
Instead its composition is subject to continuous change depending on the date and 
outcome of the elections in the Länder. Unfortunately for the Bundesregierung, the 
parliamentary terms in the Länder do not coincide with the term of the Bundestag286 
and with up to sixteen elections at Land level over the course of one four-year term of 
the Federal Parliament, the membership and thus the majority situation based on par-
ty membership is in constant flux. Moreover, a noticeable trend over the last sixty 
years has been that even if a new Bundesregierung started out with the majority in the 
Bundesrat on its side, this had usually shifted to the opposition by the end of its term, 
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sometimes quite dramatically. For example, Angela Merkel’s 2009-2013 Conservative/ 
Free Democrat287 coalition government started out with a Bundesrat majority in its fa-
vour of 38 out of 69 votes. By 2013, the parties in opposition in the Bundestag held the 
majority in the Bundesrat with 36 out of 69 votes while the parties of the Bundesre-
gierung had only 15 votes safely on their side. Such developments allow the opposition 
in the Bundestag to play on party allegiances and in case it is outvoted in the Bundes-
tag, to use its leverage in the Bundesrat to push for compromises that the Bundesre-
gierung rejected during the debate in the Bundestag. For the Bundesregierung this 
means in turn that the mere fact that it controls the majority in the Bundestag is not 
necessarily the decisive factor when it comes to the implementation of its political 
agenda.  
While this ‘re-dedication’ of the Bundesrat may be deplored from the perspective of its 
role as representative of the Länder, it is a welcome development within the context of 
the separation of powers. It turns the Bundesrat into an effective counter-force to the 
Bundesregierung and provides the Bundestag’s opposition parties with an additional 
option to control the activities of the Bundesregierung. However, as has been seen in 
the past, if used to excess, this effect may become seriously disruptive to the political 
process, even to the point of gridlock,288 something that is as such is not a natural oc-
currence within the German constitutional system.  
3. Cooperation through confrontation: budgetary responsibility and 
enquiry committees 
Unlike the process of legislation and the practical cooperation due to party political 
constraints, the options for interaction reviewed in this Section are more confronta-
tional in the sense that they allow the Bundestag to interfere considerably with the in-
dependent workings of the Bundesregierung. Especially in the hands of the opposition, 
they can develop into powerful tools for political control.  
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The responsibility for the budget is one of the most fiercely protected rights of any par-
liament, the German literature tends to refer to it as the ‘Königsrecht’ – literally the 
‘royal’ right of a parliament.289 Historically speaking, the power to control the budget 
was one of the earliest parliamentary rights to develop - already Magna Carta listed it 
among the concessions made by King John290 and with the Bill of Rights 1689, it finally 
became political reality that the monarch could not raise taxes without parliamentary 
approval.291 It was fought over for good reason - control over the budget enabled the 
parliament to control the monarch’s activities in a very direct way: without the power 
to raise the money necessary to raise an army and to pay for weapons, it was impossi-
ble for the monarch to wage war. The ultimate control over war and peace was thus – 
in a practical and very real sense – in the hands of the parliament. As Montesquieu 
pointed out:  
“… Si la puissance exécutrice statue 
sur la levée des deniers publics autre-
ment que par son consentement, il n'y 
aura plus de liberté,..." 
“… If the executive could control the 
raising of funds all by itself, there 
would be no liberty any more…”292 
The Grundgesetz follows in that tradition and allocates ultimate decision-making pow-
er over public spending (the annual budget as well as control of expenses made) to the 
national parliament, specifically the Bundestag.293 Despite the fact that the Bundesre-
gierung holds the majority in the house and can usually be sure of winning the vote, 
this allows the Bundestag considerable influence over the government’s policy deci-
sions for two reasons: for one, the political impact of the debate is considerable. The 
debate on the budget is considered one of the most important events in the annual 
political calendar that is used by the members of the Bundestag, especially by the op-
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position, as a general review of the government’s policies.294 It usually attracts consid-
erable media attention which allows the Parliament to fulfil one of its most important 
functions: to provide a platform for the exchange of a broad spectrum of opinions and 
to create transparency and accountability of the government vis-à-vis the elec-
torate.295 In its jurisprudence, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has used this allocation of 
responsibilities as an argument to strengthen the Bundestag’s position on financial 
matters vis-à-vis the Bundesregierung. Seen from the perspective of the separation of 
powers, the repercussions for the relationship between the executive and the legisla-
tive are considerable: the government’s right to protect the independence of its inter-
nal decision-making processes is much more limited when it comes to providing access 
to information about budgetary affairs.296  
Secondly, as the right is officially allocated to the Bundestag as a whole, it can turn into 
a powerful tool in the hands of the opposition when used as the basis for an investiga-
tion within the framework of an enquiry committee. As the jurisprudence of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht outlined below illustrates, there are not many instances where 
the executive can legitimately refuse to hand over the requested information.297 
Using the doctrine of separation of powers, the Bundesverfassungsgericht strength-
ened the rights of the opposition in this context, for example to prevent the parlia-
mentary majority from amending the mandate of the enquiry committee in order to 
subvert the enquiry as a whole and/or to turn it away from the actions of the govern-
ment the opposition wished to scrutinize.298 The Bundesverfassungsgericht held that in 
a parliamentary system the tension necessary for an effective control among the pow-
ers did no longer exist between the government and the parliament as such, but rather 
between the governmental majority in the parliament and the opposition/ the parlia-
mentary minority.299 In light of that fact, the enquiry rights would allow for an effective 
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control of the government and the majority it controlled only if they could be used ef-
fectively by the opposition.300 Hence, it was particularly important that that function 
and those rights could not be undermined by the government by using its majority in 
the Bundestag to change or amend the mandate of the enquiry committee in order to 
frustrate the investigation as such or to slow it down to such a degree that its purpose 
could no longer be fulfilled. Therefore, the only amendments that were acceptable 
against the wishes of the minority could be those that clarified the mandate or added 
issues that were necessary for an objective review of the issues under investigation.301 
However, the Court stressed that the majority had the burden of proof on this point as 
it had to be obvious that the amendments met those criteria. If it was not, they were 
automatically inadmissible.302 
Furthermore, once the enquiry was under way, the committee had the right to gather 
all the evidence it needed to conclude the investigation and the executive had a duty 
to cooperate by providing the files requested or by giving its civil servants permission 
to appear as witnesses.303 The executive had no discretion304 to refuse access to files or 
witnesses on the grounds for example that a disclosure would be against the best in-
terests of the nation or that confidentiality issues were at stake. The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht stressed that the protection of the interests of the nation was the joint 
duty of both government and parliament and thus as a general rule, the government 
could not rely on this argument against the parliament in order to refuse access to files 
unless confidentiality could not be ensured.305 Overall, to refuse access was to be the 
rare exception, not the rule, and acceptable reasons were mainly linked to the protec-
tion of the government’s internal decision-making processes which the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considered to be part of the executive’s core.306  
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D. Conclusion  
As the survey of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s jurisprudence illustrates, the Court’s 
approach is based in theory to a certain extent, but is overall very pragmatic and driv-
en by the desire to resolve the practical conflict at hand.  
The Court’s overall approach to the separation of powers may be described as very 
pragmatic and flexible – instead of attempting to define and delineate each power 
precisely, it uses the separation of powers in combination with in particular the princi-
ple of democracy and fundamental rights protection in order to determine the scope 
and limits of each power’s sphere of influence and their relationship in the context at 
hand. In addition, its overall focus is much more on the element of cooperation rather 
than that of separation, probably due to the fact that it considered the latter to be se-
cured by the Grundgesetz itself through its provisions on the institutions. Moreover, 
the conflicts emerging from the system of parliamentary democracy which the Court 
had to resolve revolved far more around the need to regulate mechanisms for mutual 
control rather than to protect the legislative or the executive from being usurped by 
the other. The limits to that flexibility can be found in particular in the Rechtsstaat 
principle and the requirement to protect each power’s core.  
 
The link to the literature in terms of explicit references is tenuous which could be seen 
as confirmation that the theory is of little use ‘in the field’: certainly questions of pow-
er delineations or discussions of the underlying purpose of the theory – issues that are 
widely discussed in the academic literature – are rare to non-existent. The Court does 
provide very little in terms of positive definitions or explanations - what exactly may be 
necessary to achieve ‘mutual control, limitation and moderation’307 is not explained. 
 
The mechanisms for the mutual control existing between legislative and executive pro-
vide each power with opportunities to exercise considerable influence, depending on 
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the situation. They are largely procedural and political in nature, so do not lend them-
selves easily to be enforced before the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The overall image 
that emerges is that the separation of powers is one element in the toolbox of the 
Court that helps it to shape the relationship between the Bundestag and the Bun-
desregierung. The principle of democracy, the Rechtsstaat principle and in particular 
fundamental rights protection are recurring themes that influence the balance of pow-
er between institutions, sometimes just as much as the separation of powers. 
  
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Part II: The separation of powers and the Grundgesetz 
 
 
106 
CHAPTER IV: Foreign affairs – the separation of powers ‘misfit’?  
The previous Chapter focused on the interaction of the Bundestag and the Bundesre-
gierung in the domestic context and how the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht has shaped their relationship in practice as well as the underlying concep-
tualisation of the separation of powers in the Grundgesetz. As could be seen, the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht rather favours case by case solutions over enforcing a specific 
line of reasoning as a matter of principle. As will be seen in this Chapter, this is turned 
on its head when it comes to Foreign Affairs. The Chapter will provide an overview 
over the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach to Foreign Affairs in general and its re-
percussions for the relationship between the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung.  
A. Establishing the executive’s foreign policy prerogative 
1. The text of the Grundgesetz  
In keeping with Germany’s federal nature, the Grundgesetz contains an explicit alloca-
tion of the responsibility in Foreign Affairs as regards the level – the federation or the 
Länder. Article 32 (1) specifies that ‘Die Pflege der Beziehungen zu auswärtigen Staaten 
ist Sache des Bundes.‘/ ‘Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the federa-
tion.’ However, who exactly at the federal level is meant to ‘conduct’ those relations is 
not specified – like many constitutions, the Grundgesetz does not make explicit provi-
sion as to what institutions or power(s) should be responsible for dealing with Foreign 
Affairs. Other provisions only regulate individual aspects, but do not explicitly allocate 
the responsibility for Foreign Affairs as a matter of principle to one or more power(s). 
On the other hand, what is regulated is the involvement of the Bundestag in two very 
specific situations:  
Artikel 24 
(1) Der Bund kann durch Gesetz Ho-
heitsrechte auf zwischenstaatliche Ein-
richtungen übertragen.  
Artikel 59 
(2) Verträge, welche die politischen 
Beziehungen des Bundes regeln oder 
sich auf Gegenstände der Bundesge-
Article 24 
(1) The Federation may by a law 
transfer sovereign powers to interna-
tional organizations 
Article 59 
(2) Treaties that regulate the polit-
ical relations of the Federation or re-
late to subjects of federal legislation 
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setzgebung beziehen, bedürfen der Zu-
stimmung oder der Mitwirkung der 
jeweils für die Bundesgesetzgebung 
zuständigen Körperschaften in der 
Form eines Bundesgesetzes. Für Ver-
waltungsabkommen gelten die Vor-
schriften über die Bundesverwaltung 
entsprechend.  
shall require the consent or participa-
tion, in the form of a federal law, of 
the bodies responsible in such a case 
for the enactment of federal law. In 
the case of executive agreements the 
provisions concerning the federal 
administration shall apply mutatis 
mutandis. 
Article 24 (1) reflects the realisation of the drafters of the Grundgesetz that the role of 
international organisations would become much larger in post-World War II interna-
tional relations. Hence, it regulates to whom, how and why Germany may transfer 
‘sovereign powers’. In the past 60 years it was applied for example to the ratification of 
the NATO treaty, the UN Charter and of course the European treaties.  
In contrast to the very specific scenario regulated in Article 24, Article 59 (2) refers to 
the ‘everyday’ workings of international relations with respect to obligations created 
through treaties. Like many constitutions, the Grundgesetz demands the involvement 
of the parliament at the stage of ratification. As can be seen above, Article 59 (2) re-
quires the involvement of the parliament for two specific types of treaties: those that 
“… regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal leg-
islation…”. According to established jurisprudence, treaties regulating the political rela-
tions of the Federation are those that affect the existence of the state, its territorial in-
tegrity, its independence or its status in the international community and thus affect 
matters of such fundamental concern for the state and the people that parliamentary 
consent is necessary. Treaties ‘relating to subjects of federal legislation’ are in turn 
those that create international obligations for Germany that need to be implemented 
by way of federal statute, i.e. where the implementation at domestic level requires the 
enactment of statutes and thus the Bundestag’s cooperation.308 In the past, for exam-
ple the European Convention of Human Rights has been ratified based on Article 59 
(2). Inversely, this means that as long as a treaty does not affect fundamental question 
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of Germany’s very existence or falls within existing powers of the Bundesregierung 
(original or delegated), it does not require parliamentary consent for its ratification.  
Article 24 and Article 59 do not explicitly determine the relationship between the Bun-
destag and the Bundesregierung in the area of Foreign Affairs in general.309 Thus, since 
the 1950s, there has been a controversial discussion among academics regarding the 
allocation of the responsibility for Foreign Affairs and over the exact extent of the Bun-
destag’s and the Bundesregierung’s respective responsibilities and competences and in 
particular about the options of control the Bundestag may have over the actions of the 
Bundesregierung and the resulting balance of power between the institutions. 
The discussion among academics has revolved around mainly two different interpreta-
tions: the more traditional position perceives Foreign Affairs to be ‘naturally’ a matter 
for the executive.310 Such an approach would be very much in keeping with the one 
taken by Locke and Montesquieu. Montesquieu described what he later on referred to 
as the executive power as the ‘power referring to the rights of nations’, i.e. to him, the 
typical activities of the executive included the relations to foreign states. Locke even 
separated it out as the 'federative' power – distinct from the ordinary executive power 
and the prerogative power.311 The consequence of such a classification would be that 
the Bundesregierung would be considered as exclusively in charge and the Bundestag 
would be relegated to a minor role consisting of after-the-fact oversight and political 
control powers.  
Critics have been very vocal about this remnant of ‘monarchical’ perceptions of the re-
lationship between the legislative and the executive in the area of international rela-
tions.312 Instead of the solution that gives one power a very dominant role and leaves 
the other in a fairly weak position, supporters of an alternative approach suggest to 
consider Foreign Affairs as a joined responsibility of legislative and executive. Such an 
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approach would provide the Bundestag with a level of influence similar to that enjoyed 
in the domestic context.313 This view could be supported by reference to one of the 
Court’s own decisions on the separation of powers. Regarding the reorganisation of 
the Bremen personnel division, the Court had decided that a power that was given re-
sponsibilities by the Grundgesetz may not be deprived of the competences to fulfil 
those obligations since otherwise that power would be made accountable for decisions 
it had no control over (cf. Chapter III B 2).314 If one considers the Bundestag’s general 
democratic responsibility vis-à-vis the people, in particular for the actions of the Bun-
desregierung, one may argue that the traditional approach leaves the Bundestag in a 
situation where it has to ratify treaties without having had any input into the negotia-
tion - in short: with the ratification, it is made responsible for actions of the Bundesre-
gierung it had no control over. Such a situation would be avoided is Foreign Affairs 
were to be considered the joint responsibility of the Bundestag and Bundesregierung.  
2. The Court’s initial approach 
Unfortunately, the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided already very early on to follow 
the more traditional approach. In two seminal decisions in 1952, the Court opted to al-
locate the competence to one power only, namely the executive, and relegated the 
legislative to control powers only which were largely political in nature.  
The first case concerned the so-called Petersberg Agreement which was meant to ena-
ble the then occupied Western Germany to participate in the activities aimed at creat-
ing the first European communities. The second case concerned an agreement be-
tween France and Western Germany on trade and financial transactions.315 In both 
cases, the Bundesregierung had concluded the negotiations with the Western Allies, 
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and the French government respectively, and then had the agreements published in 
the Federal Gazette without submitting them to a vote in the Bundestag. The Bundes-
tag’s opposition challenged this as a violation of the Bundestag’s rights under Article 
59 (2). Both cases concerned matters arising under the statute regulating the powers 
of the Western Allied Forces for the purposes of the occupation (the so-called Be-
satzungsstatut) and thus dealt with very specific and rather untypical situations. Nev-
ertheless, the Court used this opportunity to set out its interpretation of Article 59 (2) 
in a detailed fashion, creating rules that govern the relationship of the Bundestag and 
the Bundesregierung in the area of Foreign Affairs to this day.  
The Court dismissed both claims since neither treaty fell under the two alternatives 
laid out for consent requirements in Article 59 II – the Petersberg Agreement did not 
because it was a treaty with the occupying powers and thus not subject to the regular 
provisions of the Grundgesetz; and the Franco-German treaty did not because it was 
not a treaty that ‘regulate[d] the political relations of the Federation or relate[d] to 
subjects of federal legislation’ for the purposes of Article 59 (2). With respect to the re-
lationship between the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung, the Court’s reasoning 
contains several statements that developed into recurring themes in the subsequent 
decades, so it is worth quoting them in full:  
“… Article 59 Abs. 2 GG durch-
bricht das Gewaltenteilungssystem 
insofern, als hier die Legislative in den 
Bereich der Exekutive übergreift. […] 
daß auch insoweit die Politik des 
Bundeskanzlers der parlamentari-
schen Kontrolle unterliegt, die in ei-
nem Mißtrauensvotum nach Article 
67 GG gipfeln kann. …” 
“… Article 59 (2) of the Basic Law 
deviates from the system of the sepa-
ration of powers, in that the legisla-
tive branch encroaches in the area of 
the executive branch. […] policy mak-
ing by the Federal Chancellor is sub-
ject to parliamentary control, which 
can culminate in a vote of no-
confidence under Article 67 of the 
Basic Law…”316 
“… In der parlamentarischen De- “… In a parliamentary democracy, 
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mokratie ist grundsätzlich dem Par-
lament die Rechtsetzung vorbehalten 
und der Exekutive die Regierung und 
Verwaltung übertragen. Hierzu ge-
hört auch die Führung der Außen- 
und Handelspolitik.[…] Der Bundestag 
kann diese Funktion der Regierung 
nicht übernehmen, soweit ihm nicht 
ausdrücklich Regierungsaufgaben zu-
gewiesen sind. […] Nur weil im Article 
59 Abs. 2 GG für die beiden Sonderfäl-
le […] die Form des Gesetzes vorbe-
halten ist, kann die Legislative durch 
Mitwirkung in dieser Form in die Tä-
tigkeit der Exekutive eingreifen. Dar-
über hinaus hat Article 59 Abs. 2 GG 
dem Bundestag kein Recht gegeben, 
in den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Re-
gierung einzugreifen. Der Bundestag 
bleibt auf die allgemeinen verfas-
sungsmäßigen Kontrollmöglichkei-
ten beschränkt. Er regiert und ver-
waltet nicht selbst, sondern er kon-
trolliert die Regierung. Mißbilligt er 
deren Politik, so kann er dem Bundes-
kanzler das Mißtrauen aussprechen 
(Article 67 GG) und dadurch die Re-
gierung stürzen. Er kann aber nicht 
selbst die Politik führen. …“ 
legislation is basically reserved for 
parliament, with government and 
administration being assigned to the 
executive branch. To the latter be-
longs also the conducting of foreign 
policy and trade policy. […] The Bun-
destag is not able to assume this 
function of government unless it is 
expressly provided with such func-
tions. […] Only because Article 59 (2) 
requires a law in the two special cas-
es […] is the legislature able to inter-
vene in executive activity by way of 
participation in the form of law mak-
ing. Above and beyond this, Article 59 
II has not given the Bundestag a right 
to intervene in the Government's 
zone of responsibility. It remains lim-
ited to the general constitutional 
powers of supervision; rather than it-
self governing and administering, it 
controls the Government. Should it 
disapprove of the latter's policies, it is 
empowered to express its lack of con-
fidence in the Federal Chancellor (Ar-
ticle 67 of the Basic Law) and bring 
down the Government. But it is not 
able to conduct policy making of its 
own accord. …”317 
These statements contain in a very compacted fashion the base line of the Court’s past 
– and present – attitude in the area of Foreign Affairs: that according to the Grundge-
setz’s system of the separation of powers, Foreign Affairs had to be considered the ex-
clusive domain of the executive and any activity of the legislative in this context could 
only be seen as ‘encroaching’ on that domain. As a consequence, provisions allowing 
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such encroachment – like Articles 24 and 59 (2) – have to be considered as exceptions 
to that rule and thus have to be interpreted very strictly so as to protect the rights of 
the executive.318 Instead of legal rights, the Court consistently refers the Bundestag to 
its political control rights such as plenary debates, question times, etc. and of course 
the ultimate weapon: the vote of no confidence.  
Considering the rather sweeping nature of the statements above, it is very interesting 
to see that the Court does not provide any explanation as to why foreign policy should 
be the exclusive domain of the executive, why a broader interpretation of Article 59 II 
would create such an intolerable disturbance of the balance of power between execu-
tive and legislative or why the shift of power in favour of the executive created by the 
broad discretion in turn does not present reason for concern with regard to the bal-
ance between the two powers. Had such a question been asked in the domestic con-
text, the cases reviewed in the previous Chapter illustrate that the Court would have 
reached a different conclusion.  
Overall, this approach has to be considered rather executive-friendly as it leaves a lot 
of political decision-making power to the executive and relegates the legislative to ex-
ercising an after-the-fact legal control and otherwise to having to rely on political 
means to carry out some measure of oversight over the activities of the executive. 
Thus, even though the Court provided a measure of procedural support to the opposi-
tion, it created an atmosphere where the chances for a successful challenge against 
the executive’s actions appeared slim indeed. This stance has attracted considerable 
criticisms from the academic community and the opposition in the federal parliament 
has tried in numerous cases to change the Court’s mind. However, apart from very 
specific exceptions that will be discussed in Section B below, the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht has kept to this line of reasoning to this day. 
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3. Developments since the 1950s 
Cases decided over the next few decades confirmed those early decisions without add-
ing anything substantially new to the line of argument outlined above.319 This changed 
in 1984, although not in favour of the parliament: the Green party (then in opposition 
in the Bundestag) brought a challenge against the Bundesregierung’s agreement in the 
NATO council to allow the US to station Pershing 2 and Cruise missile nuclear weapons 
in Germany.320 Again, the Court dismissed the action, but this time it added considera-
bly to its reasoning established in the earlier cases. The Green party tried to rely in par-
ticular on the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s earlier decision regarding the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy where the Court had declared that that question was of such funda-
mental importance for the rights and lives of the citizens that only the legislative had 
the democratic legitimacy to decide about it.321 The Green party now argued that the 
military use of nuclear energy (in form of nuclear weapons) could only be treated like-
wise. Moreover, the decision of the NATO council constituted a qualitative shift in 
NATO policy that was not covered by the original ratification decision of the Bundestag 
in 1955.322  
The Bundesregierung countered that the decision of the NATO council was a normal 
part of NATO’s activities and was thus covered by the Bundestag’s 1955 decision to 
ratify the NATO treaty. Hence, it did not require a new vote in the Bundestag. Moreo-
ver, it argued that the earlier decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht referred to by 
the Green party had actually explicitly stated that Foreign Affairs were the exclusive 
domain of the executive.323  
Essentially, the Bundesverfassungsgericht followed the Bundesregierung’s arguments. 
It still used the reasoning outlined above as a base line but now added arguments re-
lating to the doctrine of the separation of powers to re-enforce its position. It high-
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lighted that Article 59 II had to be interpreted in light of the doctrine of the separation 
of powers and thus established clear delineations of the respective competences of 
the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag in the area of Foreign Affairs. Even though the 
Bundestag had certain rights due to the consent requirements, those rights were still 
an exception to the rule created by the Grundgesetz that Foreign Affairs were the ex-
clusive domain of the executive – for seemingly good reason:  
“… Die organisatorische und funktio-
nelle Unterscheidung und Trennung der 
Gewalten […] zielt darauf ab, daß staat-
liche Entscheidungen möglichst richtig, 
das heißt von den Organen getroffen 
werden, die dafür nach ihrer Organisa-
tion, Zusammensetzung, Funktion und 
Verfahrensweise über die besten Vo-
raussetzungen verfügen, und sie will 
auf eine Mäßigung der Staatsgewalt 
insgesamt hinwirken. Die Konzentration 
politischer Macht, die darin läge, dem 
Bundestag in auswärtigen Angelegen-
heiten - über die ihm im Grundgesetz 
zugeordneten Befugnisse hinaus - zent-
rale Entscheidungsbefugnisse exekutivi-
scher Natur zuzuordnen, liefe dem der-
zeit vom Grundgesetz normierten Gefü-
ge der Verteilung von Macht, Verant-
wortung und Kontrolle zuwider. […] Die 
konkrete Ordnung der Verteilung und 
des Ausgleichs staatlicher Macht, die 
das Grundgesetz gewahrt wissen will, 
darf nicht durch einen aus dem Demo-
kratieprinzip fälschlich abgeleiteten 
Gewaltenmonismus in Form eines all-
umfassenden Parlamentsvorbehalts 
unterlaufen werden. […]  
[…] beruht auf der Annahme, daß in-
stitutionell und auf Dauer typischer-
weise allein die Regierung in hinrei-
chendem Maße über die personellen, 
“…The organizational and func-
tional distinction and the separation 
of powers […] aims at securing the 
taking of public decisions as rightly as 
possible, that is, by those agencies in 
the best position to do so according 
to their organization, composition, 
function and mode of procedure, and 
acts towards moderation of State 
power as a whole. The concentration 
of political power which would lie in 
assigning the Bundestag central deci-
sion-making powers of an executive 
nature in Foreign Affairs beyond 
those assigned to it in the Basic Law 
would run counter to the structure of 
apportionment of power, responsibil-
ity and control laid down at present 
by the Basic Law [..] The specific order 
of the apportionment and balancing 
of State power which the Basic Law 
wishes to see guaranteed must not 
be undermined by a monism of pow-
ers falsely derived from the democ-
racy principle in the form of an all-
embracing reservation on behalf of 
Parliament.  
[…] institutionally and in the long 
term it would be typically only the 
government that will adequately dis-
pose of the personal, material and 
organizational capacities to respond 
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sachlichen und organisatorischen Mög-
lichkeiten verfügt, auf wechselnde äuße-
re Lagen zügig und sachgerecht zu rea-
gieren und so die staatliche Aufgabe, die 
auswärtigen Angelegenheiten verant-
wortlich wahrzunehmen, bestmöglich zu 
erfüllen. …“ 
speedily and properly to changing ex-
ternal positions and thus carry out in 
the best possible way the national 
task of responsibly handling Foreign 
Affairs.….” 324 
Here, the Court introduces ideas and lines of reasoning developed in the domestic con-
text as the so-called ‘Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur’325/ the ‘princi-
ple of the function-appropriate institutional structure’ in order to justify why the execu-
tive would be best suited to handle Foreign Affairs. It adds an almost emphatic rejec-
tion of the principle of democracy as a justification for a different result and again re-
ferred the Bundestag to the existing political options as adequate ‘compensation’. 
Overall, this decision strengthened the executive’s position considerably and con-
firmed its line of reasoning developed for the relationship of legislative and executive 
in the domestic context. 
It is interesting to see, that this is one of the very few instances where the Court explic-
itly refers to an approach to the separation of powers developed in the literature in 
order to justify its interpretation of the Grundgesetz in a specific situation. Unfortu-
nately, the Court uses it in order to lock the Bundestag into its role as merely providing 
after-the-fact control by arguing that it is institutionally ‘unsuitable’ to be involved in 
activities in the area of Foreign Affairs in a more meaningful way. Even if that were 
true, it is surprising that the Court does not even consider whether the Bundestag’s in-
stitutional structures could be adapted in order to make it more ‘suitable’ and thus ca-
pable of carrying more responsibility to exercise effective control over the executive. 
Of particular interest is the strongly worded dissenting opinion of Judge Mahrenholz 
who challenged the majority’s position as being far too favourable to the executive.326 
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He criticised in particular the use of the doctrine of the separation of powers and the 
almost cavalier attitude of the majority in allowing the executive to agree on its own to 
a step that within the domestic context would certainly require parliamentary approv-
al. Considering that such a transfer of sovereign rights to an international institution 
had a considerable impact on the competence structures established by the Grundge-
setz and thus amounted in practice to a constitutional amendment, the requirements 
for parliamentary consent required strict observation, not limitation. Moreover, he 
challenged the reasoning of the majority that the Bundestag had already given its con-
sent to the recent events as it had provided its consent to the ratification in 1955. 
Since the NATO treaty itself did not contain even an outline of a potential directionality 
of an integration programme, the original consent could not be seen as covering the 
new developments. He concluded that the majority’s opinion allowed the executive to 
exercise competences that were inherently legislative – something that the Grundge-
setz most definitely did not intend.327  
He also criticised that the majority allocated the responsibility for Foreign Affairs to the 
executive as a matter of principle and thus considered Article 59 (2) as an exception to 
the doctrine of the separation of powers as expressed by the Grundgesetz. To him, it 
was precisely the other way around: the Grundgesetz did not rely on some pre-
constitutional, ideal model of the separation of powers, but rather its individual provi-
sions had to be seen as an expression of the model the Grundgesetz tried to establish. 
Thus, Article 59 (2) had to be seen as part of the positive expression – and not a nega-
tive exception – of the Grundgesetz’s the separation of powers model. This meant that 
the interpretation of Article 59 (2) had to be based on the purpose of the provision, in 
this case, the protection of the Bundestag’s right to be involved in fundamental policy 
decisions.  
Finally, he dismissed as insufficient and beside the point the repeated reference of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to the political options of the Bundestag as ‘compensation’ 
for a lack of further legal rights. He pointed out that for example the vote of no confi-
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dence may punish the government by removing it from office but that it neither re-
moved the validity of the executive’s action at international level nor remedied the 
lack of the Bundestag’s participation earlier in the decision-making process. In addi-
tion, this measure was meant for the extraordinary circumstances of a fundamental 
disagreement between the government and its supporting majority, not for the every-
day interaction of the Bundestag with an executive secure in its power.  
Overall, Mahrenholz’s dissent shines an uncomfortably bright light onto the inconsist-
encies and weaknesses of the majority’s opinion and shows that it seems to be moti-
vated by a very traditional approach to Foreign Affairs that rebuffs the efforts of the 
Bundestag to effect more control over the actions of the Bundesregierung at every 
turn. Unfortunately, while the academic debate welcomed Mahrenholz’s dissent very 
warmly,328 the Bundesverfassungsgericht stuck to its line of reasoning in subsequent 
decisions and formally, it remains unchanged to this day.329  
B. A selective exception based on domestic competences 
The NATO/ Pershing decision shaped the relationship of the legislative and the execu-
tive for a further 10 years, before the Bundesverfassungsgericht moved finally away 
from its very executive-friendly stance and created a limit to the government’s almost 
boundless discretion. The case concerned the changes to NATOs mission directive as 
agreed by the NATO members in 1993 and the German participation in the subsequent 
peacekeeping missions enforcing the embargo and the no-fly zone against Serbia and 
UNOSOM II.330 The deciding senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht was split 4:4 as to 
whether the changes to NATOs mission directive should have been subjected to a par-
liamentary vote according to Article 59 (2). This meant a dismissal on this point, as in 
cases without a majority of judges supporting the unconstitutionality of the action un-
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der review, it is deemed constitutional.331 While frustrating for the applicant, such de-
cisions still send a clear signal to the respondent (in this case the government) to act 
more circumspectly in future.  
The novel part of the decision concerned the German participation in armed peace 
keeping mission and who was responsible for such a decision. All judges agreed that 
the deployment of armed forces required express approval by the Bundestag prior to 
the mission in question.332 In terms of the dogmatic construction, however, the judges 
took a rather interesting route: they did not limit the executive’s foreign policy prerog-
ative within itself but used the general provisions of the Grundgesetz dealing with the 
armed forces to establish the notion of the ‘parliamentary army’: in their view, the 
provisions on the creation, maintenance and the deployment of the armed forces con-
tained a common thread of strong parliamentary involvement, involvement that was 
not limited to controlling the executive’s actions but included real political decision-
making power. This led them to conclude that the Grundgesetz – like its predecessor, 
the Weimar Constitution – had intended to transfer the ultimate decision over war and 
peace to the parliament, i.e. deliberately away from the executive. In the present con-
text, this resulted in a parliamentary reserve for the deployment of armed forces irre-
spective of the reason or the area they were deployed to – e.g. due to Germany being 
attacked or due to Germany’s commitments as a member of a system of collective se-
curity, inside or outside of Germany or NATOs Member States.333 Only in cases of 
emergency did the executive have the right to make the preliminary decision itself, but 
had to ensure that parliamentary approval was provided as soon as possible after-
wards.334  
The Court strengthened the Bundestag’s position in a decision in 2008: whether a spe-
cific situation fell under the parliamentary reserve was not left to the discretionary ap-
preciation of the executive, but depended on factual and legal criteria the fulfilment of 
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which was subject to full review by the Court.335 The case concerned the NATO mission 
of surveillance of Turkish airspace by AWACS aircrafts in 2003. Despite repeated re-
quests by the Bundestag, that the Bundesregierung schedule a vote for approval of the 
mission, it refused to do so. It argued that those flights were strictly routine, purely de-
fensive and thus not linked to, or likely to lead to, armed military action. Hence, the 
consent of the Bundestag was not required. The Bundesverfassungsgericht disagreed. 
The Bundestag’s right to approve the deployment of armed forces could not be seen as 
a ‘mere’ control mechanism, but constituted a genuine right and responsibility to take 
the fundamentally important, political decision whether Germany wished to partici-
pate in armed military action. This right could not be interpreted strictly, e.g. by argu-
ing that the executive needed the wide margin of discretion its foreign policy preroga-
tive usually provided in order to act effectively.336 On the contrary: the responsibility of 
the Bundestag in this area was an intended part of the Grundgesetz’s system of the 
separation of powers, not a derogation like Article 59 (2).337 This led to a reversal of 
the usual dynamic: it was not the Bundestag who had to justify why it wished to ap-
prove a particular mission. Instead, it was the executive who had to justify why it con-
sidered a particular situation not to be subject to the Bundestag’s reserve – and since 
this reserve did not form part of the area of Foreign Affairs, the discretion the Bun-
desregierung enjoyed in this area did not apply, i.e. its decision was subject to the full 
review of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.338  
This line of cases does provide a practical limit to the executive’s discretion in the area 
of Foreign Affairs and the 2008 decision strengthened the Bundestag’s position con-
siderably. However, it concerns only a very specific scenario – the remainder of the de-
cisions on military strategy, e.g. the deployment of unarmed forces, of forces providing 
humanitarian assistance only or even the decision not to deploy German forces are all 
still left to the government’s discretion. Also, as could be seen in the 2008 decision, the 
discussion becomes focused on what may or may not constitute ‘armed missions’ or 
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whether a mission that started out as ‘unarmed’ has become ‘armed’ over the course 
of its duration and thus subject to the approval of the Bundestag. The decision high-
lighted as well how the Bundesregierung seems to consider greater parliamentary in-
volvement as a nuisance and an hindrance rather than a measure of transparency and 
democratic legitimacy, an attitude fostered i.a. by the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s own 
line of reasoning in the cases related above.  
 
C. Conclusion  
As could be seen, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach in the area of Foreign Af-
fairs differs considerably from the approach adopted for the domestic context: the 
Court conceptualises Foreign Affairs as one discrete competence area where the 
Grundgesetz is deemed to contain clear rules on the nature of the relationship be-
tween the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag. This approach has been consistent 
since the 1950s, despite considerable criticisms from the academic literature.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the following common threads can be drawn from the 
cases related above: like in the domestic context, the Bundesverfassungsgericht relies 
heavily on its notion of what the balance of power between the executive and the leg-
islative as ‘intended by the Grundgesetz’ should be. Unlike in the domestic context, 
however, it considers the area of Foreign Affairs as one ‘block’ area instead of consid-
ering the individual activities at hand and of creating an individual balance of power 
between the executive and the legislative depending on the activity in question. The 
Court justifies this by arguing that the executive’s organisational structure and support, 
its decision-making processes, etc. are uniquely suitable to meet the demands of mod-
ern-day international relations – a capacity the Bundestag is considered to lack.339 Cu-
riously, this does not seem to matter when it comes to deciding the deployment of 
armed forces. Here, the practical demands of international relations and the potential-
ly urgent need for a decision are suddenly secondary to the need to include the oppo-
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sition in a ‘free parliamentary debate’ which allows also the public to evaluate the true 
scope of the intended action340 - the classic role of a parliament as a platform for de-
bate, transparency and democratic legitimacy thus outweighs the practical disad-
vantages of a decision-making process that is seen as cumbersome and potentially 
time-consuming. This contradictory reasoning raises two rather challenging questions: 
why can the Bundestag’s general ‘unsuitability’ to participate in Foreign Affairs be 
overlooked in this context but not in others, e.g. when it comes to reviewing changes 
made to existing treaty regimes like NATO? And more fundamentally: why did the 
Court simply accept the Bundestag’s general ‘unsuitability’ to deal with Foreign Affairs 
instead of demanding that the Bundestag’s decision-making processes be adapted so 
that they matched the needs for e.g. secrecy, timely decision-making, etc. that interna-
tional relations apparently required?  
 
It is interesting that the one exception to the exclusive competence of the executive is 
based on provisions that form part of the domestic context of power relationships – 
only those seem to be powerful enough to break through the rather rigid dividing line 
the Court has drawn between domestic and Foreign Affairs. Even more worrying are 
the practical consequences of the Court’s very strict and very consistent jurisprudence 
for the overall structure of the Grundgesetz’s system of government and the general 
relationship between the executive and the legislative. The Court continues to reject 
any suggestion to change its restrictive interpretation of Article 59 and 24 and thus to 
increase the number of situations that fall within their scope of application and thus 
the requirements for parliamentary consent. This leaves the Bundestag with very few 
‘hard’ legal options to exercise a truly effective control of the executive’s activities – 
something that is at the very heart of the doctrine of the separation of powers and is – 
ironically – regularly confirmed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht as far as the domestic 
context is concerned.  
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The weaknesses and inconsistencies of the Court’s approach have been heavily criti-
cised by dissenting judges as well as academics. A particular point of criticism is that 
the Court seems to premise its approach on the possibility of a clear distinction be-
tween foreign and domestic affairs. However, this appears entirely out of touch with 
the reality of international relations in the modern-day world and their impact on the 
domestic systems of the states. Academics argue that the line between domestic and 
Foreign Affairs has been blurred to such an extent that clear, non-arbitrary definitions 
of what constitutes ‘foreign’ affairs as opposed to (purely) ‘domestic’ affairs are almost 
impossible to establish.341  
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Part II: Conclusion 
Following on from the investigation of the theory of the separation of powers in Part I, 
Part II explored the implementation of the separation of powers into the German con-
stitutional system with regard to the domestic context as well as Foreign Affairs. It is 
submitted that the perception in the literature – that the theory is fairly useless in 
practice – does not hold true. The cases surveyed here provide critical dividing lines for 
the behaviour of the legislative and the executive, both in the domestic context as well 
as in the area of Foreign Affairs. 
 
The contrast between the Court’s approach in the domestic context compared to that 
in the area of Foreign Affairs is quite striking. In the domestic context, the Court differ-
entiates between various types of activities and creates ‘area specific’ balances of 
power between the legislative and the executive. For example, as far as matters of the 
budget are concerned, the executive is in a fairly weak position. However, in general 
the executive is fairly free to use its procedural and political predominance over the 
Bundestag in order to implement its political agenda. The cases also illustrate how the 
Court sees the separation of powers as one principle among several that determine 
the outcome of the case. Fairly often considerations of democratic legitimacy, funda-
mental rights protection and the freedom of the individual inform the Court’s solution 
more than arguments specifically relating to the separation of powers.  
 
In striking contrast, none of this seems to matter in the area of Foreign Affairs. Here, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht merely considers the ‘suitability’ of the legislative and 
the executive respectively to handle Foreign Affairs as a matter of principle. The Court 
does not differentiate among for example treaty negotiations, everyday work in inter-
national organisations like NATO or the UN, or indeed sensitive diplomatic manoeu-
vres, in order to achieve a tiered pattern of involvement that would allow the Bundes-
tag much greater influence and thus create a greater degree of accountability for the 
actions of the Bundesregierung. In addition, the set of values and principles employed 
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in the domestic context like the principle of democracy, the Rechtsstaat principle and 
human rights protection, are not used here to modify the solution found based on 
what essentially amounts to organisational efficiency considerations.  
 
The investigation will now turn to the examination of the seminal decisions of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht in the area of European matters in order to establish how the 
Court’s two very distinct approaches for delineating the relationship between the Bun-
destag and the Bundesregierung are applied in that context. Particular reference will 
be made to the most recent decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht regarding the 
European Stability Mechanism and Fiscal treaties. 
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Part III: The separation of powers in the 
European context 
From the ratification of the Treaty of Rome up to the Treaty of Maastricht, the focus of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht was on the promotion of the human rights protection 
provided by the European communities. Its famous Solange I, Solange II and Bananas 
decisions342 are still landmarks for the question of implementation of European law in-
to national legal systems and its compatibility with national systems of human rights 
protection.343 Following on from there, the period between the Treaty of Maastricht 
and the Treaty of Lisbon was dominated by several enlargements which raised the 
question of how the European integration process should proceed at a fundamental 
level. Again, decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, this time Maastricht and Lis-
bon344, developed into landmark decisions, partly despite and partly precisely because 
they provided a different view on the future of the integration process compared to 
that favoured by the governments in the European Member States.  
 
However, over the course of all of those decades very little attention has been given by 
the Court to the impact the European integration process has had on the relationship 
between the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung, specifically in the phase prior to de-
cision-making at European level, i.e. at that point in time when national parliaments 
have the greatest chance to influence the position of their own government and thus 
law-making at European level. In the final part of the thesis, the analysis will therefore 
focus on seven decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the EU context and ana-
lyse them not from the perspective of the principle of democracy or with an eye to 
maximising human rights protection. Instead, the analysis will focus on drawing out the 
implications for the separation of powers as conceptualised by the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht and for the relationship between Bundestag and Bundesregierung. In or-
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der to track the changes in the Court’s approach across time, the investigation will 
proceed chronologically, starting in Chapter V with the earliest cases after the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty of Rome up to the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Follow-
ing on from there, Chapter VI will provide an outline of the so-called ESM cases and 
Chapter VII will evaluate the potential impact of those cases on the conceptual ap-
proach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht with regard to the relationship of the Bundes-
tag and Bundesregierung in the EU context.  
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CHAPTER V: European matters – a ‘special kind’ of Foreign Affairs? 
As outlined in the previous Chapter, since its inception the Grundgesetz had contained 
various provisions managing the interaction between the German constitutional sys-
tem and the international sphere. The ratification of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, 
therefore, did not represent anything out of the ordinary at the time: the treaties de-
manded the transfer of powers from their signatories to the newly created organisa-
tions and, according to Article 24 (1) of the Grundgesetz, “… The Federation may by a 
law transfer sovereign powers to international organisations …”. This required parlia-
mentary approval in the form of a statute which was provided in due course by the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat. According to the precepts of the Grundgesetz, Germany was 
now ready for the European institutions to take up their work and for the integration 
process to begin.  
However, the ensuing European integration process went far beyond what the drafters 
of the Grundgesetz may have imagined in terms of international cooperation. This 
begged the question just how open to international integration the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considered the Grundgesetz to be or in other words: how their interpre-
tation of Article 24 would affect the ability of the German constitutional system to 
‘weather’ the European integration process. Up to the Treaty of Maastricht, the cases 
brought to the Court provided it with the opportunity to delineate the relationship Ar-
ticle 24 created between the European and the German legal order, its impact on the 
latter and the responsibilities of the German institutions, especially after the powers 
transferred had been used. The Court favoured the principle of democracy and the 
Grundgesetz’s system of human rights protection as a framework for its analysis of the 
impact of the European integration process on the German constitutional system. 
Looking back at those cases now, it becomes apparent that the Court gave very little 
attention to the potential impact on the role of the executive and the legislative or on 
their relationship with each other. For conclusions on those two points, one is left to 
indirect inferences from the cases when analysed the through the lens of separation of 
powers instead of democracy as the Bundesverfassungsgericht prefers to do.  
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A. From Rome to Maastricht: not really the parliament’s business? 
The decades between the ratification of the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Maas-
tricht were dominated by two major strands in the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht: how to fit the European Communities – that clearly developed into 
something strange and new – into the existing constitutional framework and how to 
deal with the repercussions of the implemented European law. As regards the latter, 
the Court’s decisions regarding the need to maintain appropriate levels of fundamental 
rights protection are well known and deliberately not included here as they are not the 
focus of this investigation. Instead, this Section will focus on the first strand referred to 
above: how the Bundesverfassungsgericht dealt with the emerging supranationality of 
the EC with a particular eye on the separation of powers. As this Section will demon-
strate, the Court did not see the need to adapt its existing approach very much which 
had a devastating effect for the position of the Bundestag within the context of Euro-
pean decision-making as well as for its relationship with the Bundesregierung. 
1. Conceptualising Supranationality: Article 24 and the EC 
As was highlighted in the previous Chapter, Article 24 (1) covers situations where a 
treaty goes beyond creating traditional obligations for Germany as a signatory state. It 
applies to forms of international cooperation that require its members to surrender a 
measure of control to institutions outside of the national legal sphere by transferring 
sovereign rights to those institutions. The consequences are two-fold: at international 
level, the treaty effects the transfer of sovereign rights to the newly created interna-
tional institutions; in the national sphere, the statute under Article 24 (1) not only pro-
vides the international institutions with the authority to create acts which take direct 
legal effect within the German legal system, it also places an obligation on the German 
constitutional institutions and public authorities to ensure that those acts could take 
their full effect.345  
An early opportunity for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to comment on the relationship 
between Germany and the recently created European Communities presented itself in 
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1967. The case concerned a constitutional complaint directed directly against an EEC 
regulation.346 The complainants argued that the Regulation had to be treated as if is-
sued by the German authorities themselves since the European institutions had re-
ceived their powers from the German state. This meant that the German authorities 
had to be considered directly accountable for the actions of the institutions they had 
thus empowered. From the complainants’ perspective, the relationship seemed to be 
that of agent and principal - with the principal being fully accountable for the actions 
of the agent. Consequently, the complainants considered a constitutional complaint to 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht the appropriate remedy against the violation of their 
fundamental rights by the Regulation in question.  
The Bundesverfassungsgericht held the complaint to be inadmissible, insisting that the 
procedure only allowed acts of German public authorities to be challenged and that - 
in contrast to the views of the complainants - the EEC institutions did not qualify as 
such.347 The judges argued that the treaties had created their own legal order which 
was quite separate and independent from the German one.348 Rejecting the idea of a 
principal-agent relationship, the judges declared that the mere fact that the suprana-
tional bodies of that separate legal order had received their powers from Germany did 
not make them ‘German’ institutions for the purposes of the Court’s rules of proce-
dure. And even though the acts of the EEC institutions could only take effect within 
Germany due to the consent provided by the German parliament under Article 24, 
they did not become ‘German’ acts simply because they applied in Germany. To as-
sume otherwise would not only hopelessly blur boundaries necessary to determine the 
scope of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s jurisdiction349, it would also circumvent the 
treaties’ own system of remedies which was intended to cover precisely the situation 
at hand. As a result, direct challenges against European legislation were inadmissible. 
At the same time, the judges hastened to add that this decision should not be taken as 
precluding a review of EEC law with regard to the fundamental rights guarantees of the 
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Grundgesetz in the context of a case that was otherwise admissible.350 This conceptual-
isation of how the European and German legal sphere interact has become the stand-
ard formula of the Bundesverfassungsgericht used in cases from Solange I in 1974 to 
Mangold/ Honeywell in 2010.351 It also laid the foundation of the notion of the Mem-
ber States being ‘masters of the treaties’ coined later on in the decision on the Maas-
tricht treaty.352  
In a case in 1971, the Court clarified further what the transfer of rights under Article 24 
entailed for the German legal system. A company had brought a constitutional com-
plaint against a judgment of the Federal Tax Court that had used a decision of the ECJ 
interpreting Article 95 and 97 of the EEC treaty to override certain provisions of the 
German tax statutes applying to the company’s activities. The complainants argued 
that such behaviour violated the doctrine of separation of powers as laid down in the 
Grundgesetz - such adjustments constituted amendments of a statute which could only 
be done by the legislative and not by the judiciary. The Bundesverfassungsgericht re-
jected the complaint by arguing that the Federal Tax Court had ‘merely drawn the con-
sequences’ of the ECJ’s decision and that such adjustment were well within the powers 
of the judiciary.353 Indeed, the Federal Tax Court had only done what was its duty un-
der Article 24:  
“… Article 24 Abs. 1 GG besagt bei 
sachgerechter Auslegung nicht nur, daß 
die Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf 
zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen über-
haupt zulässig ist, sondern auch, daß die 
Hoheitsakte ihrer Organe, wie hier das 
Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, 
vom ursprünglich ausschließlichen Ho-
heitsträger anzuerkennen sind. Von die-
ser Rechtslage ausgehend müssen seit 
“… Article 24 (1) Basic Law, on a 
proper interpretation, says not only 
that the transfer of sovereign rights 
to inter-governmental institutions is 
permissible as such but also that the 
sovereign acts of the organs, such as 
the judgment of the European Court 
of Justice here, are to be recognized 
by the originally exclusive bearer of 
sovereignty. On the basis of this le-
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dem Inkrafttreten des Gemeinsamen 
Markts die deutschen Gerichte auch sol-
che Rechtsvorschriften anwenden, die 
zwar einer eigenständigen außerstaatli-
chen Hoheitsgewalt zuzurechnen sind, 
aber dennoch aufgrund ihrer Auslegung 
durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof im 
innerstaatlichen Raum unmittelbare 
Wirkung entfalten und entgegenstehen-
des nationales Recht überlagern und 
verdrängen; denn nur so können die den 
Bürgern des Gemeinsamen Markts ein-
geräumten subjektiven Rechte verwirk-
licht werden. …” 
gal position, since the entry into 
force of the Common Market the 
German courts must also apply legal 
provisions which, though attributa-
ble to an autonomous sovereign 
power outside the State, do never-
theless on the basis of their interpre-
tation by the European Court of Jus-
tice develop direct effect within the 
State and override and displace con-
trary national law; for it is only in 
this way that the subjective rights al-
lowed citizens of the Common Mar-
ket can be realized. …”354 
As can be seen, the Bundesverfassungsgericht placed great emphasis on the duties of 
the German courts to give effect to the acts of the European institutions in the German 
legal system. However, the national courts, which were at the heart of this process, 
came to have grave concerns about the compatibility of those acts with fundamental 
principles of the Grundgesetz and began making references to the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht in order to have pieces of European law reviewed. The reference proce-
dure in Article 100 (1) Grundgesetz serves a similar function to that laid down in Article 
267 TFEU: since ordinary German courts do not have jurisdiction to set aside legislation 
they consider unconstitutional, they have to make a reference to the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht. The Bundesverfassungsgericht will then conduct a review of the statute 
or the provision in question and should the statute be found to violate the Grundge-
setz, the Court has the power to declare it void. Such decisions bind all state bodies, 
i.e. the ordinary courts as well as parliaments and governments at federal and Land 
level.355 In 1967, a regional tax Court made such a reference to have the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht review Regulation 19/62/EEC.356 The arguments of the referring Court dif-
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fer from the human rights related arguments that have dominated the discussion since 
Solange I in that their main focus is the institutional structure of the EEC. From the re-
ferring Court’s point of view, the secondary legislation enacted by the Council under 
then Article 189 EEC had to be classified as genuine legislative acts. However, since the 
whole Council was composed of representatives of the Member States’ executives, its 
involvement in genuine legislative activity constituted a violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. This violated the limits to integration set out in Article 79 (3) 
Grundgesetz which in turn led to the unconstitutionality of the German statute ratify-
ing the EEC Treaty.357 With that statute void, the EEC had no valid authority for its ac-
tivities - the ‘permission’ under Article 24 to use the sovereign rights with effect for 
Germany having been lost, as it were.  
The Bundesverfassungsgericht rejected the reference on a technicality and did not en-
gage with the arguments of the referring Court regarding the institutional structure. 
Indeed, even though similar arguments were put forward by referring courts and ap-
plicants in several cases over the years, the Court did not engage with them at all until 
much later in its Maastricht decision and even then only in passing.358 Instead, the 
Court stressed that the ratification had been the moment in time at which the institu-
tional structures and decision-making processes could - and should - have been influ-
enced to make sure they complied with the requirements of the Grundgesetz.359 Once 
that moment had passed, the only option left was for the German courts to try to pro-
tect the individuals in Germany from having to suffer under the consequences of those 
structural deficits the political institutions had not taken the necessary precautions to 
prevent.360 In other words: the Bundesverfassungsgericht had more or less ‘banished’ 
European law to its own legal ‘sphere’, where it enjoyed a certain amount of autono-
my. The Court followed through on this line with its claims to have retained review 
powers regarding fundamental rights protection, ultra vires actions and violations of 
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the Grundgesetz’s identity.361 True to form (cf. Chapter III), the Court chose what it 
considered the fastest and most effective way to deal with the problem, invariably fa-
vouring the legal over the political option. Instead of waiting until such time as the 
Bundesregierung had managed to use its influence at European level to effect the de-
sired changes to the institutional structures362, the Court proceeded to provide itself 
the protection it considered necessary. In doing so, it also established itself as a power-
ful veto player in opposition to the European – and German – political institutions, the 
same position it had shaped for itself in the purely national context.  
Overall, in the Court’s interpretation of the Grundgesetz, the ratification of the NATO 
treaty was not in any way different to the ratification of the European treaties: both 
had created non-German institutions which had been authorised to create legally bind-
ing acts that reached directly into the national legal sphere without any further acts of 
implementation or transformation by the German institutions being necessary. In its 
decisions, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not separate out the EEC from the overall 
context of Article 24. For example, it built on its decision in Solange I (1974) to decide a 
complaint regarding Eurocontrol (1981) which in turn fed forward into a decision on 
NATO (1984) and later into Solange II (1986)363, even though the integration process 
for those three organisations had been vastly different. For the Court, however, they 
seemed to be merely three examples of the many forms international cooperation 
could take and where the Court had to deal with the implementation.  
2. Delineating spheres of responsibility 
Looking at the decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on European matters, the 
absence of comments on the institutional structures and decision-making processes of 
the organisation Germany had transferred a considerable amount of sovereign rights 
to is remarkable. Equally, potential changes to the balance of power between the Bun-
desregierung and Bundestag resulting from the European integration process did not 
                                                     
361
 BVerfG, ‘Solange I’ (n 36); BVerfG, ‘Solange II’ (n 36); BVerfG, ‘Kloppenburg’ [1987] BVerfGE 75, 223. 
362
 BVerfG, ‘Solange I’ (n 36). 
363
 ibid; BVerfG, ‘Eurocontrol I’ (n 319); BVerfG, ‘Atomwaffenstationierung’ (n 320); BVerfG, ‘Maastricht’ 
(n 38). 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Part III: The separation of powers in the European context 
 
 
134 
seem to have been a concern. Unlike in the area of Foreign Affairs where the opposi-
tion began to challenge the actions of the government before the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, the cases concerning the EEC were all either references from ordinary 
courts or constitutional complaints from individuals. While these procedural constella-
tions do shape the framework of the decisions around fundamental rights, there would 
have been opportunity for the Court to explore the questions indicated above.364 In 
order to evaluate the impact of the European integration process on the relationship 
between the government and the parliament, one therefore has to look at the deci-
sions of the Court on Foreign Affairs since, from the perspective of the Grundgesetz, 
European matters were still considered to be such.  
As was discussed in the previous Chapter on Foreign Affairs, the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considered Articles 59 and 24 Grundgesetz to establish a clear system of 
allocation of powers between the executive and the legislative: the executive was the 
power to which responsibility for Foreign Affairs was allocated as a matter of princi-
ple.365 The legislative was meant to provide oversight only. Hence, provisions providing 
the Bundestag with options to participate in Foreign Affairs had to be interpreted nar-
rowly - as the exception to the rule. Over the years, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has 
given particular attention to the question what exactly was covered by the ratification 
decision under Articles 59 and 24 and how the rights of the Bundestag in this context 
had to be understood in relation to the position of the government.  
The Court argued that the right of the Bundestag to approve the ratification of treaties 
in general and the transfer of sovereign rights in particular was rooted in the general 
right of the legislative to control the activities of the executive as well as in the idea 
that decisions of such importance should be approved by the directly elected repre-
sentatives of the people. In its Eurocontrol decision in 1981, the Court elaborated on 
the latter: transferring sovereign rights to institutions outside the constitutional struc-
tures of the Grundgesetz interfered with, and changed, the competence structures as 
originally designed by the constitution, i.e. such a transfer had all the actual effects of a 
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constitutional amendment without having gone through the procedure normally re-
quired for it (Article 79). To leave the decision whether Germany should participate in 
such endeavours in the hands of the executive in exercise of its foreign policy preroga-
tive was therefore not possible and justified the requirement for parliamentary ap-
proval as a necessary precaution to preclude constitutional amendments through a 
‘back door’.366 This did not mean, however, that every single decision in such a context 
required parliamentary approval. In the NATO decision, the Court developed the no-
tion of the so-called ‘programme of integration’, i.e. that the original ratification deci-
sion covered not only the text of the treaty ‘as was’ but also reasonably foreseeable 
developments of the treaty system. As was further developed in the Maastricht and 
Lisbon decisions, the Court considered the integration programme to be part of the 
original treaty and as long as future developments and the activities of the interna-
tional and the German institutions did not go beyond it, the approval requirement 
would not be triggered anew.367 The Court’s reasoning was based on the idea that 
when the Bundestag had decided on the ratification of the original treaty, it had ‘of 
course’ considered, assessed and evaluated potential future developments of the inte-
gration process and deemed them constitutional - insofar as they could be deemed as 
‘foreseeable’. Consequently, the government did not need to trouble the parliament 
again when those potential developments became a reality later on.  
As such, the notion that the parliamentary approval could cover not just the original 
treaty but allow it to develop according to an ‘integration programme’ does make 
sense within the context of Article 24 which, after all, aims to promote Germany’s in-
ternational integration and not to make it practically impossible by requiring parlia-
mentary approval at the slightest deviation from the original text of the treaty. How-
ever, the use the Bundesverfassungsgericht made of this notion arguably stretched the 
notion of ‘foreseeability’ to the breaking point: for example its decision that the origi-
nal NATO treaty (ratified in 1954) actually contained the ‘seeds’ for the new defence 
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concept developed after the end of the cold war, seems rather questionable.368 The 
assumption that the parliament could foresee at least the outline of the subsequent 
development of the European integration process merely by looking at the original 
treaties of Rome and Paris, seems equally precarious.  
In practical terms, this meant that conducting the ‘day-to-day business’ of internation-
al relations including activities in international organisations was the business of the 
executive. Only once the government had concluded the negotiations on a treaty, had 
decided whether Germany should become a party and which and how many sovereign 
rights to transfer – in short: had made all the political choices – was the Bundestag al-
lowed to get involved and to vote on whether it wanted to give its approval for the rat-
ification.  
These practical consequences of the Court’s decisions are in stark contrast to notions 
expressed in earlier decisions where one could perceive the Bundestag not only as the 
key decision maker but as being actually in charge of the whole process of negotiating 
the power transfer:  
“… Article 24 Abs. 1 GG räumt dem 
Gesetzgeber ein weites Ermessen ein, 
ob und inwieweit einer zwischen-
staatlichen Einrichtung Hoheitsrechte 
eingeräumt werden und in welcher 
Weise diese Einrichtung rechtlich und 
organisatorisch ausgestaltet werden 
soll. …” 
“… Article 24 (1) grants the legisla-
tor broad discretion as to whether 
and to what extent an international 
institution may be granted sovereign 
powers and in what way this institu-
tion is to be given legal and organiza-
tional shape. …”369 
The express reference to the legislator (and not the executive) could lead one to be-
lieve that the Bundestag was not merely called to approve (or not) of the treaty as a 
whole and only once it was negotiated. Quite the opposite in fact: the Bundestag’s in-
volvement seemed to include deciding on nature and scope of the powers to be trans-
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ferred as well as influencing the institutional framework and the decision-making pro-
cesses of the organisation receiving those powers. Unfortunately, any hopes of such an 
interpretation were destroyed only three years later by the Court’s NATO decision 
where it clarified that the powers of the Bundestag in the area of Foreign Affairs 
should most certainly not be understood as enabling it to make actual political choices 
or even to shape foreign policy.370 Indeed, to interpret the Bundestag’s approval rights 
in this fashion would lead to far too much political power pooling in the hands of the 
legislative, power to boot that the Court considered to be executive and not legislative 
in nature. In short, to allow the Bundestag to do more than sign off (or not) on the 
treaty in question would enable it to usurp the government’s power which would vio-
late the very idea of separation of powers as established by the Grundgesetz.371 In or-
der to prevent the legislative from exerting ‘undue political pressure’ on the executive, 
the Court went as far as giving the latter the monopoly on the initiation of the debate 
in parliament.372 As a result, the Bundestag’s only tools for overseeing the activities of 
the executive that were under its control were the same political tools that it had to 
control the executive’s activities in general, i.a. question times and enquiry commit-
tees.373 
Overall, the interpretation of Articles 59 and 24 by the Bundesverfassungsgericht pro-
vided the government with an astonishing amount of power in the area of Foreign Af-
fairs and left the parliament with very few options to control those activities. It seems 
highly ironic that this is the result of decisions motivated by grave concerns about an 
all-powerful legislative setting out to usurp the powers of a helpless executive.374 
While the Court’s reasoning had a profound effect on the relationship of the executive 
and the legislative in the area of classic Foreign Affairs, the impact in the European 
context was almost overwhelming: it exacerbated the shift of political decision-making 
power from the legislative to the executive caused by the institutional structures of the 
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EEC, since - protected by the foreign policy prerogative - the government alone had the 
right to conduct the ‘everyday business’ in Brussels.375  
The Bundestag’s contributions prior to the implementation stage were limited to the 
original ratification and the political oversight conducted as part of their general duty 
to control the actions of the executive. The resulting disempowerment of the parlia-
ment was regretted by many but considered to be the unavoidable consequence of a 
membership in the EC. 
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B. From Maastricht to Lisbon: the Bundestag as political ‘by-
stander’? 
The period between the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Lisbon was a rather 
eventful period in European integration history, shaped by profound changes to the 
treaty system, major strides with regard to the development of the common market 
and of course the introduction of the EURO. All these changes had decided repercus-
sions for the national legal systems of the Member States. This Section will explore 
whether the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in light of those changes, re-considered its po-
sition on the role of the Bundestag, the manner and shape of its involvement and its 
relationship to the government.  
A prominent feature during these years were the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s continu-
ing efforts to develop further its particular brand of judicial cooperation. However, the 
Court also started to give attention to the duties of the parliament. The amendment of 
the Grundgesetz in the wake of the ratification of the treaty of Maastricht is of particu-
lar interest here: the newly minted Article 23 was intended to provide a explicit consti-
tutional basis for Germany’s relationship with the EU as well as to compensate the 
Bundestag and the Länder for the loss of power they had suffered due to European in-
tegration. However, initial hopes were soon disappointed. Only in one area did the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht leave the Bundestag in a slightly better position than before: 
the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon saw the Bundestag provided with a share in the 
‘integration responsibility’ incumbent on the German institutions to shape the integra-
tion process in a way that was compatible with the Grundgesetz. 
Overall, however, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not make any move to halt or 
even reverse the continuing disempowerment of the Bundestag - it left the parliament 
it its role as political bystander.  
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1. Democracy and Sovereignty: the framework for legitimate 
integration 
The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht represented a qualitative shift in the nature 
of the European integration process. In that light, Article 24 was considered to be far 
too ‘meagre’ to be able to continue to support the developments that had already tak-
en place and those still to come.376 The consensus among the political institutions was 
that a new constitutional foundation was needed that was capable of taking Germany 
safely into the future.377 Compared to the ‘meagre’ Article 24 (1) which merely states 
that ‘The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organisa-
tions’, the clause in Article 23 (1) that deals with the future integration process is far 
more specific: 
Zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten 
Europas wirkt die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland bei der Entwicklung der 
Europäischen Union mit, die demokra-
tischen, rechtsstaatlichen, sozialen und 
föderativen Grundsätzen und dem 
Grundsatz der Subsidiarität verpflichtet 
ist und einen diesem Grundgesetz im 
wesentlichen vergleichbaren Grund-
rechtsschutz gewährleistet. Der Bund 
kann hierzu durch Gesetz mit Zustim-
mung des Bundesrates Hoheitsrechte 
übertragen. Für die Begründung der 
Europäischen Union sowie für Ände-
rungen ihrer vertraglichen Grundlagen 
und vergleichbare Regelungen, durch 
die dieses Grundgesetz seinem Inhalt 
nach geändert oder ergänzt wird oder 
solche Änderungen oder Ergänzungen 
ermöglicht werden, gilt Artikel 79 Abs. 
2 und 3.  
With a view to establishing a united 
Europe, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many shall participate in the develop-
ment of the European Union that is 
committed to democratic, social and 
federal principles, to the rule of law, 
and to the principle of subsidiarity, 
and that guarantees a level of protec-
tion of basic rights essentially compa-
rable to that afforded by this Basic 
Law. To this end the Federation may 
transfer sovereign powers by a law 
with the consent of the Bundesrat. The 
establishment of the European Union, 
as well as changes in its treaty founda-
tions and comparable regulations that 
amend or supplement this Basic Law, 
or make such amendments or supple-
ments possible, shall be subject to 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.378 
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Especially the first sentence represents the attempt to transform into legislation the 
conditions and limits for European integration developed by the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht over the previous thirty years. It aims to provide a detailed picture of 
Germany’s vision for the integration process and expects the political institutions to 
work actively towards it, e.g. through the transfer of sovereign rights which as before is 
subject to parliamentary approval.  
Subsequently, Members of the Bundestag used it to challenge the ratification of the 
treaty of Maastricht and, 16 years later, the ratification of the treaty of Lisbon. Those 
cases provided the Bundesverfassungsgericht with an opportunity to review a Europe-
an treaty prior to its ratification, i.e. to comment on more than an already enacted 
piece of European legislation based on a competence already transferred. It enabled 
the Court to comment on the integration process as a whole, its past and its potential 
future. The procedural framework in both cases was a constitutional complaint which 
required the Court to frame its analysis around individual rights of the complainants - 
in this case the right to vote under Article 38.379 This enabled the Court to frame the 
analysis around the two themes of sovereignty and democracy: it depicted the right to 
vote as the ultimate expression of a people to elect the representatives who would 
then wield its sovereign power in order to implement the people’s will. Since it was not 
the representatives’ power in the first place and because they needed to remain capa-
ble of doing what they were elected to do, those representatives were limited in how 
they could dispose of that power.380 Most importantly, they could not transfer it away 
to other institutions or organisations to such an extent that they would lose the ability 
to be the decisive shaper of policy since that would make electing them meaningless - 
which in turn would make the right to vote meaningless. In the domestic context, for 
example, this resulted in limits as to scope and extent of regulatory power the parlia-
ment could delegate to the government. In the present context, the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht used it as the backdrop for the evaluation of the Maastricht and the Lis-
bon treaties. It steered the analysis very much towards an examination of Germany’s 
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role in the integration process, i.e. the relationship between the EC/ EU and Germany 
as a whole. Unfortunately, this drew attention almost entirely away from issues arising 
with regard to the relationship of government and parliament - which were, interest-
ingly, very much the focus of the complainants’ arguments.  
a) The Maastricht decision: democracy under review 
The main issue in Maastricht was whether or not the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty violated the principle of democracy. The complainants argued that with the Eu-
ropean Parliament in a mostly consultative role, the EC’s main legislator was in fact the 
Council. So all the competences that were transferred to the EC were essentially trans-
ferred to an institution composed of members of the executive. In addition, Article 23 
essentially handed sole decision-making power over the exercise of the participation 
rights of the Bundestag to the Bundesregierung. In combination, the effect on the posi-
tion of the Bundestag would be that it would be turned into a Parliament in name only, 
as all essential powers would be transferred to the EU/EC. As the German people had 
elected the Bundestag (and not the EC) to exercise that power, their sovereign right to 
determine who governed them was threatened. The complainants considered this to 
be not only a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also a violation of 
the principle of democracy in its very core and thus unconstitutional.381  
The judges unanimously concluded that it was not. At the same time they established a 
number of limits for the transfer of powers to the EC that had to be respected by the 
German as well as the European institutions. In this, they agreed with the complain-
ants: the democratic principle was part of the inviolable core of the Grundgesetz, one 
of those values that were reserved to the disposition by the sovereign alone - high-
lighted by the Grundgesetz by protecting them from constitutional amendment even 
by the Parliament.382 As the Bundestag did not have any powers in this respect, these 
values constituted the limit up to which it could commit Germany to European Integra-
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tion.383 Therefore it had the political responsibility to make sure that any transfer left it 
with functions and powers of ‘substantial importance’.384  
The Bundesverfassungsgericht also worried about the exercise of those powers after 
the transfer, specifically the exact delimitation of the powers transferred to the EC. In 
its opinion, the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality were the main 
safeguards to prevent the EC from assuming powers which it was not supposed to 
have. Therefore, the German representative in the Council had to ensure strict compli-
ance with those principles.385  
After establishing these important duties for the German institutions, the Court con-
firmed its view on Supremacy established in Solange II386: since this principle derived 
its legitimacy from the approval of the Member States embodied in the act of acces-
sion, any action that was not based on a competence actually transferred to the EC 
lacked such approval and would not be binding on the Member States. To control the 
actions of the EC institutions in this respect was the responsibility of the Member 
States. For Germany, this responsibility fell to the Bundesverfassungsgericht who 
therefore had the competence to review secondary EC law and where it was found to 
transgress Community competences, to declare it inapplicable within Germany.387 
Commentators saw this pronouncement as a clear indication that the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht had not relinquished its negative attitude towards the EC or the ECJ but 
had indeed created an additional obstacle to successful European Integration. 
Unfortunately, this did not change anything for the Bundestag. The fact that from the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s perspective democratic legitimacy was now shared be-
tween the European Community/ Union and Germany did not lead to a re-evaluation 
of its classification of European matters as Foreign Affairs. As a consequence, the for-
eign policy prerogative was still in full effect and still determined largely the relation-
ship between Bundestag and Bundesregierung. 
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b) The Lisbon decision: sovereignty under review 
In June 2009, the Bundesverfassungsgericht delivered a judgment on the constitution-
ality of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the two accompanying Acts: the Act 
changing the Grundgesetz and the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat in EU Matters, (the so-called Extending Act), following 
Constitutional Complaints by several Members of the Bundestag and an application for 
an Inter-Institution Dispute (Organstreit) by the Linke-Party.388  
The arguments of the complainants and applicants pertaining to this analysis were as 
follows: the changes would cause a violation of unalterable core values (especially the 
principles of democracy, the Rechtsstaat principle, human rights protection and sepa-
ration of powers), in particular an intolerable increase of the already existing lack of 
democratic legitimacy. Also, the transfer of powers would go beyond the limits estab-
lished in Maastricht and – considering its extent – would equip the EU with all the 
characteristics of a state with substantive competences in all fundamental areas (e.g. 
foreign policy, internal security and the use of the military) that so far had remained 
more under the control of the Member States. This would effectively lead to the end of 
Germany’s existence as an independent state. As this new European state did not 
comply with the very strict standards established by the Grundgesetz, the resulting 
German participation would violate the democratic principle and thus the limits estab-
lished in Maastricht.389 Unanimously, the judges dismissed the challenge against the 
Lisbon Treaty and the Act changing the Grundgesetz but held the Extending Act to be 
unconstitutional and ordered a stay in the German ratification process until the Ex-
tending Act had been revised to their satisfaction.  
The main focus of the reasoning was on the changes to the overall treaty system and 
their compatibility with the democratic principle of the Grundgesetz. The Bundesver-
fassungsgericht first of all stressed that the Grundgesetz encouraged German partici-
pation in various forms of peaceful international cooperation and integration. Such 
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participation was not ‘tantamount to submission to alien powers’,390 but was in fact a 
realisation of the Grundgesetz’s notion of sovereignty.391 For the EU, the Grundgesetz 
is seen to go even further:  
“… der Verfassungsauftrag zur 
Verwirklichung eines vereinten Euro-
pas bedeutet insbesondere für die 
deutschen Verfassungsorgane, dass es 
nicht in ihrem politischen Belieben 
steht, sich an der europäischen In-
tegration zu beteiligen oder nicht. Das 
Grundgesetz will eine europäische In-
tegration … Es gilt deshalb der Grund-
satz der Europarechtsfreundlichkeit. 
…” 
“… the constitutional mandate to 
realise a united Europe … means in 
particular for the German constitu-
tional bodies that it is not left to their 
political discretion whether or not 
they participate in European integra-
tion. The [Grundgesetz] wants Europe-
an integration … Therefore … the prin-
ciple of openness towards European 
law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) ap-
plies. …”392 
For the Court, this ‘Openness towards European law ’ implied that the strict constitu-
tional standards applying to the Grundgesetz in terms of democratic governance did 
not apply to the EU; a certain amount of democratic deficit could be tolerated since 
the EU, after all, was not a nation-state.393  
However, the Court confirmed that limits established in Maastricht still applied: the 
core of unalterable values was ‘not amenable to integration’394 – in particular the prin-
ciple of democracy was ‘inviolable’395, Supremacy was still rooted in the ‘constitutional 
empowerment’396 of the Member States and applied only ‘by virtue of, and in the con-
text of, the constitutional empowerment that continues in effect’397 and a blanket em-
powerment that would allow the EU to draw competences independently from the 
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Member States’ transfer decision, i.e. to give the EU Kompetenz-Kompetenz, would be 
unconstitutional. The principle of conferral in particular acted as a safeguard of the 
Member States’ prerogative in this respect.  
For the Court, this did not mean, however, that a treaty had to outline every detail in 
order for the competence transfer to be constitutional. Following its reasoning in the 
NATO and Maastricht decisions, the judges affirmed that it was enough if the Lisbon 
Treaty specified the ‘integration programme’. It was the Bundestag’s responsibility to 
assess whether this integration programme and the potentially resulting integration 
process were overall compatible with the limits set out in the Grundgesetz. Its decision 
to ratify was then deemed to cover the ensuing integration process as a whole, even if 
the process developed an inner dynamic and led to unexpected results like e.g. the 
principle of Supremacy. However, any such development bound Germany only be-
cause of the original decision of the Bundestag. Consequently, any action of EU institu-
tions that was not covered by that decision could take no effect in the Member States, 
thus justifying the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s competence to declare actions ultra vir-
es and to review ‘whether the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity … is 
respected’ in order to protect the ultimate prerogative of the German people as the 
sovereign.398 
At this point, the Court clarified that the duty to respect the limits outlined above rest-
ed not only on the EU institutions, as expressed in Article 4 (2) EU (Lisbon), but also on 
the national constitutional institutions. The Bundesregierung and the Bundestag car-
ried the primary ‘integration responsibility’. They had to cooperate closely and to use 
all the options available to them – e.g. as Council representative or before the ECJ – in-
cluding those introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. the early warning system for the 
national parliaments) to ensure compliance, so that their ‘integration responsibility’ 
could be realised in the everyday work of the EU institutions (e.g. while legislating) as 
well as during a revision of the treaty system.399 As one of Germany’s constitutional in-
stitutions, the Bundesverfassungsgericht also carried that responsibility. Therefore it 
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had to offer remedies against actions ultra vires of EU institutions and, from now on, 
also against actions that violated the Grundgesetz’s constitutional identity. Should the 
review confirm a violation with regard to either, the Court would declare the respec-
tive piece of EU law to be inapplicable in Germany. However, any applicant had to ex-
haust the remedies available to them on EU level first and the review followed the 
principle of Openness towards European Law.400  
After thoroughly examining the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the judges 
concluded that the ratification did not violate the limits outlined above: neither did the 
power transfer give the EU Kompetenz-Kompetenz, nor did the introduction of the 
bridging clauses enable the EU to change primary law independently from the Member 
States.401 However, in order to protect the political responsibility of the German Par-
liament, as the directly elected representative of the German people, and to preserve 
the democratic principle, the German representative in the Council was not allowed to 
act without prior approval by the German Parliament when it came to changes in pri-
mary law, e.g. by using the newly introduced simplified or regular amendment proce-
dures, the use of any of the bridging clauses, but also the use of the competence in Ar-
ticle 352 TFEU (formerly Article 308 EC). The vote for this approval had to be taken as a 
formal statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat and in some cases (e.g. the use 
of Article 352 TFEU) even a two-thirds majority in both Houses, as required by Article 
23 GG.402 
2. The integration responsibilities of the Bundestag  
a) Participation rights for the European context  
The new Article 23 did include not only a ‘successor’ clause to Article 24 in terms of the 
transfer of sovereign rights, but also provisions on how the Bundestag and the Bundes-
rat (as representative of the Länder) were meant to participate with regard to the de-
cision making at EU level as well as the formation of the Bundesregierung’s position 
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prior to that stage. The official claim was that those clauses were meant to compen-
sate both the Bundestag and the Länder for the loss of political decision-making power 
they had suffered since the 1950s.403 The wider participation rights for the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat served a dual purpose: to compensate them for the loss of power 
and to enable closer scrutiny of the actions of the Bundesregierung. The result was 
meant to be a stronger democratic foundation of the actions of the Bundesregierung in 
the European institutions and thus to strengthen the principles of democracy and fed-
eralism.  
Given the acute loss of power the Bundestag had suffered over the course of the thirty 
years between the ratification of the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht, one could have 
expected its members to have been particularly keen to see their options to participate 
in the formation of Germany’s position in the European institutions removed from the 
general rules of cooperation applying in Foreign Affairs and strengthened by having 
them expressly included in the constitution. Surprisingly, however, it was the Länder 
and not the Bundestag that were the major force behind having participation rights 
put down in writing. They, too, had been greatly affected by the transfer of legislative 
competences to the European institutions, partly because it was their own compe-
tences that were transferred and partly because the loss of federal competences im-
pacted on their influence on the federal legislative process via the Bundesrat. Unlike 
the Bundestag404, however, they were very conscious of that fact and as a conse-
quence very insistent on seeing the constitutional amendment providing them with 
adequate compensation.405 Since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty required the 
Grundgesetz to be amended in more areas than just the new Article 23 and such 
amendments required a two-thirds majority in both Bundestag and Bundesrat, they 
had the necessary leverage to see their claims realised. In striking contrast, the Bun-
destag’s utter lack of awareness of its diminished position is illustrated by the fact that 
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the original draft of the new Article 23 provided for its participation only with respect 
to the transfer of sovereign rights, i.e. where the drafters had adapted the existing rule 
in Article 24. Provisions for the Bundestag’s participation in ‘every-day-business’ were 
added only after the bill had already been introduced to the parliament for delibera-
tion.406 For the present context, the crucial provisions are the second and third para-
graph of Article 23:  
(2) In Angelegenheiten der Euro-
päischen Union wirken der Bundes-
tag und durch den Bundesrat die 
Länder mit. Die Bundesregierung hat 
den Bundestag und den Bundesrat 
umfassend und zum frühestmögli-
chen Zeitpunkt zu unterrichten.  
(3) Die Bundesregierung gibt dem 
Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellung-
nahme vor ihrer Mitwirkung an 
Rechtsetzungsakten der Europäi-
schen Union. Die Bundesregierung 
berücksichtigt die Stellungnahmen 
des Bundestages bei den Verhand-
lungen. Das Nähere regelt ein Ge-
setz. 
(2) The Bundestag and, through the 
Bundesrat, the Länder shall participate 
in matters concerning the European Un-
ion. The Federal Government shall keep 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in-
formed, comprehensively and at the ear-
liest possible time. 
(3) Before participating in legislative 
acts of the European Union, the Federal 
Government shall provide the Bundestag 
with an opportunity to state its position. 
The Federal Government shall take the 
position of the Bundestag into account 
during the negotiations. Details shall be 
regulated by a law. 
At first glance, they seem fairly straightforward: the Bundesregierung still had the lead-
ing role and the Bundestag was allowed to ‘participate’ in those activities e.g. by 
providing opinions. The Bundesregierung in turn had a duty to keep the Bundestag in-
formed. Given the very visible connection between the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s de-
cisions on Article 24 and the text of the new Article 23, commentators agreed that the 
cases decided under the ‘old’ rule could still be used as a reference point for the inter-
pretation of the new one.407 However, when it came to the actual interpretation of 
those provisions, the situation seemed less clear. The question arose whether Article 
23 was simply meant to perpetuate the status quo or was intended to provide any di-
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rection beyond the old rule, given e.g. the specific references to strengthening the 
principles of democracy and federalism. In other words, whether these provisions did 
indeed provide (some) compensation for the very real loss of influence and decision 
making power the Bundestag had suffered in the preceding decades and/ or what ef-
fect those rights would have on the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the 
Bundestag.  
The debate among academics was divided between those who considered Article 23 as 
a mere distillation of what had been constitutional practice anyway and those who ar-
gued that it did indeed provide something more than that.408 As analysed in the previ-
ous Chapter, the constitutional practice until then had led to a particularly powerful 
government that could keep the Bundestag’s involvement to the bare minimum by re-
lying on its foreign policy prerogative: since it was the executive’s right to conduct For-
eign Affairs, the parliament had to justify its ‘interference’, usually by relying on the 
principle of democracy.409 This gave the latter the mandate to monitor the govern-
ment’s activities, but could only justify oversight up to a point. If one were to apply this 
logic to Article 23 (2) and (3) in order to determine how far exactly the Bundestag was 
allowed to influence and control the Bundesregierung’s activities, one would have to 
opt for a fairly narrow interpretation of ‘participate’ (Article 23 (2)) and ‘opportunity to 
state its position’ (Article 23 (3)) in order to keep the Bundestag from being able to un-
dermine the Bundesregierung’s responsibilities. Cynically put, the Bundestag’s rights 
under Article 23 (3) would be comparable to those of the European Parliament under 
the consultation procedure.  
In contrast, other authors claimed that the new Article 23 had been intended to recon-
ceptualise the relationship between the EU and the German legal system by integrat-
ing the former into domestic policy making and thus to set the relationship between 
the executive and the legislative onto an entirely different footing.410 Such an interpre-
tation would turn the existing dynamics on its head and completely alter the balance 
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of power between the two institutions: as explored in Chapter III, in the domestic con-
text, the Bundestag (and the Bundesrat) are seen as being involved in political deci-
sion-making processes as a matter ‘of course’ and of right and it is the government 
that has to justify any limitation on their influence.411 Considering the considerable 
practical repercussions, it is astonishing that until the ratification of the ESM Treaty in 
2012, there were no cases brought to the Bundesverfassungsgericht to decide this 
fundamental question. Not a single member of the Bundestag felt it necessary to chal-
lenge the activities of the government as being in violation of their right to ‘participate’ 
in European matters. It was left to academic commentary to debate the issue and the 
majority favoured the narrow interpretation, i.e. to assume that no changes to the pre-
existing constitutional practice had been intended.  
b) Reserves from the domestic context 
In the Lisbon decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht commented on various areas of 
policy making where integration efforts had to tread rather carefully. Two of them 
stand out because they provide the parliament with actual decision-making power be-
yond the confines of Article 23 (2) and (3): the deployment of armed forces and the 
budget.  
Chapter IV above provided an evaluation of how the Bundesverfassungsgericht had 
conceptualised the decision-making on military action outside of Germany. The Bun-
destag’s right to approve such an action prior to the mission was not meant as a limita-
tion of the government’s foreign policy prerogative, but rather as a genuine right of 
the parliament. This construction has already proven to be very effective in protecting 
the rights of the Bundestag, but here we can see that it also applies to the European 
context – a consistent continuation of the reasoning that European matters are still 
Foreign Affairs. The Court declares that any Europeanisation would not be permissible, 
i.e. the specific responsibility to decide on the deployment of armed German forces 
was in the hands of the Bundestag and had to remain there. This did not mean that the 
European Union could not develop defensive capabilities, but it did mean that the Eu-
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ropean treaties could not be amended in a way that would enable the authorisation of 
specific military action without the express approval of the Bundestag. In the words of 
the Court, this reserve outranked Article 23 and was therefore ‘integration re-
sistant’.412 The Court then clarified that the budget required similar consideration be-
cause it protected the materials means of a Member State to realise its goals:  
“… Die Hoheit über den Haushalt ist der 
Ort konzeptioneller politischer Entschei-
dungen über den Zusammenhang von 
wirtschaftlichen Belastungen und staatlich 
gewährten Vergünstigungen. […] Ent-
scheidend ist aber, dass die Gesamtver-
antwortung mit ausreichenden politischen 
Freiräumen für Einnahmen und Ausgaben 
noch im Deutschen Bundestag getroffen 
werden kann. …“ 
“… Budget sovereignty is where 
political decisions are planned to 
combine economic burdens with 
benefits granted by the state. 
[…]What is decisive, however, is 
that the overall responsibility, with 
sufficient political discretion re-
garding revenue and expenditure, 
can still rest with the German Bun-
destag. …”413  
c) The Mandate to integrate 
Given the Court’s persisting image as hostile towards European integration, the char-
acterization of the Grundgesetz’s stance as a ‘mandate to integrate’ constitutes per-
haps the most surprising part of the Lisbon judgment. It would have been easier to 
simply recall Maastricht and then to allow the Lisbon Treaty to pass, subject to the 
previously established provisos. Instead, the Bundesverfassungsgericht unequivocally 
asserted the Grundgesetz’s commitment to European integration, a commitment that 
binds all of Germany’s constitutional institutions, including the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht itself. The characterization of this commitment as a ‘constitutional man-
date’ and as part of a constitutional principle emphasizes the importance that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht attached to the process of European integration and Ger-
many’s participation in it.414 As outlined in Chapter III A, such principles represent fun-
damental value decisions of the Grundgesetz that play a vital role in the interpretation 
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of individual constitutional provisions and in the assessment of the constitutionality of 
actions under review,415 as can be seen in the Maastricht decision where the Court 
used the principle of democracy to great effect. Although, unlike the latter, this new 
principle of openness is not seen as part of the unalterable core, its status as a consti-
tutional principle means that the Bundesregierung and Bundestag, the German courts, 
but also the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself, will have to consider it whenever Europe-
an law is involved.  
In this context, one noticeable difference between the Maastricht and the Lisbon deci-
sion is the Court’s approach to the institutions and their activities. While Maastricht 
had strongly emphasized the duties of the European institutions with regard to re-
specting the Member States’ rights, the focus in Lisbon is far more on the duties ‘in-
cumbent upon German constitutional bodies’.416 The Bundestag and the Bundesregier-
ung are identified as carrying the primary responsibility which has to be realised in the 
everyday work of the European institutions (e.g. while legislating) as well as during a 
revision of the treaty system.417 In order to maintain the political responsibility of the 
Bundestag, the Court decided that the bridging clauses and the simplified and ordinary 
amendment procedure as well as the use of Article 352 TFEU could only be used with 
prior approval of the German Parliament. Moreover, the vote on this instruction had to 
be taken as a formal statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat and in some cases 
even a two-thirds majority in both Houses.418  
These requirements do constitute a qualitative shift: while so far the activities of the 
Bundesregierung have of course been subject to parliamentary oversight as of right, 
the democratic principle now turns this right into a duty. This forces the members of 
the Bundestag to take their role more seriously and not simply to rely on the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht to enforce their rights vis-à-vis the Bundesregierung.419  
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In terms of the practical consequences, however, these changes strengthen the Bun-
destag’s position only to a limited degree. The subjection of the bridging clauses and 
the simplified amendment procedure to the Bundestag’s approval merely confirms the 
existing approval rights under Article 23 (1). The only new element is that now also the 
use of Article 352 TFEU is included here which could potentially lead to a greater in-
volvement of the Bundestag. Overall, however, the integration responsibility of the 
Bundestag seems to constitute merely of a small degree of tighter internal control to 
ensure that the Executive does not use its position in the European institutions to cir-
cumvent the parliament’s right officially to control the integration process. This com-
plements the principles developed in the decisions on the European Arrest Warrant 
Act and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System cases regarding accountability es-
pecially of the activities of the Federal Parliament.420  
Therefore, before one hails this as a strengthening of the Bundestag’s rights, one 
should consider that these approval requirements only come into play once the gov-
ernment has decided that it wants to vote for the use of the clause in question. If the 
Bundesregierung has decided to use its veto anyway, they do not need to seek the ap-
proval of the Bundestag. So the actual political decision as to whether the clause is 
used is still very much with the government. Considering also that in parliamentary 
democracies like Germany, the government will generally be able to rely on its own 
majority in parliament to get the required approval, it remains to be seen how effec-
tive this control mechanism will be in practice.421 It will be very much up to the Mem-
bers of the Bundestag themselves whether the only consequences of the Lisbon re-
quirements will be increased transparency and public scrutiny422 or whether they will 
manage to achieve a measure of actual control. The identity review introduced by Lis-
bon may be used here as an internal enforcement mechanism, allowing the Bundestag 
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(especially the opposition), to challenge any action taken without prior approval. But 
the Bundesregierung could also make use of it: using it in combination with the man-
date to integrate, it could challenge the constitutionality of a particular vote before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in order to have it annulled, in case the Bundestag refused 
to authorise steps for further integration although they would not threaten Germany’s 
constitutional identity. Used creatively by both Bundesregierung and Bundestag, the 
procedural mechanisms can be both a threat and an opportunity. Ideally, this should 
induce the government to involve the Parliament more and earlier in the process, in 
particular to keep the Bundestag informed well ahead of the vote at European level to 
give it enough time to schedule the necessary debate and vote. 
It has been argued that the requirements outlined above were established to safe-
guard Germany’s sovereignty.423 However, they would not be very effective in this re-
spect, but then again they were not meant to serve as such. The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht is not concerned that e.g. the bridging clauses will be used at all but that, 
when the decision about their use is taken, it is done by the institution that the Ger-
man people elected for that very purpose. Incidentally, those requirements mirror 
demands for more participation of national Parliaments at European level that fea-
tured highly during the process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty as well as the Lis-
bon Treaty, so to interpret them simply as expressions of euro-hostility would be an 
oversimplification.424  
3. Conclusion 
Even though the European integration process developed in quite a different way to 
e.g. NATO, the Bundesverfassungsgericht saw no need to adapt the stance adopted for 
Foreign Affairs in general: under Article 24, the Bundestag had political decision-
making power as to the treaty as a whole and the duty to make sure that the power 
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transfer did not transgress the limits established by the Grundgesetz. Once the original 
ratification was completed, the usefulness of the Bundestag seemed to be ‘exhausted’. 
Its only options for control and supervision of the activities of the Bundesregierung in 
the European institutions were political tools such as question times and enquiry 
committees.425 In other words, the foreign policy prerogative of the executive applied 
unaltered even though over time the decisions taken in Brussels began to impact far 
more on domestic policy making than any decisions in more traditional international 
affairs ever had.426 
The requests for reform focused all on the EEC and revolved around fundamental 
rights protection, i.e. the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s efforts focused on subjecting the 
actions of the ‘new’ shared bearer of Germany’s sovereign rights to restrictions regard-
ing the content in the same way as it did with the German institutions. As the relation-
ship between institutions is shaped by processes and competences, the doctrine of 
separation of powers did not feature prominently in the Court’s decisions. A further 
reason for the Court’s neglect could be that it saw the institutional structures of the 
EEC as being fixed in the moment of ratification with no further option for change. Al-
so, the cases brought to the Bundesverfassungsgericht were mostly constitutional 
complaints which forced the Court to use a fundamental rights framework for its deci-
sion which did not lend itself easily to the consideration of separation of powers issues. 
However, the fact that no cases were brought by the Bundestag, especially the Bun-
destag’s opposition, speaks volumes in itself and is an interesting parallel to the evolu-
tion of the European integration process during those decades.427 In conclusion, up to 
the treaty of Maastricht, European matters were treated like Foreign Affairs under the 
Grundgesetz and the rather unique development of the European integration process 
since then up to the treaty of Lisbon did not lead to a reconsideration of that assess-
ment.  
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C. Conclusion 
The overall picture that forms of the decades between Maastricht and Lisbon is that of 
a parliament the main activities of which are still reduced to the implementation stage, 
despite various statutory changes at European and at national level. Hopes428 that 
those changes would integrate European decision making into the national process of 
policy formation were disappointed. The declared aim of Article 23 to strengthen the 
democratic legitimacy of the executive’s actions by countering the legislative’s loss of 
power was not achieved. Thus, the only moment in time when the Bundestag holds 
real decision-making power is still the original ratification and subsequent amendment 
treaties. 
This is due to a combination of factors: in the domestic context, the parliament is in a 
rather strong position and well capable of controlling the government, mainly due to 
its role in the legislative process.429 However, this strength turns into a weakness in the 
European context where a lot of legislative competences have been transferred to the 
EU which translated into fewer opportunities for the Bundestag to scrutinize the Bun-
desregierung’s policies. The compensation intended by Article 23 was to involve the 
parliament more actively at an earlier stage, especially before matters are decided at 
European level. However, even though Article 23 (2) specified that the Bundestag had 
the right to be ‘kept informed’ and to ‘participate’, it was still kept at arm’s length. The 
switch to an ex ante system of scrutiny made it dependent on the government for ac-
cess to information and for the implementation of its concerns. Interestingly, it is actu-
ally not predominantly the attitude or behaviour of the government or the nature of 
the integration process that contributes to the disempowerment of the Bundestag. In-
stead, the Bundesverfassungsgericht turns out to be the main ‘gate keeper’430 – with 
its insistence on classifying European matters as ‘Foreign Affairs’431 and on maintaining 
the foreign policy prerogative of the government even in the face of the substantial 
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loss of legislative power of the Bundestag, it prevented the participation rights in Arti-
cle 23 (2) from gaining momentum and thus the parliament from regaining at least 
some of the power it lost. As a result, the Bundestag is still left with the role of political 
‘bystander’ – a position the Bundesverfassungsgericht would never tolerate in the do-
mestic context and which is also very much at odds with the Court’s own jurisprudence 
on how the powers should provide ‘mutual restraint and control’ to each other. 
  
As the cases examined in the next Chapter will show, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
has largely maintained that position. Even though it has moved to establish yet anoth-
er reserve that limits the power of the Bundesregierung, its overall approach remains 
dishearteningly consistent and in favour of a strong executive.  
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CHAPTER VI: The decisions on the ESM and Fiscal Treaties 
The EURO crisis and the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as well as the adoption of the Fiscal Treaty 
gave rise to a series of so far more than eleven decisions that, for the first time, re-
volved very much around the role of the Bundestag in the European context. This 
Chapter will focus on seven432 of those decisions that deal with the substantive con-
tent of the challenges brought partly against the ratification of the treaties in questions 
(in the tradition of the decisions on the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties) and partly 
against decisions of the Bundestag under the EFSF and the ESM; against the statute 
detailing the procedure as to how the Bundestag would be involved in decision making 
in this context as well as against the activities of the Bundesregierung in the run-up to 
the ratification of the ESM and the Fiscal Treaties. The detail provided here will form 
the background of the analysis in the following Chapter.  
A. The ESM cases: facts, arguments and outcomes 
The seven decisions issued between September 2011 and March 2014 that are the fo-
cus of this thesis stem from four different proceedings brought before the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht. In chronological order, the decisions were issued as follows:  
1. The decision issued in September 2011 concerned the decision to grant Greece 
funding for a bailout and the creation of the EFSF; 
2. The decision made in February 2012 dealt with a challenge against the statute 
adopted by the Bundestag to regulate the procedure for parliamentary decision-
making within the EFSF; 
3. The decision of June 2012 asked for a review of the behaviour of the Bundesre-
gierung prior to the ratification of the ESM and the Fiscal Treaties; 
The next four decisions are all part of the same set of proceedings where complain-
ants challenged the constitutionality of the ESM and Fiscal treaties. After the Bundes-
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tag and Bundesrat ratified the treaties in June 2012, citizens as well as members of 
the Bundestag brought actions to have the constitutionality of the treaties reviewed: 
4. In September 2012, complainants brought an injunction against the Federal Presi-
dent to prevent him from submitting the ratification documents before the deci-
sion in the main action; 
5. After the ESM had taken up its work, some of the complainants brought an injunc-
tion in April 2013 in order to prevent the Bundestag from voting on the application 
of Cyprus under the ESM framework; 
6. Among the acts challenged in the main action was the decision of the European 
Central Bank concerning Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). In January 2014 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht made the unprecedented move to make a prelimi-
nary reference to the CJEU because the judges considered the decision to be Ultra 
Vires;433  
7. In March 2014, the Court issued the decision in the main action on the remaining 
challenges.  
1. BVerfGE 129, 124: Greek Bailout/ EFSF (7 September 2011)434 
Several members of the Bundestag as well as members of the general public brought 
constitutional complaints against the German statutes implementing the decision of 
the European Council about the financial aid for Greece, the creation of the EFSF and 
the decision of the Members of the EURO-zone to enhance the stability of the EURO 
(‘EURO stabilization package’). As they did in the Maastricht and Lisbon case, the com-
plainants used the right to vote under Article 38 Grundgesetz and the principle of de-
mocracy to challenge the above which would allow them to have the content of the 
decisions and statutes reviewed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (cf. above Chapter V 
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B 1). The Court considered admissible only the challenges against the German statutes 
and only on the grounds of a violation of the right to vote under Article 38. The chal-
lenges directly against the acts of the European institutions for being ultra vires were 
considered inadmissible since the complainants were not directly affected by these 
acts and thus could not challenge them via constitutional complaint. The Court also 
dismissed the challenges against the acts of participation of the German representative 
in those institutions, holding that the alleged violation of the integration responsibility 
of the Bundestag was insufficiently substantiated.435  
The Court reaffirmed that the right to vote in Article 38, in conjunction with the demo-
cratic principle, allowed challenges against actions of the Bundestag that eroded its 
role as an effective representative of the citizens. Picking up a thread from the Lisbon 
decision436, the judges now extended that to include decisions that could render a pre-
sent or future parliament not just legally – through transfer of competences – but 
practically – e.g. by binding its finances – incapable of fulfilling that role: budgetary au-
tonomy and manoeuvrability was a fundamental element of democratic self-
determination and one of the crucial tools available to a parliament for a comprehen-
sive control of the government. Thus the responsibility for the budget formed part of 
the core of a parliament’s power and of the protected democratic identity of the 
Grundgesetz437 - it had to remain with the Bundestag even within a system of inter-
governmental governance.438  
As it was the Bundestag’s responsibility to ensure that Germany retained its financial 
autonomy, it would violate the democratic core if the Bundesregierung could enter in-
to substantial commitments without the prior consent of the Bundestag.439 It was up 
to the Bundestag to evaluate Germany’s budgetary capacities and economic strength 
and to balance these against the likelihood that the guarantees be realised. As long as 
fundamental fiscal decisions were taken by, or with the consent of, the Bundestag, 
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they would not violate the constitutional core even if they reached substantial propor-
tions.440 In order to exercise its budgetary responsibility, the Bundestag had to ensure 
it retained a decisive influence on the decisions taken in these organisations, in par-
ticular situations even on a case-by-case basis.441  
Applying these principles, the Bundesverfassungsgericht concluded that the statutes 
and decisions under consideration did not erode the Bundestag’s budgetary autonomy 
to the point that it violated the core of the democratic principle. In particular did they 
not create an automated liability where decisions of other Member States could cause 
the creation of liabilities for Germany without its say-so. With regard to the Greek 
bailout under review, the Court emphasized that it had to respect the political preroga-
tive of the parliament in this context, which prevented it from substituting its own as-
sessment of the risks for that of the elected body and limited its review to evident vio-
lations of the limitations outlined above. ‘Evident’ in this context were decisions that 
were unjustifiable in light of the amount involved and the potential consequences for 
budgetary autonomy.442 The Court concluded that the Bundestag’s assessment about 
the potential impact on the budget was constitutionally acceptable.443  
Conversely, the Court did find parliamentary control insufficient with regard to the 
statute implementing the EFSF as it required the Bundesregierung merely to try to ob-
tain the approval of the Bundestag’s budget committee in advance of the decision in 
the EFSF council. Instead of annulling the statute, however, the judges merely required 
it to be interpreted in conformity with the constitution, i.e. it had to be read as requir-
ing the Committee’s prior consent, unless it was an emergency.444  
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2. BVerfGE 130, 318: Participation of the Bundestag (EFSF) (28 
February 2012)445 
The next decision was a challenge against the statute that aimed to implement the re-
quirements resulting from the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision in September 
2011. The statute had been amended following a proposal from the Bundestag’s 
Budget Committee and defined in detail what situations were subject to the approval 
of the Bundestag as a whole, which ones were to be decided by the Budget Committee 
and which ones were to be referred to a so-called Special Committee formed by a 
small number of members of the Budget Committee.446  
The applicants, members of the Bundestag, brought an inter-institutional dispute 
against the Bundestag, arguing that with the enactment of that statute, the latter had 
violated their rights to equal participation under Article 38 Grundgesetz. In an inter-
institutional dispute, the applicant claims that the respondent institution violated its 
rights under the Grundgesetz and the Court’s decision is intended to settle the differ-
ence of opinion between the two parties. The potential consequences are rather lim-
ited: if the Court finds the actions under review to be unconstitutional, all it can do is 
declare them to be thus, unlike in case of a constitutional complaint where it can re-
peal the actions in question - one of the main reasons that the actions against Europe-
an treaties tend to be brought as constitutional complaints. Despite its limitations, the 
procedure is a very useful tool especially for the opposition of the Bundestag as it al-
lows challenges against actions of the majority of the Bundestag or the government 
and results in a definitive delineation of the rights in questions. Since the Court’s inter-
pretation is binding on all institutions, such cases have decided repercussions for their 
future behaviour and thus the potential to reshape the relationship of the institutions 
involved in a fundamental fashion - as could be seen in Chapter IV (Foreign Affairs), 
where the Court’s jurisprudence on the parliamentary reserve on the deployment of 
armed forces originated in an inter-institutional dispute.  
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Here, the applicants argued that according to established jurisprudence447 of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht, all members of the House have the right to equal participation 
in the duties and responsibilities of the Bundestag.448 Therefore the default delegation 
of decisions in EFSF matters to the Budget Committee (with a size of 41 out of the then 
total number of 620 members of the Bundestag) would exclude a majority of the 
House from participating in decisions that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had, after all, 
deemed to be a crucial part of the parliament’s duties. This would apply even more in 
the case of matters intended to be referred to the Special Committee - which had an 
intended size of only 9 members (out of 620).449 The respondent Bundestag - support-
ed by the Bundesregierung - argued that the case be dismissed since the Bundestag as 
an institution had the right to organise its own affairs autonomously and that included 
decisions as to which matters to refer to committees and which ones to reserve to the 
plenum.  
Given the track record of the Bundesverfassungsgericht for dismissing challenges in the 
EU context, it must have come as a rather unwelcome surprise to the Bundesregierung 
when the Court found in favour of the applicants. It concurred with them in that in 
principle it was the Bundestag as a whole that was the directly elected representative 
of the people. As a consequence, all members had in principle the same right to share 
effectively in the activities of the House.450 This applied in particular to the budgetary 
responsibility. The budget represented the economic dimension of fundamental policy 
decision-making for which the Bundestag was responsible vis-à-vis the people. 
Through the debates, parliament became the platform for public discussion of the 
competing interests and thus allowed the citizens to participate in the control of the 
powers governing them. As a result, the responsibilities of the Bundestag with regard 
to the budget were not merely a means to control the government, but rather a fun-
damental element of democratic self-determination.451 Therefore it was also the Bun-
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destag as a whole that had the responsibility for the budget - not just the parties hold-
ing the majority (and supporting the government), particular parliamentary party 
groups or even individual members.  
Recalling their decision of September 2011, the judges highlighted that the obligation 
on the Bundesregierung to obtain prior approval of the Bundestag before a vote in the 
governing body of the EFSF was meant to prevent the government from entering into 
financial obligations that would circumvent the Bundestag’s responsibilities.452 The 
‘Bundestag’ in this context was as such the plenum, i.e. every member of the Bundes-
tag had the right to review and vote on EFSF proposals. The Court distinguished be-
tween two different types of committee activities had to be distinguished:453 to refer 
to committees work preparing for a vote in the plenum was a well-established parlia-
mentary tradition and sensible for the sake of efficiency. However, the referral of ac-
tual decision-making power away from the plenum was subject to strict proportionality 
considerations454. Here, the statute under review employed the assumption that al-
most all decisions were ‘urgent’ and/ or required confidentiality and thus were within 
the remit of the Budget Committee, if not the Special committee. This turned the 
committee referral, which was supposed to be the exception, into the rule and thus 
removed most decisions on the EFSF from the remit of the plenum of the Bundestag, 
i.e. most of its members.455 With regard to the Special Committee, the judges criticised 
that is composition defeated its purpose: if the committee was supposed to enable 
fast decision-making in urgent situations, then it made no sense not to have deputies 
assigned to each member so that quorum could be ensured.456 The only instance 
where the Court considered the referral to the Special Committee justifiable were for 
highly sensitive decisions where even a hint of a rumour about mere discussions taking 
place would endanger the very purpose of the measure under consideration.457  
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3. BVerfGE 131, 152: Duty to Inform the Bundestag (ESM) (19 June 
2012)458 
Like the previous decision, the decision of June 2012 was rendered in an inter-
institutional dispute - this time between the Green party parliamentary group (part of 
the opposition) and the Bundesregierung. The applicants challenged the behaviour of 
the Bundesregierung in the run-up to the ratification of the ESM and the Fiscal Treaties 
as being in violation of their rights under Article 23 (2) Grundgesetz. Since its introduc-
tion into the Grundgesetz in 1993, this was the first case ever to be brought with re-
gard to Article 23 (2) and politicians as well as academics eagerly awaited the outcome. 
And again, against all expectations, the applicants won.  
The case revolved around the events that had taken place from ca. November 2010 up 
to the finalisation of both treaties in November 2011. The Bundesregierung had a very 
active role in the negotiations about the ESM and the Fiscal treaty had actually been its 
own idea. Despite this, the Bundesregierung kept the Bundestag very much at arm’s 
length during the entire time - based on the argument that the events in question 
were not ‘European matters’ for the purposes of Article 23 and that therefore the tra-
ditional rules on interaction in the area of Foreign Affairs applied. In other words: the 
Bundesregierung considered these negotiations to be within the remit of its foreign 
policy prerogative and the Bundestag had no right to interfere. In keeping with this 
view, any information it provided to the Bundestag was given under the express provi-
so that this could not be construed as an acknowledgment of a legal duty to do so. 
Over the course of the months, cabinet ministers informed individual committees and 
answered requests from individual members of the Bundestag in a more or less de-
tailed fashion, but there was no coherence. The first draft of the ESM treaty that was 
available at European level at the beginning of April 2011 was not forwarded to the 
Bundestag by the Bundesregierung – the members of the Bundestag only got access to 
it because they managed to get a copy from the Austrian parliament.459  
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The applicants argued that this behaviour had violated their right under Article 23 (2) 
to be kept informed about European matters ‘comprehensively and at the earliest pos-
sible time’. The behaviour of the Bundesregierung made it impossible for the Bundes-
tag to have any real and effective input into the decision-making process and on the 
content and shape of the ESM or the Fiscal treaties.460  
Providing a definitive interpretation of the rights in article 23 (2) for the first time al-
most twenty years after its enactment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht largely agreed 
with the applicants, but also outlined limitations to those rights that aimed to preserve 
the core of the government’s prerogative. The judges started by outlining the 
Grundgesetz’s traditional approach to Foreign Affairs, stressing that the Grundgesetz 
had allocated the competence for Foreign Affairs to the executive and that it enjoyed 
broad discretion as to how to fulfil that responsibility.461 They recalled their estab-
lished jurisprudence that the Grundgesetz was to be seen as having deliberately lim-
ited the Bundestag’s in the area of Foreign Affairs due to the Bundestag’s institutional 
structures being ‘unsuitable’ for handling the daily demands of Foreign Affairs. The 
judges also recalled their evaluation that to give the Bundestag a greater role would 
lead to a circumvention of the balanced system of power distribution set up by the 
Grundgesetz. Therefore the parliament’s input was limited to after-the-fact legal con-
trol of the government’s actions.462  
The judges then asserted that the traditional approach did not apply to Article 23 
which they saw as having intended to set the relationship between Bundesregierung 
and Bundestag in European matters on a different footing: while the executive was still 
meant to be the power in control, the participation rights provided to the Bundestag 
were intended as a compensation for the loss of power it had suffered as a conse-
quence of the European integration process. In order for those participation rights to 
be most effective, one had to give Article 23 a broad remit, i.e. adopt a broad defini-
tion of ‘European matters’. Therefore the ESM and the Fiscal treaty had to be consid-
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ered as such even though they were created deliberately outside the EU’s treaty struc-
ture.463 
An equally broad interpretation had to be applied to the duty of the government under 
Article 23 (2) to keep the Bundestag informed. Reiterating a point already made in 
their judgement in February 2012,464 the judges highlighted that without comprehen-
sive information the Bundestag could not exercise its participation rights effectively 
and since the Bundesregierung - due to its dominant role in the decision-making pro-
cesses at European level - was in possession of the necessary information, it had a duty 
to provide the Bundestag with all the materials and information it needed to make an 
informed decision. And this information had to be provided early enough so that the 
Bundestag had a real chance to influence the position of the Bundesregierung before 
definite decisions were made in Brussels. In other words: Article 23 (2) did precisely 
not intend for the Bundestag to conduct only after-the-fact legal control. The judges 
also pointed out that the duty to provide comprehensive information in time had been 
even more important in the present context since it concerned the budgetary respon-
sibility of the Bundestag - one of its core duties.465 
While the judges considered those rights of the Bundestag to be rooted in the principle 
of democracy and in need of a broad interpretation so that the Bundestag could use 
them effectively, they did not leave the government entirely ‘defenceless’. Similar to 
their approach in the domestic context (cf. Chapter III), they used the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers in order to establish the limits of the Bundestag’s rights to get actively 
involved in European matters. They argued that the doctrine served to protect the 
Grundgesetz’s system of power distribution between the institutions, in this case it 
acted to preserve the independence of the executive’s internal decision-making pro-
cesses - as a matter of principle, the phase of ‘initiative, deliberation and action’ was 
not subject to review or control by the Bundestag while it was still on-going.466 How-
ever, this did not mean that the government could withhold all information until it had 
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taken the final decision. Interim or partial results that were capable of being released 
to the public or to third parties for consultation were no longer part of the internal de-
cision-making process and the government had a duty to inform the Bundestag about 
those results.467  
4. BVerfGE 132, 195: Injunction against the ESM and Fiscal Treaties (12 
September 2012)468 
Directly after the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of June 2012, the Bundes-
tag voted for the ratification of the ESM and Fiscal treaties. Immediately afterwards, a 
considerable number of concerned citizens and some members of the Bundestag 
brought constitutional complaints and the members of the opposition party Die LINKE 
brought an inter-institutional dispute, all contesting the constitutionality of those trea-
ties and of some of the implementing legislation. In September 2012, the Court decid-
ed on an injunction brought by those complainants and applicants. The aim of the in-
junction was to suspend the ratification until after the Court had decided on the main 
action, i.e. to avoid that matters became irrevocable before the constitutionality of the 
issues under review had been settled. 
The Court’s general approach to injunctions is to assess only the potential conse-
quences of granting or refusing the injunction without assessing the likely outcome of 
the case, so as to avoid pre-empting the decision in the main action. However, in the 
present case the potential repercussions either way reached far beyond Germany or its 
constitutional system: if the Court rejected the injunction, the ratification would go 
ahead and Germany would become bound by those treaties under international law. 
Should they ultimately prove to be unconstitutional, it would be very difficult for Ger-
many to disentangle itself from those legal and financial obligations - the latter ones 
potentially of considerable proportion. On the other hand, if the Court granted the in-
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junction, the ratification would be suspended and, without Germany, the treaties 
could not enter into force. The economic repercussions of that scenario would affect 
not just Germany but the whole EURO zone. Should the treaties then prove to be con-
stitutional, the resulting economic and political damage would likely be impossible to 
remedy.469 In cases such as this one, the Bundesverfassungsgericht tends to derogate 
from its usual practice and to conduct a summary examination of the main action in 
order to establish whether there was a ‘high degree of probability’470 for a success or 
dismissal and then granted or refused the injunction accordingly.  
Its summary examination led the Court to conclude that the actions appeared mostly 
admissible but not likely to be well founded on the merits. It therefore rejected the in-
junction with the proviso that the Federal president submitted the following two res-
ervations when submitting the German ratification instruments:  
1. … dass keine Vorschrift dieses 
Vertrages so ausgelegt werden kann, 
dass für die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land ohne Zustimmung des deutschen 
Vertreters höhere Zahlungsverpflich-
tungen begründet werden; 
2. die Regelungen der Artikel 32 
Absatz 5, Artikel 34 und Artikel 35 Ab-
satz 1 des Vertrages zur Einrichtung 
des Europäischen Stabilitätsmecha-
nismus nicht der umfassenden Unter-
richtung des Bundestages und des 
Bundesrates entgegenstehen. 
1. … that no provision of this Treaty 
may be interpreted in a way that es-
tablishes higher payment obligations 
for the Federal Republic of Germany 
without the agreement of the German 
representative; 
2. the provisions under Article 32 
paragraph 5, Article 34 and Article 35 
paragraph 1 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism do 
not stand in the way of the compre-
hensive information of the Bundestag 
and of the Bundesrat.471 
The Court considered the applications admissible only insofar as the complainants had 
argued that the ratification of the treaties would violate their rights under Article 38 by 
transferring too much decision-making power to the supranational level which would 
make it impossible for the Bundestag to realise its budgetary responsibilities. The 
judges agreed that this created at least the possibility of a violation of the core of the 
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principle of democracy which in turn constituted a violation of the Grundgesetz’s iden-
tity as highlighted in the decision on the Lisbon treaty.472  
The Court largely recalled its comments made in the decisions issued in September 
2011 and February 2012 with regard to the nature of the Bundestag’s budgetary re-
sponsibilities. It confirmed that they - as well as the right to be kept informed by the 
Bundesregierung - were an essential element in the Grundgesetz’s efforts to ensure 
the realisation of a strong democracy and thus part of the Grundgesetz’s identity pro-
tected by Article 79 (3).473 However, the judges rejected the applicants’ arguments that 
the changes made to Article 136 TFEU were unconstitutional simply because they con-
stituted an alteration of the existing structure of the currency union and as such went 
beyond what the Bundestag had agreed to with the original act of ratification and 
what the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself had declared to be constitutional in its re-
view of the Maastricht treaty. They pointed out that the regime originally established 
by the treaty was by no means the only viable design option and that it was well within 
the remit of the Member States as the ‘masters of the treaties’ to review and change 
the existing regime should it prove unsuitable to the task.474  
With regard to the Fiscal Treaty, the Court agreed that it would oblige its parties to 
pursue a specific budgetary and fiscal policy. But this did not constitute a per-se viola-
tion of the principle of democracy. The judges pointed out that in 2009, the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat themselves had amended the Grundgesetz to include a provision that 
put considerable restrictions on the federal and Länder parliaments with regard to bor-
rowing. The reasoning behind these limits was to prevent current parliaments from in-
curring debts that would severely limit the financial manoeuvrability of future parlia-
ments and thus their democratic power to shape the lives of their citizens. Hence, the 
Court had no objection to such restrictions being created not merely by national con-
stitutional law but also by international or European law since those obligations were 
freely entered into. The primary political responsibility for assessing if and how far 
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Germany should bind itself in this fashion rested with the legislator and it enjoyed a 
considerable amount of discretion in this respect.475 
Applying those considerations to the actions under review, the Court concluded that 
they were not unconstitutional. However, it found the ESM treaty to be slightly ambig-
uous with regard to the overall amount each Member State could be made liable for 
and with regard to the secrecy required by the members of the governing bodies. 
Therefore it required the Federal President to clarify those points at the moment of 
ratification by submitting the two reserves formulated in the operative part of the 
judgement (cf. above).  
5. Injunction against the approval of ESM grants to Cyprus (17 April 
2013)476 
After the injunction failed in the September 2012, the ratification went ahead and the 
ESM was established as planned. Since June 2012, Cyprus had been in negotiations 
with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF about finan-
cial support within the EFSF framework. A Memorandum of Understanding was agreed 
in March 2013. In April 2013, Cyprus made an application to the ESM for further funds. 
On the 13th April, the Federal Minister of Finance submitted a proposal to the Bundes-
tag for a vote approving the adaptation of the existing Memorandum of Understand-
ing and for approval of the release of ESM funds. The vote on this proposal in a plenary 
session of the Bundestag was scheduled for the 18th April - in time for the vote in the 
ESM’s Governing Council on the 24th April.  
Some of the concerned citizens who had brought the - at that time still pending - con-
stitutional complaint against the ESM and Fiscal treaty filed for an injunction in order 
to prevent the Bundestag from voting on the proposal and to require the Bundesre-
gierung to provide further and more detailed information to clarify a number of issues 
that had remained unclear in the documentation provided by the European Commis-
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sion, the European Central Bank and the IMF. They argued that the extremely short 
period of time between the submission of the proposal and the vote did not leave the 
members of the Bundestag enough time to properly review the details of the proposed 
regime and assess its ramifications. To them, this constituted a violation of their rights 
under Article 38 as the Bundestag could not effectively exercise its budgetary respon-
sibility as established by the Court in previous ESM decisions.  
This case was the first one dealing with an attempt to have the government’s practices 
with respect to the Bundestag’s rights within the EFSF/ ESM framework reviewed and 
to test how much control power this new budgetary reserve could provide. Unfortu-
nately, the Bundesverfassungsgericht disposed fairly swiftly of the application: for an 
injunction to be granted, the associated main action had to be at least admissible and 
in the complainants’ case there was none available.477 Their already pending case 
against the ESM treaty could not serve in this function since the objectives of the two 
actions were different. And a potentially new, separate, constitutional complaint 
would be inadmissible since the complainants would have no standing: it was accepted 
practice in the European context to use Article 38 to challenge in principle decisions of 
the Bundestag transferring powers and/ or setting up a regime for their use. However, 
it did not provide complainants with the option to challenge every single individual de-
cision made by democratically elected institutions - i.e. it did not give citizens the pow-
er to have the Court review any majority decision simply because they did not approve 
of it.478 The judges further pointed out that the only way for a case against the actions 
in question to be admissible was to file an inter-institutional dispute and claim a viola-
tion of the Bundestag’s participation rights under Article 23 (2). This, however, was not 
an option open to the complainants since they were ‘merely’ citizens and not members 
of the Bundestag.479  
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6. BVerfGE 134, 366: OMT/ Order for a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU (14 January 2014)480 
A move that divided the academic community481 was the decision of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht to separate out the challenges against the decision of the European Cen-
tral Bank of September 2012 concerning Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and to 
refer it for review to the CJEU as it considered that decision to be Ultra Vires. Accord-
ing to the requirements of the test the Court had developed in its own Mangold/ Hon-
eywell decision,482 it was obliged to make a reference to the CJEU before it could de-
clare the act to be ultra vires, so as to give the European Court the opportunity to clari-
fy the interpretation of the act in question. The decision was taken with six judges 
forming the majority and Justices Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt issuing two very critical 
dissenting opinions. Incidentally, Justice Landau, who had issued the critical dissenting 
opinion in the Mangold/ Honeywell case, formed part of the majority this time. 
The test devised by the Court required that a measure had to be ‘manifestly’ ultra vir-
es, i.e. violate the principle of conferral and thus the existing competence structures in 
a ‘sufficiently serious’483 manner. Such a sufficiently serious violation was contingent 
on the impugned act being manifestly in breach of competences and leading to a struc-
turally significant shift to the detriment of the Member States in the structure of com-
petences.484 The Bundesverfassungsgericht considered those criteria to be met by the 
OMT decision as it went beyond the mandate of the ECB conferred by the European 
treaties merely to support the general economic policies of the European Union, but 
not to implement its own independent policy. Moreover, considering its scope and in-
tended method of implementation, the OMT programme would amount to a systemic 
financial redistribution, an option that was precisely precluded by the treaties which 
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aimed to protect the budgetary independence of members of the monetary union. 
Thus, both cumulative criteria were met and the act had to be considered ultra vir-
es.485 Such a classification led to specific duties for the German institutions in light of 
their so-called integration responsibility: not only were they prohibited from imple-
menting or applying such acts, but they also had a duty to challenge such transgres-
sions.486 This is why the majority considered the constitutional complaints challenging 
the OMT decision to be admissible as citizens had a right to challenge the actions of 
German public authorities if they violated the limits for European integration as set out 
in Article 23 and as protected by Article 38.487 
The Grand Chamber of the CJEU issued its decision in June 2015 after Advocate Gen-
eral Cruz Villalón submitted his opinion in January 2015. Cruz Villalón discussed in 
great detail the reasons put forward by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in favour of the 
ultra vires nature of the OMT decision, but concluded that it should be considered law-
ful (though an unconventional move) provided certain conditions were met during im-
plementation to ensure proportionality and strict compliance with the TFEU. The CJEU 
agreed with Cruz Villalón in principle that the OMT decision was indeed lawful and not 
ultra vires, but decided against imposing the conditions for the implementation sug-
gested by Cruz Villalón.488 With that, the case returned to the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht and awaits decision after the oral hearing on 16 February 2016.489 
For the present context not the proposed ultra vires review, but the two rather strong-
ly worded dissenting opinions are of interest. Justices Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt heavi-
ly criticised the majority for what they described as setting a dangerous precedent for 
the introduction of an actio popularis/ popular action.490 The challenges the majority 
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held to be admissible were not only brought directly against an act of a European insti-
tution, but also against what the applicants considered to be objectionable omissions 
on the part of the German authorities, specifically that the Bundesregierung had not 
brought an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU against the OMT decision and 
that the Bundestag had not conducted a thorough review of the proposed activities of 
the ECB.  
Justice Lübbe-Wolff criticised that by declaring admissible challenges against omissions 
instead of specific actions, the majority had gone far beyond what a Court could legit-
imately decide without violating the principles of democracy and separation of powers 
in the process, In other words, the Court had crossed the line between what was ‘justi-
ciable’ and what was not.491 Lübbe-Wolff readily acknowledged that that line was fluid 
and formulated and interpreted differently by different legal traditions. For example, 
US courts used the so-called political question doctrine to draw that line while the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht traditionally used admissibility criteria and self-imposed lim-
its to its own review powers for the same purpose. Despite that fluidity, she consid-
ered there to be certain guidelines that one could derive from the principle of democ-
racy, the Rechtsstaat principle and the doctrine of separation of powers which all 
pointed to the inadmissibility of the challenges in the present case.492 Moreover, the 
majority’s approach derogated from principles only recently confirmed i.a. in the 
Court’s own decisions of September 2011 and June 2012 where challenges against 
omissions had been considered admissible only as far as a very specific action could be 
identified as having been required and a very specific follow-up action could be identi-
fied. In the present case Lübbe-Wolff saw neither as being possible: how precisely the 
Bundesregierung and the Bundestag had been supposed to react to an EU act that was 
potentially ultra vires and how they would have to react if the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht were to declare the act to be so, was not something a Court should dic-
tate or the public should be able to dictate with the assistance of a Court. The choice 
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between legal or political action was that of the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag 
alone.493  
Similarly, Justice Gerhardt argued that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had in essence al-
lowed the complainants to challenge activities of the political institutions without Arti-
cle 38 providing a sufficient basis for the challenge since “… the individual citizen can-
not claim a right under Article 38 (1) to particular acts of the Federal Government and 
of the Bundestag. …”494 Put differently: what the complainants (and the majority) had 
classified as a lack of democratic action, Gerhardt saw as precisely the opposite: not to 
criticise the ECB was a political choice the Bundestag was entitled to make and this ‘in-
action’ represented the decision of a democratically elected majority for a specific pol-
icy. It was up to the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag to criticise that decision 
and thus push for a public debate on that issue. It was not up to the citizen to control 
the flow of the debate by way of judicial action. And it was not for a Court to enable 
such control.495  
7. BVerfGE 135, 317: Decision in the main action on the ESM and Fiscal 
Treaties (18 March 2014)496 
So far the final decision in the ESM series, issued in March 2014, was the decision in 
the main action against the ratification of the ESM treaty and the Fiscal Treaty - minus 
the OMT challenges. After the Court’s decision on the injunction in September 2012, 
the overall outcome was not surprising: in as far as the Court considered the challeng-
es to be admissible, it dismissed them as not well founded on the merits. It reiterated 
that the right to vote in Article 38 enabled the complainants to challenge activities that 
threatened the democratic process - and in this context in particular the budgetary re-
sponsibility of the Bundestag. The legislator had to make sure that it could effectively 
exercise its integration responsibility and in particular did not endanger its budgetary 
responsibility.497 The Court recalled its statements from the previous decisions on the 
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importance of the budget for the democratic self-determination of a people and that 
the Bundestag had to ensure that it could discharge its responsibilities in this respect 
even within a system of ‘intergovernmental governance’.498 This included i.a. a duty to 
ensure that Germany would never be in a position that its voting rights in the govern-
ing bodies of the ESM were suspended.499 With regard to the Fiscal treaty, the Court 
confirmed its previous statements that obligations to pursue a particular fiscal policy 
did not in principle violate the budgetary autonomy as it was  
“… Dabei ist es in erster Linie Sache 
des Gesetzgebers, abzuwägen, ob und 
in welchem Umfang zur Erhaltung de-
mokratischer Gestaltungs- und Ent-
scheidungsspielräume auch für die Zu-
kunft Bindungen in Bezug auf das Aus-
gabeverhalten geboten und deshalb - 
spiegelbildlich - eine Verringerung des 
Gestaltungs- und Entscheidungsspiel-
raums in der Gegenwart hinzunehmen 
ist ….” 
“… primarily for the legislature to 
weigh whether and to what extent, 
in order to preserve some discretion 
for democratic management and 
decision-making, one should enter 
into commitments regarding future 
spending behaviour and therefore – 
correspondingly – accept a re-
striction of one’s discretion for 
democratic management and deci-
sion-making in the present. …”500 
Overall, neither the ESM treaty, the Fiscal Treaty nor the implementing legislation vio-
lated the core of the principle of democracy. All actions taken at the European and the 
national level were still effectively linked to the Bundestag. The Court stressed that not 
the format but the practical effectiveness of the Bundestag’s influence was the crucial 
issue.501  
At the same time, it confirmed its position that foreign - and European - affairs were as 
such the responsibility of the executive and the discretion necessary to act effectively 
in this area was at odds with strict parliamentary oversight. However, the Court con-
ceded that for the present, limited, context the need to preserve the Bundestag’s 
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budgetary responsibility made it necessary to subject the representative of the Ger-
man government in the ESM institutions to strict instructions.502  
B. Conclusion 
The ESM cases are remarkable in several ways: in some instances the applicants actual-
ly won - given the track record of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to dismiss challenges 
after using the case to make statements on matters of principle, this was in itself a 
surprising occurrence. It contributed to the impression that the cases had a profound 
impact on the relationship of the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag. Taken together, 
the decisions also provide a unique opportunity to track the impact of the Court’s ap-
proach on the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag along the 
whole range of their interaction in the European context within the same treaty/ trea-
ties:  
 the behaviour of especially the Bundesregierung during the negotiations prior to 
the ratification of a treaty,  
 the content of the treaty - its compatibility with the Grundgesetz reviewed at the 
stage of ratification,  
 review of the domestic legislation enacted to enable the implementation of the 
obligations arising from the treaty, 
 and, lastly, the practice arising from the use of the powers laid down in that legis-
lation in the ‘day-to-day’ activities of the international institutions created.  
After the first of the decisions under discussion here was issued, the subsequent de-
bate in the Bundestag on the revision of the statutes concerning German participation 
in the EFSF framework, the leader of the CDU party group, Volker Kauder, hailed the 
decision as a paradigm shift in the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the 
Bundestag in matters of parliamentary scrutiny.503 And indeed, these cases appear to 
recast the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag: the new par-
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liamentary ‘reserve’ on matters of budgetary responsibility created by the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht requires the Bundestag to have a rather active role in the decision-
making processes, something that the Court had so far considered as contrary to the 
intentions of the Grundgesetz regarding European matters and Foreign Affairs (cf. esp. 
Chapter IV). However, now, effective ex ante decision-making power in the European 
context seemed for once to be within its reach. Albeit only on one specific issue: the 
new reserve does not mean that the regular EU budget will now require prior parlia-
mentary approval – since the mechanisms and procedures for this were cleared by the 
Court with the approval of the Lisbon treaty. 
 
The next Chapter will evaluate the impact of the cases with regard to the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht’s approach to the separation of powers and to the conceptualisation 
of the relationship between the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung in the EU context. 
The analysis will focus on whether a ‘paradigm shift’ did indeed occur or whether the 
Court has in actual fact merely created a very specific exception to the general rule 
that Foreign Affairs as well as European matters are still very much the domain of the 
executive. If it is the latter, the rather prominent role for the Bundestag would be 
merely due to the fact that all these activities strongly affect state finances and the 
budget, i.e. an area where - in the domestic context - parliaments are traditionally in a 
strong position. 
However, if it is the former, those cases could be considered as (the first step of) a 
move towards a different conceptualisation of European matters and the general bal-
ance of power between the executive and the legislative in this context. 
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CHAPTER VII: The myth of the paradigm shift 
At first glance, the ESM cases seem to indicate a major shift in the Court’s approach to 
European matters in general and to the relationship between the Bundestag and the 
Bundesregierung in particular: the importance of the Bundestag’s involvement is em-
phasized throughout and for the first time the focus is on the phase prior to decision-
making at European level – something that Article 23 had provided for since its inser-
tion in 1993 but that had never been fleshed out by the Court. This would then appear 
to be in stark contrast to the Court’s previous attitude to see the Bundestag’s role 
mostly in providing the official stamp of democratic approval to yet another amend-
ment treaty after it was negotiated by the Bundesregierung – as was the case for i.a. 
the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties.  
However, as the analysis in this Section will reveal, this impression does not hold up on 
closer inspection. Even though there are a number of changes as to how the Court ap-
proaches the theoretical conceptualisation of the relationship between the executive 
and legislative, the implementation by the Bundestag and enforcement by the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht illustrate the shortcomings of this new reserve.  
This Section will analyse the impact of the ESM cases on the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht’s approach to separation of powers in the EU context and with that, on 
the relationship between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag – e.g. with regard to 
the balance of power between them and the level of scrutiny and control exercised by 
the Bundestag over the actions of the Bundesregierung. The aim is to evaluate wheth-
er the Court has created ‘merely’ a very specific parliamentary reserve regarding the 
budget in the area of European matters or Foreign Affairs - similar to the reserve on 
troop deployments (cf. above Chapter IV B) or whether the decisions can be seen as 
the first steps of a reconceptualization of the relationship between the Bundesregier-
ung/ executive and the Bundestag/ legislative in the European context. To that end, 
Section A will determine scope and limits of what the Bundesverfassungsgericht has 
labelled the ‘budgetary responsibility’ of the Bundestag and will then consider how this 
more prominent role of the Bundestag relates to, and impacts on, the foreign policy 
prerogative of the executive/ the government that still largely applies in European 
matters. Section B will follow this with an evaluation of how issues of implementation 
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and enforcement may impact on the practical effectiveness of the Bundestag’s newly 
created rights and duties. 
A. New parameters of interaction for Bundestag and Bundes-
regierung in the European context 
1. The budgetary responsibility as a core power of the parliament 
In the traditional context (as outlined in Chapter III C 3), control over the budget al-
lowed the parliament to control a monarch’s activities in a rather literal sense: without 
the power to raise the money necessary e.g. to raise an army and to pay for weapons, 
it was impossible for the monarch to wage war. The ultimate control over war and 
peace was thus – in a practical and very real sense – in the hands of the parliament. 
Even though things have changed since then – and with them the reasons as to why 
the parliament (and not the government) has ultimate control over the budget, it is 
still considered to be one of the most crucial powers a parliament may possess: with-
out money, a government would find it impossible to implement the policies it had de-
cided on. Controlling the money gave the parliament the necessary leverage to exer-
cise effective control over the government’s activities. This is one of the reasons why – 
as the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself stresses – the annual plenary session on the 
budget is traditionally used as a general review of the government’s policies, especially 
by the opposition.504  
 
Like many other constitutions, the Grundgesetz allocates ultimate decision-making 
power over public spending to the national parliament, specifically the Bundestag. As 
was demonstrated in Chapter III, this allows the parliament considerable influence 
over the government’s policy decisions in the domestic context; even more so in the 
hands of the opposition and in particular when it becomes the subject matter of an 
enquiry committee: the Bundesverfassungsgericht has repeatedly strengthened the 
right of the Bundestag to have extensive access to government files and with it the 
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level of practical control the Bundestag may exercise over the government. Overall, its 
budgetary responsibilities enable the legislative to provide an effective check on the 
executive’s powers.  
The Court defined the budgetary/ fiscal control exercised by the Bundestag as a crucial 
element in a state’s democratic process: as the Court highlighted in the Lisbon deci-
sion, it was not just a question of sovereignty or a limit to integration for its own sake:  
“… Die Hoheit über den Haushalt ist 
der Ort konzeptioneller politischer Ent-
scheidungen über den Zusammenhang 
von wirtschaftlichen Belastungen und 
staatlich gewährten Vergünstigungen. …” 
“… Budget sovereignty is the 
place of conceptual political deci-
sions on the connection of eco-
nomic burdens and privileges 
granted by the state. …”505 
In other words: budgetary autonomy and manoeuvrability were crucial to democratic 
self-determination and part of the constitutional core identity - without control over 
their ‘purse strings’, the Member States would no longer be able to shape the lives of 
their citizens in a truly independent fashion.  
The ESM cases presented the Court with an opportunity to elaborate on scope and lim-
its of this ‘budget sovereignty’ as well as the Bundestag’s role in protecting it within 
the European integration process. The judges recalled their by now traditional reason-
ing developed in the decisions on the Maastricht and the Lisbon treaty that the notions 
of sovereignty and democracy as embodied in the Grundgesetz required that the Ger-
man people as the sovereign needed to stay in ultimate control of what happened in 
the German state. This meant that their elected representatives in the Bundestag did 
not have the right to render themselves powerless and thus incapable of fulfilling the 
very role the people had elected them for – to exercise its sovereign power in its stead. 
In this respect, the present cases remained on familiar ground: in the Maastricht and 
Lisbon decisions, this line of argument had led to a review of the transfer of legislative 
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competences for its impact on the power the Bundestag could still effectively wield, 
i.e. the legal consequences of membership in the EU. The ESM cases saw the same log-
ic applied to factual financial obligations and in light of the potential consequences, the 
Court considered the undertaking of financial obligations capable of limiting a coun-
try’s independence just as much as legal obligations when it came to the ability of the 
German parliament to shape German affairs independently.506 The control of the 
Member States over their budget not only in a formalistic sense, but in terms of actual 
financial manoeuvrability, was essential to preserve the Member States’ independence 
and a crucial tool for controlling the government. Hence, the parliament needed to re-
tain actual decision-making power throughout – as regards treaty content, ratification 
and subsequent implementation. The parliament as the directly elected representative 
of the people had to control public spending – and thus the government. If it could not 
do so – because the money was spent on someone else’s say-so (here the ESM council 
or another Member State), then democratic self-determination was impossible. 
This is in stark contrast to the situation in the area of traditional Foreign Affairs. The 
fact that a treaty may lead to (considerable) financial obligations for Germany is not a 
factor that would limit the government’s exclusive power to negotiate and conclude 
the treaty in question. As illustrated in Chapter IV, Germany’s membership in the IMF, 
the World Bank or NATO did not cause concerns in terms of the incurred financial obli-
gations. Taking NATO as an example: the government’s agreement in the NATO Coun-
cil to support a distinctive change in NATO’s military policy could have led to Germany 
having to increase its defence budget considerably. If one were to apply the line of 
thought developed in the ESM cases to this situation, the result would have been that 
the Bundesregierung should not have agreed to that change without prior approval of 
the Bundestag due to the substantive effects on Germany’s financial resources. How-
ever, as was outlined in Chapter IV, the Court did not even consider the financial impli-
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cations of that decision but simply considered it to be part of the ‘normal’ Foreign Af-
fairs activities conducted by the executive.507 
The same held true so far for the EC and the EU in general: the fact that Germany has 
been a net-contributor to the European budget for decades did not seem to worry the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. In its evaluation of the establishment of the currency union 
in the Maastricht decision, the Court focused on how many competences, in other 
words how much legal decision-making power, would be transferred to the European 
level. To the Court, the crucial point was apparently not how the obligations undertak-
en by the members of the currency union to maintain a stable budget and limit their 
national debts would impact on Germany financial manoeuvrability. Rather, the Court 
focused on whether a progressive transfer of competences could end up disempower-
ing the German parliament to such an extent that it was no longer capable of effective-
ly representing the interests of the German people.508  
While the arguments in the ESM cases are employed vis-à-vis the European level, i.e. 
with a view as to how much ‘Europeanization’ of Germany’s budget was constitutional, 
the language used also hints at the use of the doctrine of separation of powers: the po-
litical responsibility for the budget is considered to be part of the ‘core’ of the legisla-
tive’s power509 – part of its very essence. The Bundesverfassungsgericht highlights how 
it is part of the crucial control powers the legislative has over the executive. These lines 
of argument strongly remind one of how the Court delineated the relationship be-
tween the executive and the legislative in the domestic context (cf. Chapter III): it es-
tablished for each power certain core areas, competences and activities which were 
protected against interference from the other powers or in turn used to allow each 
power to control the other two. For example, in the present context the right of the 
Bundestag to decide on the national budget (Article 110) was seen not just as a simple 
allocation of competences to certain institutions but as the expression of a constitu-
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tional principle – the notion that it is in the Bundestag where financial decisions are 
made. This ‘locus’ of decision-making had to be maintained even within the ‘intergov-
ernmental system of governance’510 that the EU currently represents. Hence, the Court 
reasoned, the Bundestag had to be given the power to make the actual decision on the 
release of funds within the ESM/EFSF framework.  
Unlike with the competence transfer where the government leads not only on the ne-
gotiations about the amendment treaty, but also afterwards when it comes to the 
formulation and vote on European legislation in the Council, here the Court requires 
that the parliament is involved in the treaty negotiations prior to ratification as well as 
retains control over individual decisions afterwards. That latter part is indeed very 
‘new’ and could potentially alter the relationship between the Bundestag and the Bun-
desregierung in a fundamental manner (cf. further Subsection 2 below). 
As the Court clarifies, the Grundgesetz places this responsibility as a matter of principle 
on the Bundestag as a whole.511 It therefore firmly rejected the proposal from the 
budget committee – tabled by its majority a.k.a. the Bundesregierung – to transfer 
most of the actual decision-making power away from the plenum to the budget com-
mittee or an even smaller group of MPs in its decision of February 2012.512 Interesting-
ly, on the surface, this case dealt with complaints from individual MPs about how the 
Bundestag organises its internal committee structures as expressed in the decisions by 
the majority of the House. The arguments revolved around the rights of the Bundestag 
as an institution to organise its own work, of individual MPs to participate in that work, 
etc. And even though the Bundesregierung joined the proceedings on the side of the 
Bundestag, its position or influence does not seem to factor into the assessment: the 
political reality that the majority of the respondent institution – the Bundestag – is in 
fact controlled by the government is not acknowledged by the Court in an express 
fashion. However, reading between the lines of this case, the Court’s arguments send a 
clear signal to the government that the Bundestag’s budgetary responsibility cannot be 
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circumvented by making use of the institution’s internal organisational structures. For 
example, the Court rejected the argument made by the government that all of the de-
cisions concerning the ESM related to Foreign Affairs and were highly political in na-
ture and therefore should be decided by a committee and not the plenum. Instead, the 
Court recalled the reasons that the budget is deliberated and voted on in the plenum 
and had no compunction to apply the same line of thought to decisions relating not to 
domestic, but European affairs, specifically the ESM/EFSF framework. The underlying 
reasoning seems to be that decisions on financial matters affect all citizens and need to 
be debated in the public forum ‘Bundestag’. Whether it concerns the national defence 
budget, social benefits or indeed ESM funding, the Parliament as a whole has a right to 
share in the decision. 
Related to the political tension outlined above is another issue: like in its previous EU 
cases, the ESM cases see the Court refer to the ‘parliament’ as an institution or to the 
‘Gesetzgeber’/ the ‘legislator’ as a power to be the one that bears the political respon-
sibility for the decision on competence transfers (cf. especially the Lisbon decision) or – 
as in this case – the decision whether Germany should undertake the financial obliga-
tions in question. The decisions of September 2011 and March 2014 make it very clear: 
the Court expressly points to the political prerogative of the Parliament to assess 
whether the national budget could retain its autonomy in light of the amounts in-
volved. However, as the decision of June 2012 makes abundantly clear, it was precisely 
not the ‘parliament’ who negotiated the details of the EFSF, the ESM or the Fiscal Trea-
ty. Not only did the government keep the parliament out of the loop, it withheld vital 
information from the parliament until all decisions had been finalised at European lev-
el. All the Parliament actually got to decide was whether to ratify the treaties put be-
fore it. Considering that the Bundestag is dominated by a government who currently513 
holds an 80% majority in that house and that the situation was so politically charged 
that a NO vote was only a theoretical option, it turned the parliament’s power to con-
trol the actions of the government as intended by the Grundgesetz on its head and the 
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vote into little more than a ‘tick-box’ exercise. This gives the impression that the Court 
seems to ignore the political reality that the majority in the Bundestag is controlled by 
the Bundesregierung. An argument in favour of Court’s approach could be that from its 
perspective the government is after all deemed in charge of Foreign Affairs, so it 
should be able to realise its political agenda effectively – using the fact that it controls 
the majority in the Bundestag is therefore a means to ensure that the legislative can-
not undermine the executive in one of its core activities. However, the retreat behind a 
rather formalistic view of checking that the correct ‘institution’ took the required deci-
sion – without expressly acknowledging the political composition of that institution or 
the implications of the fact that in Germany’s parliamentary democracy that institution 
is controlled by another power – considerably diminishes the nature and amount of 
democratic legitimacy a vote in the Bundestag is able to provide.  
The overall result of this reasoning is that it burdens the Bundestag with the political 
responsibility vis-a-vis the people for decisions that it had no factual control over. This 
is in rather jarring contrast to the Court’s stance in one of its earliest cases on the doc-
trine of separation of powers where it established that the executive could not be de-
prived of certain powers without this leading to a situation where it was responsible 
for decisions it had no control over.514 At that time, the Court considered this to be a 
violation of the principle of separation of powers as enshrined in the Grundgesetz.515 
This begs the question why arguments made in favour of the executive do not seem to 
apply to the legislative when it finds itself in a similar situation. The pattern identified 
in Chapter III can again be seen here: the Court uses the principle of democracy to de-
fine the Bundestag’s role within the institutional setup and then sets the principle of 
separation of powers against it to protect the executive. The decision of June 2012 is a 
case in point: the further rights of the Bundestag under Article 23 (2) are justified by 
reference to the principle of democracy and then limited by the government’s right to 
protect the confidentiality of its internal decision-making processes with reference to 
the principle of separation of powers.  
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2. The budgetary responsibility in the European context 
a) ‘Foreign affairs’ versus ‘European matters’ 
After establishing the budget responsibility of the Bundestag as one of its core powers, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to integrate it into the existing constitutional 
framework governing the relationship between the Bundestag and Bundesregierung in 
the European context. This required a reconciliation between scope and limits of the 
legislative’s core power with regard to the budget and the executive’s core power in 
the area of Foreign Affairs respectively - or, as the Court framed it in its jurisprudence, 
to balance scope and limits of the principles of democracy and separation of powers 
respectively.  
The end result in many ways reflects the approach adopted by the Court in the domes-
tic context when it had to balance the Bundestag’s budgetary responsibilities with the 
Bundesregierung’s right to protect its internal decision-making processes: a pragmatic 
balancing act that aims to preserve as much of each power’s core as possible. Howev-
er, even though the Court clearly differentiated between ‘European matters’ for the 
purposes of Article 23 on the one hand and ‘Foreign Affairs’ in general on the other, it 
did not sever the link between the two completely. When it came to outlining the re-
percussions for the relationship between the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung as 
regards ‘European matters’, the reasoning followed very much the logic applied in the 
area of Foreign Affairs: as such, the role of the Bundestag in the European context may 
be intended to provide greater democratic legitimacy for the actions of the govern-
ment. But this did not alter the principle as such that the government was seen to be 
in charge of European affairs. In this context, Article 23 (2) provided both the founda-
tion and the limit for the Bundestag’s participation in European matters.  
Even though Article 23 (2) had introduced the term ‘European matters’ into the 
Grundgesetz in 1993 and was meant to provide the Bundestag with a greater role in 
the European context, the decision of June 2012 was the first one where the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht explicitly differentiated between ‘Foreign Affairs’ on the one 
hand and ‘European matters’ on the other. This was largely due to the fact that the EU-
related cases decided since 1993 did not revolve around the rights of the Bundestag in 
the phase prior to the ratification of an amendment treaty. In contrast, in the decision 
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of June 2012, precisely this point was one of the contentious issues as the Bundesre-
gierung (the respondent in the case) had argued that the negotiations about the ESM 
and the Fiscal treaty were not ‘European matters’, but rather generic ‘Foreign Affairs’. 
Consequently, the Bundesregierung argued, the Bundestag could not rely on its rights 
under Article 23 (2), but was limited to the options for participation and control tradi-
tionally available in the area of Foreign Affairs.516  
As was outlined in Chapter IV, this would have left the Bundestag with very few legal 
options indeed as the Bundesregierung is more or less exclusively in charge. The means 
available to the Bundestag are largely political in nature, e.g. scheduling debates on 
contentious issues, questioning members of the government during such a debate in 
the plenum, requesting information and documents from the government, convening 
enquiry committees, etc. – and of course the ultimate option to depose the govern-
ment by way of a constructive vote of no confidence (Article 67). As the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht consistently insists in its jurisprudence that these are by no means useless 
or ineffective tools.517 However, none of these tools can effectively stop the Bundesre-
gierung from executing its plans. There are only three instances where the Bundesre-
gierung cannot proceed without the official approval of the Bundestag: the ratification 
of international treaties (Article 59), the transfer of sovereign rights to international in-
stitutions (Article 24) and the deployment of armed forces. As was highlighted in Chap-
ter IV, this does provide the Bundestag as an institution with some power. However, 
considering that the Bundesregierung controls the majority of the Bundestag and can 
thus ensure that the necessary vote is likely to go its way, even these three instances 
have so far not impacted that much on the Bundesregierung’s freedom to manoeuvre. 
As could be seen in Chapter V, up to the ratification of the treaty of Maastricht in 1993, 
this legal regime officially applied also in the European context. Even though the insti-
tutional setup of the then European Communities had led to a distinct shift in actual 
decision-making power away from the parliament/legislative towards the govern-
ment/executive, the Court did not see the need to strengthen the Bundestag’s rights 
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at that time. Instead, it focused on the phase of implementation and enforcement of 
EC law and on its compatibility with human rights guarantees. The legal situation 
changed in 1993 with the introduction of Article 23, a provision wholly dedicated to 
Germany’s relationship with the European Communities and the European Union. Un-
like Article 24 and 59, Article 23 provided the Bundestag with specific rights to infor-
mation and participation beyond the ratification stage. However, as was demonstrated 
in Chapter V, this new foundation in law hardly made any difference to the relationship 
between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag in practice.  
As a consequence, the decision of June 2012, almost 20 years after the insertion of Ar-
ticle 23 into the Grundgesetz, provided very welcome guidance on scope and limits of 
Article 23 (2) and its relationship to Article 24 and 59, in other words on what exactly 
the difference was between ‘European matters’ and ‘Foreign Affairs’ and what the role 
of the Bundestag in each context was meant to be. The precise formulation at issue 
was “… In Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union…” /“…in matters concerning the 
European Union…”.518 The Bundesregierung suggested that ‘matters concerning the 
European Union’ had to be interpreted narrowly as Article 23 (2) constituted an excep-
tion to the rule that the Bundesregierung was in charge of Foreign Affairs. So, it should 
be understood as referring to matters arising within and from the framework created 
by the existing European treaties. Since the ESM and Fiscal treaty did not form part of 
that, but were created deliberately outside of the existing treaty framework, they did 
not fall within the scope of Article 23 (2) and the Bundestag could not rely on the rights 
to participation information prescribed therein.  
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, rejected those arguments. It started by re-
calling the traditional approach to Foreign Affairs and the reasons for it being an exclu-
sive competence of the Bundesregierung, mainly because the judges considered the 
Bundestag to be organisationally/ institutionally ‘unsuitable’ to play a greater role than 
merely supporting the government’s activities by way of after-the-fact legitimacy.519 
The judges contrasted this with the regime introduced by Article 23. They argued that 
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the legislative history and the purpose of Article 23 suggested that a broad interpreta-
tion had been intended at its inception. It had been intended to capture how far Euro-
pean integration had progressed up to 1993 and to compensate for the changes the in-
tegration process had caused in the national constitutional system and was i.a. meant 
to compensate the Bundestag for the loss of influence it had suffered in its wake.520 It 
was also intended to provide a solid constitutional foundation for the integration yet 
to come and thus had to be interpreted as covering the evolving integration process in 
all its dynamic and variety.521 As a consequence, ‘European matters’ could not be un-
derstood as referring merely to matters arising specifically within the existing treaty 
framework, but also those that  
“… wenn sie in einem Ergänzungs- o-
der sonstigen besonderen Näheverhältnis 
zum Recht der Europäischen Union ste-
hen. […] oder ein sonstiger qualifizierter 
inhaltlicher Zusammenhang mit einem in 
den Verträgen niedergelegten Politikbe-
reich - also mit dem Integrationspro-
gramm der Europäischen Union - besteht, 
[…] oder wenn ein völkerrechtlicher Ver-
trag ausschließlich zwischen Mitglied-
staaten der Europäischen Union geschlos-
sen werden soll. …” 
“… supplement, or stand in an-
other particular proximity to, the 
law of the European Union. […]  if 
there is another qualified substan-
tive connection with an area of 
policy laid down in the treaties – 
that is, with the integration pro-
gramme of the European Union 
[…] or if an agreement under in-
ternational law is to be entered in-
to solely between Member States 
of the European Union. …”522  
According to the Court, this meant that the rights of the Bundestag laid down in Article 
23 (2) did apply to a broader range of situations than merely that of preparing second-
ary legislation and that it had indeed intended to reshape the relationship between the 
Bundesregierung and the Bundestag for the European context.523  
From a pragmatic perspective, this non-technical definition that detaches ‘European 
matters’ from specific EU competences or competence areas provides the Bundestag 
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with influence in all matters that concern the EU, irrespective of how the currently ex-
isting treaty framework develops in future or of how many complementary frame-
works the Member States decide to create. However, this seems to be in stark contrast 
to the approach adopted in the area of Foreign Affairs were the Court tends to limit 
the involvement of the parliament as much as possible. Except when it came to the 
deployment of armed forces, the Court had consistently upheld its approach as to why 
the executive had to be solely in charge of Foreign Affairs and maintained that the 
Bundestag was ‘unsuitable’ or institutionally ‘incapable’ of participating as an equal 
partner. That line of thought does not seem to matter in the European context, how-
ever. Here, the question of whether the Bundestag is institutionally ‘capable’ of partic-
ipating effectively does not seem to constitute an argument to limit its involvement as 
a matter of principle. Instead, the Court saw the higher level of involvement of the 
Bundestag justified by the fact that this would enable the Bundestag to provide demo-
cratic legitimacy to the European decision-making processes.524 As Section B below will 
show, this leads the Court to require the Bundestag to create the necessary decision-
making structures so that it can effectively realise its budgetary responsibilities – in 
other words, the Court has identified the institution who ‘should’ make the decision 
and then requires adaptations so that the institution ‘becomes capable’ of doing so. 
This is very much in contradiction to the Court’s approach in the area of Foreign Affairs 
where it consistently maintains that the Bundestag is institutionally incapable of bear-
ing more responsibility and the notion of adapting its institutional structures to make it 
more capable does not even enter the discussion.525  
Essentially, the Court returned to the ideas of sovereignty and democracy, its over-
arching themes in the European context – the former as the ultimate limit to integra-
tion, the latter as its indispensable precondition. For once, however, the Court’s line of 
thought does not focus on the democratic legitimacy of the actions of the European 
Union, but rather aims to ensure that decision-making also at national level does not 
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fall below constitutionally acceptable standards. This does provide a different starting 
point in theory compared to the area of Foreign Affairs: there, the Bundestag’s partici-
pation is seen as the exception to the rule that the government is in charge. Article 23 
(2) as interpreted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht changes that logic slightly in the 
sense that the Bundestag’s participation is considered the rule, however, as the analy-
sis below will show, the Court retained the notion that overall responsibility lies still 
with the government which has decided repercussions for scope and limits of the Bun-
destag’s involvement in practice. 
Therefore, despite individual comments that could be taken to the contrary, the ESM 
cases do not represent a shift in the Court’s general approach to considering European 
matters as being rooted in Foreign Affairs and to the resulting allocation of the compe-
tences and responsibilities of the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung and the balance 
of power between the institutions in this context.  
b) The budgetary responsibility and the foreign policy prerogative 
In the ESM cases, the Bundesverfassungsgericht constructed the relationship between 
the budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag and the foreign policy/European policy 
prerogative of the government similar to the way the judges constructed the troop de-
ployment reserve in the area of general Foreign Affairs: it is not merely an option for 
control handed to the parliament in an area where the government has as such the ex-
clusive competence. Instead, one is dealing with a genuine right of the parliament 
which is pitted against a genuine right of the government. As pointed out above in 
Chapter IV, the crucial difference is that in the first case the judges would interpret 
such control powers narrowly in order to give the power who has full control every 
chance to maintain its independence. In the second case, however, that logic does not 
apply. Here, the Court has to find a balance between two stakeholders whose interests 
are equally valid and have to be protected as much as possible. 
After establishing the budgetary responsibilities as a core power of the legislative as a 
matter of principle, the Court outlined its impact on the relationship between the Bun-
destag and Bundesregierung. Interestingly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not use 
the Bundestag’s more generic integration responsibility, the so-called mandate to in-
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tegrate, or even the Principle of Openness to European Law to frame the analysis. It 
steps away from these tools for conceptualising the relationship of the German consti-
tutional institutions with the European Union that were so prevalent in the Lisbon de-
cision. Indeed, the Court explicitly rejected these arguments as put forward by the 
Bundesregierung as a limitation to the budgetary responsibilities of the Bundestag and 
as to why the government’s foreign policy prerogative should have precedence.526  
This has been taken as evidence that the Court has not considered properly the dog-
matic repercussions of its new reserve.527 At the same time, the pattern used here is 
similar to that used in the context of classic Foreign Affairs and the Bundestag’s re-
serve for the deployment of armed forces: like the budgetary responsibilities, this re-
serve stems from the relationship between the powers on the domestic level and is 
then applied by the Court to the area of Foreign Affairs (as for troop deployment) and 
European affairs (as for budget responsibility) respectively. This meant that the budg-
etary responsibilities of the Bundestag were not seen as an exception to the rule, as in-
terfering with the foreign policy/European affairs prerogative of the government – in 
which case they would have been interpreted narrowly in order to retain as much as 
possible of the government’s prerogative. Instead, the Court conceptualised the budg-
etary responsibilities as a limit to the government’s prerogative, i.e. as a reserve prop-
er that could as such not be interfered with and where the government had no discre-
tion as to the form and procedure of the Bundestag’s involvement.528 That way, the is-
sue is presented as a conflict not between one power in charge of the situation and 
another which is tasked with controlling the activities of the other. Rather, the Court 
conceptualises it as a conflict between two powers that both aim to rely on compe-
tences and responsibilities that relate to their respective core, i.e. are more or less on 
an equal footing. However, in trying to find a workable compromise between the for-
eign policy prerogative of the government on the one hand and the budgetary respon-
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sibilities of the Bundestag on the other, the Court reverts to its usual pattern of resolv-
ing a conflict between the legislative and the executive: it uses the principle of democ-
racy in order to delineate scope and reach of the Bundestag’s right and duty to pre-
serve its budgetary responsibilities and then uses the doctrine of separation of powers 
in order to protect the government’s right to lead on the political choices.529 Any im-
pression that the Court had indeed transitioned to a different view of European affairs 
was subsequently disappointed by the decision of March 2014.530 The judges made it 
very clear that they considered European matters still to be very much rooted in For-
eign Affairs and that the government’s exclusive competence in this respect was not 
just a practical solution but a constitutional requirement.  
This meant that the only reason that the Bundestag was allowed greater level of in-
volvement of the Bundestag in the ESM framework was because of its budgetary re-
sponsibility and because Article 23 (2) stipulated as much. But the judges stressed that 
this was - and had to remain - very much the exception. Indeed, the judges seemed ra-
ther uncomfortable with the fact that the Bundestag should be able to interfere with 
the prerogative of the government in a substantial fashion: 
“… Mit Blick auf die außen- und in-
tegrationspolitische Tätigkeit der Exe-
kutive ist zu berücksichtigen, dass die 
sachlich-inhaltliche Legitimation nur 
begrenzt durch parlamentarische Vor-
gaben ausgestaltet werden kann. Der 
Verkehr mit anderen Staaten, die Ver-
tretung in internationalen Organisati-
onen, zwischenstaatlichen Einrichtun-
gen und Systemen gegenseitiger kol-
lektiver Sicherheit sowie die Sicherstel-
lung der gesamtstaatlichen Verant-
wortung bei der Außenvertretung 
Deutschlands fallen grundsätzlich in 
“… With regard to the work of the 
executive branch in the areas of For-
eign Affairs and European integration, 
it must be taken into account that par-
liamentary requirements can only to a 
limited extent ensure substantive legit-
imation. Dealings with other states, 
representation in international organi-
sations, international institutions and 
systems of mutual collective security, 
and guaranteeing the responsibility of 
the country in the context of Germa-
ny’s external representation, are gen-
erally the responsibility of the Federal 
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den Kompetenzbereich der Bundesre-
gierung. Die zur Wahrnehmung ihrer 
Aufgaben notwendigen Freiräume ste-
hen einer strikten parlamentarischen 
Determinierung entgegen … 
…Soweit die Mitwirkung der deut-
schen Vertreter in den ESM-Organen 
die haushaltspolitische Gesamtver-
antwortung des Bundestages betrifft, 
sind allerdings, um dessen maßgebli-
chen Einfluss zu wahren, konkrete par-
lamentarische Weisungen an die Bun-
desregierung erforderlich. …“ 
Government ... The latitude which the 
Federal Government needs to perform 
its functions would conflict with strict 
parliamentary determination ...  
… To the extent that the participa-
tion of the German representatives in 
the ESM bodies affects the overall 
budgetary responsibility of the Bun-
destag, specific parliamentary instruc-
tions to the Federal Government are 
required to safeguard the Bundestag ’s 
decisive influence …”531  
In this, the Court’s approach clearly shows that the starting point for its reasoning still 
owes a great deal to the traditional conceptualisation as applied in the area of Foreign 
Affairs and the to its conviction that the Bundestag is structurally not capable of being 
involved as an equal partner.532 However, given that the Court clearly considers the 
Bundestag to be, or to be able to become, capable of making decisions regarding the 
budget whatever the context, its insistence that the Bundestag is otherwise incapable 
by nature to be involved as an equal partner more generally in European matters, if 
not Foreign Affairs, begins to appear inconclusive. Here the Court clearly returns to its 
(by now outdated) approach to value the government’s ability to represent Germany’s 
interests effectively in the international arena over ensuring democratic accountability 
and legitimacy of the actions of that institution.  
This is consistent with the Court’s approach to separation of powers in the domestic 
context where the doctrine is applied very much with the aim to support effective 
government rather than with the aim to control the exercise of state power. As could 
be seen in Chapter III, the Bundesverfassungsgericht follows very much the narrow in-
terpretation put forward by the German literature in that separation of powers has a 
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very strong procedural and organisational input but does not primarily serve the 
preservation or protection of individual liberty. Even though this notion features in the 
standard formula for the separation of powers developed by the Court533, the applica-
tion in practice leans much more towards the use of separation of powers as a tool to 
ensure effective governance (cf. Chapter III C). In this, the German tradition differs 
quite markedly from the original conceptualisation as put forward by Locke, Montes-
quieu and the Federalist papers (cf. Chapter I).534 The cases also demonstrate that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht still favours the protection of the core of each power over 
creating a balanced system of separated powers (as outlined in Chapter III B). It still 
considers the allocation of competences as set out by the constitution as the deliber-
ate expression of how the powers are intended to interact, even if this leads to an un-
even balance between powers or even a clear dominance of one power in a specific 
context. Consequently, it sees its own role as having to maintain that relationship, 
however imbalanced, and to protect the core of each power from being usurped by 
another. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that even though there is a qualitative shift in the Court’s 
approach to the relationship between the Bundesregierung and Bundestag in the Eu-
ropean context, the analysis shows that it is focused on a very specific area. In that, it 
is very similar to the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s jurisprudence on the reserve regard-
ing troop deployment. There, same as here, the Court uses the connection to what it 
considers core competences of the legislative in order to justify the Bundestag’s in-
volvement in Foreign Affairs/ European matters – or as the Court put it itself in its 1952 
decision, the Bundestag’s ‘encroachment’ into the exclusive zone of the executive.535  
What cannot be answered without the guidance of further decisions is whether this 
reserve in the Court’s view may or should apply to European matters in general. The 
Lisbon decision provides some guidance as regards the ratification of amendment trea-
ties. The Court explicitly stated that a supranationalisation of the budget would not be 
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compatible with the Grundgesetz.536 However, it did not introduce any requirement for 
the Bundesregierung to obtain the consent of the Bundestag prior to a e.g. budget 
summit. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the existing treaty regime regarding the 
determination of the European Union’s budget is compatible with the Grundgesetz. 
This would allow the tentative conclusion that e.g. the ratification of the TTIP treaty, 
should it reach that stage, would be subject to a similar level of scrutiny by the Court, 
but likely not trigger specific consent requirements either. In other words, the Court 
would fall back on its traditional approach to Article 24 and Article 23 in the sense that 
the vote by the Bundestag and Bundesrat to ratify the treaty covers all reasonably 
foreseeable consequences, which in case of the TTIP could be deemed to include e.g. 
investment dispute settlement decisions going against Germany, even if they reach 
substantial amounts. The next Section will explore whether the changes in the theoret-
ical set up are likely to have repercussions in practice 
B. The practice: issues of implementation and enforcement 
As the previous Section demonstrated, the Bundesverfassungsgericht focused very 
much on providing a pragmatic solution to the conflicts at hand rather than a fully de-
veloped theoretical reconstruction of the issue. As a result, the ESM cases provide a lot 
of guidance on how to implement this new budgetary reserve and also serve as exam-
ples as to how to enforce it within the context of Article 23 and the systems of reme-
dies available before the Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
This Section will first consider how the Court appears to envisage the implementation 
of the budgetary reserve and how this may change the relationship, potentially even 
the balance of power, between the Bundestag and Bundesregierung (Sub-section 1). 
Then the analysis will turn to the Court’s approach with regard to enforcement, in par-
ticular the admissibility of remedies available in this context and how this may affect 
the practical effectiveness of the budgetary reserve (Sub-section 2). 
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1. Implementation: forging new pathways of interaction 
As the decisions outlined in Chapter VI illustrate, the Bundestag’s duty to retain ulti-
mate control over the budget applies to all stages of decision making: from the negoti-
ations about a prospective treaty to the individual decisions to be taken once the trea-
ty has been ratified and implemented. This complements and reinforces the Bundes-
tag’s rights to ‘participate’ and to be ‘kept informed by the Bundesregierung’ under Ar-
ticle 23 (2) which has decided repercussions for the executive:  
 during the negotiation phase, the Bundesregierung has to provide the Bundestag 
more often, and with more detailed information, than it would normally have 
done to enable the Bundestag to exercise actual influence on the position of the 
government during the negotiations (decision of June 2012);537  
 the treaty must be drafted in such a fashion that it does not preclude the involve-
ment of Bundestag to the degree necessary for it to retain ultimate control over 
the budget, if necessary this needs to be clarified and asserted during ratification 
(decision of September 2012);  
 the implementation of the treaty needs to ensure that the German representative 
in the institutional framework created by the treaty may not act without prior au-
thorisation from the Bundestag (decision of February 2012 and March 2014);  
 and last, but not least, the Court expressly clarified that the government may not 
reclaim an undue control over those participation rights by the way the parliamen-
tary procedures are designed (decision of February 2012). 
The underlying thread that runs through all those decisions is the Court’s attempt to 
strike a balance between on the one hand the need to provide democratic legitimacy 
and accountability by involving the Bundestag and on the other hand the clear inten-
tion to retain the government’s ability to act as an effective representative of Germa-
ny’s interests at European level. It also tried to resolve practical issues that concern in 
particular the availability, and the flow, of information between the two institutions. 
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The decision of June 2012 illustrates this with regard to the negotiation phase of the 
ESM and Fiscal Treaties: the Court severely criticised that the government had provid-
ed only very sketchy information and only to specific committees of the Bundestag in-
stead of providing regular and detailed updates to the Bundestag as a whole. While 
this constituted already a violation of the Bundesregierung’s duty under Article 23 (2), 
the Court emphasised that the Bundesregierung should have been even more diligent 
considering the subject matter of the treaties concerned the budgetary responsibility 
of the Bundestag and considering that it was in possession of the information the Bun-
destag needed in order to make an informed decision.538 The result of the govern-
ment’s behaviour was that the Bundestag was faced with the situation of having to rat-
ify treaties without having had the opportunity to influence their content or even to 
discuss its position and thus influence the stance taken by the government during the 
negotiations. Even worse, by the time the Bundestag was informed in a more compre-
hensive fashion, the draft treaty had already been agreed on by the governments in-
volved which meant that Germany as a Member State had already created legitimate 
expectations as to the eventual ratification which in turn left the Bundestag fairly help-
less to prevent the treaty from becoming binding.539 Overall, the government’s behav-
iour had effectively prevented the Bundestag from realising its budgetary responsibili-
ties in this context. At the same time, the Court was equally clear on the limits of the 
Bundestag’s rights to request information: using the principle of separation of powers, 
the Court argued that the internal decision-making processes of the government prior 
to the formulation of a position were not subject to the duties outlined above which 
meant that the Bundestag had to wait until the government had at least developed the 
preliminary position which was suitable to be communicated to third parties, e.g. the 
public or the governments of other Member States.540  
The decision of February 2012 on the parliamentary procedures dealt with similar is-
sues at the stage of implementation. It also illustrates how the Bundesregierung may 
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attempt to use the fact that it controls the majority in the Bundestag in order to mini-
mise the latter’s involvement as much as possible and thus circumvent the require-
ments laid down by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its decision of September 2011. 
The Court prevented such a circumvention by holding that as a matter of principle it 
was the whole house, and not just the committee that carried the budgetary responsi-
bility and thus the default position should be that the house as a whole decided on fi-
nancial grants within the EFSF and ESM framework.  
Both of these decisions illustrate the attitude of the current Bundesregierung with re-
gard to the involvement of the Bundestag: it appears that they intend to minimise it as 
much as possible and prefer to adhere to the letter of the Court’s decisions rather than 
their underlying spirit. This attitude may lead to a situation where the shift in the legal 
situation (as outlined in Section A above) will have very little impact in practice unless 
members of the opposition are willing to challenge the government’s behaviour again 
and again before the Bundesverfassungsgericht. This situation is further exacerbated 
by practices that have developed outside the framework designed by the Court. Empir-
ical research indicates that the members of the government parties have privileged ac-
cess to government information by way of their regular party meetings prior to major 
events. While the meetings originated probably in the need to ensure that the gov-
ernment would have the coalition parties’ support, they do provide the members of 
the coalition parties with opportunities to influence the government’s position.541 This 
development is not only worrying because it prevents the opposition parties from 
gaining access to that same information, but also because it undermines the parlia-
ment as an institution and as a ‘power’ in one of its core functions – to provide a plat-
form for debate, to ensure transparency of decision-making and to provide effective 
control over the government’s activities. The two decisions outlined above may coun-
ter this development to certain extent, but it will depend to a considerable degree on 
the attitude of the government how effective the Bundestag can be in realising its 
budgetary responsibilities. 
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2. Enforcement: the weak link?  
The final point of interest in the analysis concerns the conclusions that may be drawn 
from the cases as to how the Bundesverfassungsgericht intends to enforce the rights it 
proclaimed so resoundingly. On this point, similarly to the question of implementation 
discussed above, the Court’s actions seem to undermine the theoretical shift it under-
took in the cases under review. 
For example in the decision of September 2011, the Court allowed the political actors 
considerable leeway and did not respond to the arguments of the complainants that 
the political pressure exercised by the Bundesregierung prior to the vote had turned 
parliamentary participation into mere window dressing.542 As was already highlighted 
above, the applicants in the decision of June 2012 raised similar concerns and high-
lighted the tension between the formalistic adherence to the Bundestag’s participation 
in the form of the vote on the ratification of the treaty and the political reality of what 
happened: even though it had little to no influence over the content of those treaties, 
it had to assume the political responsibility vis-à-vis the people. The outcome of the 
case feels unsatisfactory: even though the Court did consider the actions of the Bun-
desregierung to be unconstitutional, this could not prevent the treaty from being rati-
fied. Even more paradox: as the decisions of September 2012 and March 2014 illus-
trate, the only option to prevent the ratification of the treaties was to challenge the 
constitutionality of their content irrespective of any irregularities during the ratifica-
tion procedure.  
The decision on the injunction against the vote on the ESM grants to Cyprus543 further 
illustrates this point: the statute implementing the ESM treaty provided that the Fed-
eral Minister for finance compiled a proposal for the Bundestag to vote on ‘sufficiently 
in advance’ of the vote in the ESM governing bodies. The complainants criticised that 
the members of the Bundestag had received the proposal on very short notice which 
left them no time to review it properly and thus to make an informed decision during 
the vote in the Bundestag. The complainants also criticised that the Federal Minister 
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for finance had not carried out his own investigations, but largely relied on the report 
from the European Commission for the compilation of the proposal. The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht rejected the injunction as inadmissible largely because the complainants 
were not members of the Bundestag and therefore lacked standing.544 However, the 
scenario demonstrates the difficulty a constitutional Court faces in the context at 
hand: even though the Bundesverfassungsgericht is notorious for its proactive stance 
and for not shying away from interfering with the political process to a considerable 
extend, outlining the conditions for preventing or potentially invalidating a vote in par-
liament reaches into the internal decision-making processes of the legislative to such 
an extent that the Court may see itself in violation of the separation of powers.  
A further thread that runs through a number of the cases under discussion is the use of 
the right to vote in Article 38 as a means to bring a constitutional complaint against ac-
tions of the political institutions. In particular the decision of September 2011, Sep-
tember 2012, the Cyprus injunction of April 2013 and the decision of March 2014 con-
tain repeated comments by the Court that even though the right to vote as embodied 
in Article 38 does allow citizens to challenge the constitutionality of treaties that may 
undermine the powers of its representative, a.k.a. the parliament, it does not … 
“… regelmäßig kein Recht der Bür-
ger, demokratische Mehrheitsent-
scheidungen auf ihre Rechtmäßigkeit 
hin durch das Bundesverfassungsge-
richt kontrollieren zu lassen. Das 
Wahlrecht dient nicht der inhaltlichen 
Kontrolle demokratischer Prozesse, 
sondern ist auf deren Ermöglichung 
gerichtet. Als Grundrecht auf Mitwir-
kung an der demokratischen Selbst-
herrschaft des Volkes verleiht Article 
38 Abs. 1 GG daher grundsätzlich kei-
ne Beschwerdebefugnis gegen Parla-
mentsbeschlüsse, insbesondere Geset-
zesbeschlüsse ….” 
“… in general give rise to any right 
of the citizens to have the lawfulness 
of democratic majority decisions re-
viewed by the Federal Constitutional 
Court. The right to vote does not serve 
to monitor the content of democratic 
processes, but is intended to facilitate 
them. Article 38.1 of the Basic Law, as 
the fundamental right to participate in 
the democratic self-government of the 
people, therefore in principle grants no 
entitlement to file a specific constitu-
tional complaint against decisions of 
Parliament, in particular enactments. 
…”545 
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Even though the Court proclaimed this to be an established principle of its jurispru-
dence on European matters, it reversed its stance in a rather dramatic fashion in its 
OMT decision in January 2014 by declaring admissible the constitutional complaints 
against the omission of the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag to use their influence 
to have the OMT decision of the European Central Bank repealed.546 As dissenting Jus-
tices Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt pointed out, in doing so the Court transgressed its self-
established boundaries with regard to Article 38 and provided citizens with an oppor-
tunity for ‘popular action’547 for a review of the constitutionality of the content of acts 
or omissions of the Bundesregierung and Bundestag as well as the European institu-
tions.548 Considering that the same judges returned to their original position in their 
decision of March 2014, it is submitted that the stance taken in the OMT decision was 
very much a strategic move in order to enable the Bundesverfassungsgericht to refer 
the OMT decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union which is not likely to 
be repeated in future. 
This leaves the question as to whether the Bundesverfassungsgericht would consider 
to apply this new reserve to everyday activities of the European institutions that could 
result in considerable financial obligations for Germany as a Member State or have 
considerable impact on its budget. Such a question has not yet been raised explicitly 
before the Court. Theoretically there are two options for dealing with such a situation: 
the more likely possibility is that the Court would argue that the ratification of the Eu-
ropean treaties by the Bundestag and Bundesrat contained an implicit approval of the 
actions of the Bundesregierung in the given context.  
The other possibility is that the Court would see this as a violation of the limits to inte-
gration, as set out most recently in the Lisbon decision, and use the ultra vires and 
identity review to deal with the situation. The use of the ultra vires review is rather 
improbable. The test developed in the Mangold/ Honeywell decision requires that a 
measure has to be ‘manifestly’ ultra vires, i.e. violate the principle of conferral and 
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thus the existing competence structures in a ‘sufficiently serious’ manner.549 Such a 
sufficiently serious violation is contingent on the impugned act being manifestly in 
breach of competences and leading to a structurally significant shift to the detriment 
of the Member States in the structure of competences.550 As the OMT case illustrates, 
the Court takes that test seriously which means that the ultra vires review would only 
be available in those rare cases where the act in question – in parallel to causing con-
siderable financial burdens for the Member States – were to satisfy those criteria.  
The other alternative is the relatively new identity review. Introduced by the Lisbon 
decision in order to complement the ultra vires review, it is intended to allow the 
preservation of the specific constitutional identity of the Grundgesetz against actions 
that appear to violate the limits to integration as set out in the Lisbon decision.551 Such 
transgressions may be either procedural or substantive in nature, e.g. that the German 
representative participated in the Council without necessary prior instruction by the 
Bundestag or that the action in question infringed the necessary ‘space for the political 
formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life’.552 Such actions 
could normally not be classified as ‘ultra vires’ as they would fall within the limits of 
the competences actually transferred and thus be valid despite the violation of nation-
al constitutional limits.553 Despite this, the Court considered it necessary to provide a 
remedy to address these situations.  
So far, this remedy has only been used once – in the Greek bailout decision of Septem-
ber 2011.554 There, the Court rejected the motion of the applicants on this point, argu-
ing that financial commitments were as such an accepted part of Germany’s participa-
tion in the European integration process. It was up to the Bundestag to evaluate Ger-
many’s budgetary capacities and economic strength and to balance these against the 
likelihood that the EFSF guarantees be realised. As long as fundamental fiscal decisions 
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were taken by, or with the consent of, the Bundestag, they would not violate the con-
stitutional core even if they reached substantial proportions.555 However, this case is 
not likely to be a typical example for an identity review considering that it dealt with 
the ratification of the EFSF and thus dealt with the question of acts of European insti-
tutions yet to come and not those already made. Unfortunately, the Court did not pro-
vide a test that one could apply in order to determine whether the creation of sizeable 
financial obligations as the consequence of individual decisions of European institu-
tions would constitute a violation of the Grundgesetz’s identity. Therefore it has to be 
considered an open question whether the Bundesverfassungsgericht would consider 
using the identity review for this scenario and with that would consider declaring void 
a legally binding act of the European institutions that seemingly violates the budgetary 
responsibility of the Bundestag.  
C. Conclusion 
In conclusion it is submitted that the ESM cases do not constitute the paradigm shift in 
the relationship between Bundesregierung and Bundestag that they were hailed to be. 
They do include a number of changes as to the theoretical conceptualisation of that re-
lationship when it comes to decisions that fundamentally impact on the budgetary 
control. As far as that goes, the changes do indeed alter the balance of power between 
the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung to a certain extent and the Court seems intent 
on enforcing the Bundestag’s rights to exercise effective influence before decisions be-
come definite at European level. However, when compared to the Court’s previous ju-
risprudence, it can be seen that even those changes are very much in line with the 
Court’s approach to the relationship of those two institutions in the domestic context 
and in the area of classic Foreign Affairs. It is submitted that the rather prominent role 
of the Bundestag in the ESM cases is largely due to the fact that they concerned the 
question of budgetary control and that they do not constitute a first step towards a 
fundamental review of the balance of power between the Bundestag and Bundesre-
gierung in the European context.  
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Part III: Conclusion  
Part III explored how the Bundesverfassungsgericht transferred the approach used in 
the area of Foreign Affairs to the European context. Chapter V reviewed the years up 
to the ratification of the treaty of Lisbon. In the decades between the ratification of 
the Treaty of Rome and the treaty of Maastricht, the Court did not see the need to dis-
tinguish between Foreign Affairs and European matters. As a consequence, the Bun-
desregierung could rely on its foreign policy prerogative in order to shape European 
matters as it chose. The Bundestag was relegated to providing after-the-fact legal con-
trol of the Bundesregierung’s activities. The new ‘Europe-Article’ Article 23 introduced 
into the Grundgesetz in 1993 did contain a greater range of rights for the Bundestag 
but did not have a noticeable impact on the Court’s approach to the separation of 
powers and its way of conceptualising the relationship between the institutions in 
practice.  
 
Chapter VI surveyed the ESM cases and concluded that a prima facie case may be 
made that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach had changed at fundamental lev-
el. The analysis conducted in Chapter VII, however, revealed that this was not the case. 
The Court had merely introduced a new ‘reserve’ in favour of the Bundestag, not un-
dertaken a qualitative shift towards a new conceptualisation of the separation of pow-
ers in the area of European law with repercussions for the relationship of the executive 
and the legislative in that area.  
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CONCLUSION 
The thesis explored whether the recent decisions on the ESM and Fiscal treaties may 
be considered a ‘paradigm shift’ in the approach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht with 
regard the relationship of the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung in the European 
context in light of the model of the separation of powers the Court use to conceptual-
ise it.  
 
Part I investigated the role and status of the theory of the separation of powers in con-
stitutional systems with particular reference to German legal scholarship.  
Chapter I concluded that for Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalists the separation of 
powers constituted an indispensable element of a constitutional system in order to 
avoid the establishment of a tyrannical regime. The separation of powers enabled the 
three powers to influence and control each other from within the political process, 
thus preventing any one power from becoming too dominant. These authors used the 
social power embodied in the classes (Locke, Montesquieu) or in the diverse factions 
existing in the population (the Federalists) in order to provide the institutions those 
groupings constituted with the necessary standing and ambition to exercise the de-
sired control. Additionally, this made the people, or rather their representatives, part 
of the constitutional process and thus provided them with a direct conduit to the exer-
cise of state power and with the means to controlling it. 
Chapter II explored how general constitutional developments, the values embodied in 
constitutions, but also the legal tradition as such and philosophical traditions on the 
nature and role of the state and the constitution itself influence the role and status of 
the separation of powers within that system. As a consequence, present-day ap-
proaches as presented by lawyers accord the separation of powers a high status for 
theoretical discussions but see its value for the solution of practical conflicts as negligi-
ble.  
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Following on from the investigation of the theory of the separation of powers in Part I, 
Part II explored the implementation of the separation of powers into the German con-
stitutional system with regard to the domestic context as well as Foreign Affairs. It is 
submitted that the perception in the literature – that the theory is fairly useless in 
practice – does not hold true. The cases surveyed here provide critical dividing lines for 
the behaviour of the legislative and the executive, both in the domestic context as well 
as in the area of Foreign Affairs. 
The contrast between the courts approach in the domestic context compared to that 
in the area of Foreign Affairs is quite striking. In the domestic context, the Court differ-
entiates between various areas of interaction and creates ‘area specific’ balances of 
power between the legislative and the executive. For example, as far as matters of the 
budget are concerned, the executive is it a fairly weak position. However, in general 
the executive is fairly free to use its procedural and political predominance in order to 
implement its political agenda. The case also illustrates how the Court sees the separa-
tion of powers as one principal among a number that determine the outcome of the 
case, fairly often considerations of fundamental rights protection and the freedom of 
the individual – very much in keeping with the classic rendition of the separation of 
powers – inform the Court solution more than arguments specifically relating to the 
separation of powers.  
In striking contrast, none of this seems to matter in the area of Foreign Affairs. Here 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht merely considers the suitability of the legislative and the 
executive respectively to handle Foreign Affairs as a matter of principle. The Court 
does not differentiate among for example treaty negotiations, everyday work in inter-
national organisations like NATO or the UN, or indeed sensitive diplomatic manoeuvres 
in order to achieve a tiered pattern of involvement that would allow the Bundestag 
much greater influence and thus create more accountability for the actions of the gov-
ernment. In addition, the set of values and principles employed in the domestic con-
text like the principle of democracy, Rechtsstaat principle and human rights protec-
tion, are not used here to modify the solution found based on essentially organisation-
al efficiency considerations.  
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Part III explored how the Bundesverfassungsgericht transferred the approach used in 
the area of Foreign Affairs to the European context. Chapter V reviewed the years up 
to the ratification of the treaty of Lisbon. In the decades between the ratification of 
the Treaty of Rome and the treaty of Maastricht, the Court did not see the need to dis-
tinguish between Foreign Affairs and European matters. As a consequence, the Bun-
desregierung could rely on its foreign policy prerogative in order to shape European 
matters as it chose. The Bundestag was relegated to providing after-the-fact legal con-
trol of the Bundesregierung’s activities. The new ‘Europe-Article’ Article 23 introduced 
into the Grundgesetz in 1993 did contain a greater range of rights for the Bundestag 
but did not have a noticeable impact on the Court’s approach to the separation of 
powers and its way of conceptualising the relationship between the institutions in 
practice.  
Chapter VI surveyed the ESM cases and concluded that a prima facie case may be 
made that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach had changed at fundamental lev-
el. The analysis conducted in Chapter VII, however, revealed that this was not the case. 
The Court had merely introduced a new ‘reserve’ in favour of the Bundestag, not un-
dertaken a qualitative shift towards a new conceptualisation of the separation of pow-
ers in the area of European law with repercussions for the relationship of the executive 
and the legislative in that area.  
A. Evaluation of the findings 
By using separation of powers instead of democracy and sovereignty as the framework 
for analysis, this thesis was able to demonstrate how much the relationship between 
the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag in the European context is defined by the 
Court’s insistence to retain the traditional dichotomy of ‘domestic’ versus ‘Foreign’ af-
fairs and to classify European matters as ‘Foreign’ affairs, albeit a special kind. This 
means that the executive’s foreign policy prerogative provides it with almost exclusive 
responsibility to handle all European matters.  
As was highlighted in Chapter IV, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning for allocat-
ing the responsibility for Foreign Affairs to the executive rests on its approach to sepa-
ration of powers. In the German constitutional tradition that theory is seen as an ele-
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ment of the Rechtsstaat principle that embodies an organisational Ordnungsidee and 
is meant to supply effective mechanisms for the comprehensive control of state power 
– in contrast to e.g. Locke and Montesquieu who saw it as a guarantee for liberty and 
an enabler of democratic government. The analysis of the general repercussions as ex-
plored in Chapters I to IV highlighted the crucial difference between the two conceptu-
alisations: separation of powers aims to resolve practical conflicts between powers by 
answering mainly these two questions: who should be deciding this issue? Who should 
participate in the decision? If one anchors separation of powers within democracy and 
with the protection of liberty as the key objective, the answers to those questions will 
look at the legitimacy of decision-making; if one anchors it within the Rechtsstaat prin-
ciple with organisational efficiency as the key objective, the answers to those ques-
tions will focus on the ‘suitability’ (and not the legitimacy) of the power in question to 
decide the issue.  
Using the argument of organisational suitability and efficiency, the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considered the executive to be the most suitable power to handle Foreign 
Affairs – and thus European matters. However, this meant that the Bundestag was lim-
ited to very few options of controlling the activities of the executive most of which 
came into play after the executive had already taken action. Moreover, since the Bun-
desregierung was conducting European matters ‘as of right’, the Bundestag was put in 
the unenviable position of having to justify its involvement instead of the Bundesre-
gierung having to justify its actions, thus turning the idea of government accountability 
on its head.  
 
The question arises what the consequences of this approach are with regard to the 
ability of the German constitutional system to deal with European matters, to ensure 
the legitimacy of the decisions made by the political institutions and potentially even 
its credibility as a system of democratic governance. 
The Court has an impressive track record with regard to its demands that the safe-
guards for the protection of liberty and the preservation of democratic structures of 
government that exist in the national constitutional systems be re-created at European 
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level. The notion of sovereignty and the principle of democracy are pivotal for its anal-
ysis of the constitutionality of amendment treaties where its reasoning usually re-
volves around the importance of democracy as a fundamental value and the im-
portance of the parliament remaining the central forum and locus for decision-making. 
Such reasoning is fairly absent in the ESM cases. The Court does not compensate for 
the perceived loss of democratic decision-making power by according greater weight 
to maintaining the democratic structures of the decision-making processes that have 
remained at national level. It actually uses separation of powers to protect the execu-
tive’s foreign policy/ European matters prerogative and rejects demands for a greater 
involvement of the Bundestag which are backed by the principle of democracy. This 
line of argument has been employed by the Court in purely domestic matters with the 
aim of preventing what it calls a power ‘monism’ of the legislative. The irony is that, in 
doing so, the Court actually creates an almost power monism of the executive.  
European decision-making processes are different and the way European law impacts 
on the national legal systems of the Member States also differs from classic interna-
tional law - simply to adapt in a superficial fashion one’s traditional approaches which 
were created for 'classic' domestic and International scenarios appears inadequate.  
The result of the Court’s approach is the exacerbation of the shift of political decision-
making power towards the executive that had occurred in the European context as it 
does not allow the legislative to increase the level of control correspondingly. Consid-
ering that the Court champions the values of democratic government, it is rather ironic 
that the disempowerment of the German parliament is largely the result of it maintain-
ing its traditional conceptualisation of separation of powers and Foreign Affairs. 
 
It is submitted that the Court neglects the interaction of democracy and separation of 
powers in the European context and thus undermines the very purpose of separation 
of powers. It also overlooks the potential that the doctrine of separation of powers 
could have to protect the values it holds so dear. Due to the impact of European law 
on the constitutional and legal systems of the Member States, the hitherto uncon-
strained use of the national level safeguards mentioned above is impaired to a consid-
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erable extent. However, that is exactly why separation of powers may provide an al-
ternative as it was originally designed to operate without those safety mechanisms: it 
does not need a democratic system of governance, and effective implementation of 
the rule of law or access to effective legal remedies for individuals – it provides institu-
tional safeguards from within the system for the control of the exercise of state power. 
In doing so, it could support the reform efforts of the Member States not only by high-
lighting areas of concern but also by providing practical solutions that are not likely to 
violate the fundamental precepts of the constitutional systems of the Member States. 
B. Outlook 
The analysis conducted in the thesis raises a number of follow-up questions both with 
regard to the theoretical as well as the methodological and practical angle that are 
worth pursuing: the investigation identified weaknesses in the decision-making struc-
tures at national level due to the theoretical conceptualisation of the relationship be-
tween the government and the parliament. In order to remedy those issues, one could 
explore whether there may be alternatives to the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ap-
proach to Foreign Affairs, for example considering the notion of a joint responsibility of 
the legislative and executive. If both powers are deemed to be equal partners with 
equal rights to influence the decision-making, it could provide the legislative at the 
very least with more effective opportunities to review the executive’s activities and to 
provide effective input before decisions become final at European level. As the reasons 
for the exclusive allocation of Foreign Affairs to the executive rests within the current 
conceptualisation of separation of powers, this would necessitate a change at funda-
mental level.  
As has been outlined in Chapters I-IV, the currently used definition of the Grundsatz 
der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur as constructed by Danwitz implies that the insti-
tutional structures in the constitutional context are set by the Grundgesetz and are 
thus not adaptable. Therefore the question “who should deal with this task?” became 
redundant and the only question left to ask was “what institution is ‘suitable’ to handle 
this task?”. As the Bundesverfassungsgericht has confirmed consistently since its deci-
sion in the NATO case in 1984, the Bundestag is ‘institutionally unsuitable’ to handle 
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Foreign Affairs as a matter of principle: its procedures for decision-making, rules on 
confidentiality, speed of decision-making, etc. all made it ill-equipped to handle For-
eign Affairs.556 However, in the ESM cases the Court involved the Bundestag in the 
‘day-to-day’ work of the ESM almost as a ‘matter of course’. It even set out specific 
procedural requirements, all without discussing as to why the Bundestag was suddenly 
deemed ‘suitable’, or could be ‘made’ suitable to handle such matters – a notion the 
Court had consistently rejected until that point. As has been already pointed out in 
Chapters IV and VII, this challenges the very foundation of the Court’s reasoning in the 
NATO case and thus could open the door to a fundamental reconceptualization. As a 
basis for this reconceptualization one could make use of the Court’s own arguments 
put forward in one of its earliest cases on the restructuring of certain administrative 
bodies attempted by the Bremen parliament.557 There, the Court had rejected those 
changes as unconstitutional as they deprived the executive of the control over crucial 
personnel decisions. The Court argued that the executive was accountable for those 
decisions vis-à-vis the parliament and therefore had to be in control of the administra-
tive bodies making those decisions. It is worth exploring whether that logic can be ap-
plied to the Foreign Affairs context as well since the Bundesverfassungsgericht consist-
ently stresses that the Bundestag is responsible for the actions of the government vis-
à-vis the people.  
A different approach to the reconceptualization would be to explore the possibility of 
returning to liberty as the primary objective of separation of powers. As was outlined 
above, this would lead to institutional relationships being based on a view of which in-
stitution would provide the highest level of protection for the individual and collective 
liberty of the citizens instead of asking ‘the institutional structure and decision-making 
processes of which institution are best suited and most efficient’. Such an exploration 
would have to address the potential repercussions of such a reconceptualization for 
the German constitutional system as a whole. For example if the assumption is that 
this would strengthen the Bundestag, does this create a realistic danger of a power 
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monism of the legislative? Potential arguments against this could be drawn from the 
Kalkar decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 558 and the notions on institutional le-
gitimacy put forward by the literature.559 
A solution leading into the opposite direction could be sought by taking the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht’s reasoning with regard to the preservation of sovereignty to its logical 
conclusion. Since the Court seems intent on framing the debate by delineating the 
spheres of influence along the lines of the classic domestic sphere/ international 
sphere divide and to maintain its stance on Foreign Affairs, one of the solutions availa-
ble to remedy the problem identified in this thesis could be the ‘domestication’ of Eu-
ropean matters. In other words: one would conceptualise them no longer as ‘Foreign 
Affairs’, but as ‘domestic matters’ – with the consequence that the government would 
be subject to the full range of participation rights and control powers that the parlia-
ment has at its disposal in the domestic context.  
A further route that could be pursued is to connect the findings in this thesis with the 
literature on Federalism and/ or Multilevel Governance in order to explore whether 
one could develop a truly multilevel concept of separation of powers that not only 
provided a framework for the interaction between the levels (vertical perspective), but 
also comprised rules for the interaction of the institutions within each level (horizontal 
perspective).  
The investigation conducted here deliberately focused on the establishment of the le-
gal framework. Therefore, apart from the more theoretical follow-up projects sketched 
out above, the results of the thesis also provide a solid foundation for empirical studies 
into the repercussions of this new reserve on the relationship of the Bundesregierung 
and the Bundestag in everyday practice. Interviews, questionnaires and e.g. the analy-
sis of parliamentary documents could prove highly interesting in order to determine i.a 
how the members of the Bundestag (government coalition and opposition) use the 
powers they have within the ESM framework, how the Bundesregierung complies with 
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the requirements laid down by the Bundesverfassungsgericht as regards i.a. its duties 
to provide the Bundestag with enough information to enable its effective participation, 
the flow of information between the Bundesregierung and the Bundestag as such, be-
tween the Bundesregierung and individual members, whether there is differential 
treatment between the members of the government coalition and those of the opposi-
tion, etc.  
The information gathered in such surveys could provide valuable insights as to whether 
this increased level of participation in one particular area may have changed, or is like-
ly to change, the self-confidence of the members of the Bundestag in the use of their 
political control powers vis-à-vis the Bundesregierung which could have repercussions 
for the relationship between the Bundestag and Bundesregierung in general. Inversely, 
the material could also provide insights as to whether there has been a change in atti-
tude on the part of the Bundesregierung with regard to European matters in general, 
in other words whether it has lost its ‘gatekeeper’ mentality that was so evident in the 
events leading up to the ratification of the ESM and Fiscal treaties - as related in the 
facts of the decision of 19/06/2012.560 This would also provide a follow-up study to the 
enquiry conducted by Sprungk in 2003.561 
Finally, this thesis could lead to similar studies in other Member States which could 
provide a comprehensive picture of how the national parliaments participate at na-
tional level in decision-making in the European context. Such studies could provide the 
foundation for a comparative project in order to investigate the particular interaction 
between the governments and the parliaments and the role of the constitutional 
courts (as far as existing) in the respective Member States.  
  
                                                     
560
 BVerfG, ‘Duty to Inform the Bundestag (ESM)’ (n 15). 
561
 Sprungk (n 280). 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Table of Statutes 
 
 
218 
Table of Statutes 
Bill of Rights 1688, available at 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/WillandMarSess2/1/2/introduction> ac-
cessed 15 April 2016 
Grundgesetz Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (translated by Prof. Christian To-
muschat, David P. Currie and Donald P. Kommers) <http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html> accessed 15 April 2016 
Magna Carta 1215 (English translation provided by the British Library) 
<http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation> 
accessed 15 April 2016 
 
Table of Cases (chronological order) 
Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht  
BVerfG, ‘Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftsabkommen’ [1952] BVerfGE 1, 372 
BVerfG, ‘Petersberger Abkommen’ [1952] BVerfGE 1, 351 
BVerfG, ‘Gleichberechtigung’ [1953] BVerfGE 3, 225 
BVerfG, ‘Volksbefragung’ [1958] BVerfGE 8, 104 
BVerfG, ‘Bremer Personalvertretung’ [1959] BVerfGE 9, 268 
BVerfG, ‘EWG Recht’ [1967] BVerfGE 22, 134 
BVerfG, ‘EWG Verordnung’ [1967] BVerfGE 22, 293 
BVerfG, ‘Verwaltungsstrafverfahren’ [1967] BVerfGE 22, 49 
BVerfG, ‘Abhörurteil’ [1970] BVerfGE 30, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Milchpulver (Lütticke)’ [1971] BVerfGE 31, 145 
BVerfG, ‘Hessisches Richtergesetz’ [1972] BVerfGE 34, 52 
BVerfG, ‘Grundlagenvertrag’ [1973] BVerfGE 36, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Solange I’ [1974] BVerfGE 37, 271 
BVerfG, ‘Ostverträge’ [1975] BVerfGE 40, 141 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Table of Cases (chronological order) 
 
 
219 
BVerfG, ‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch I’ [1975] BVerfGE 39, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Kalkar I’ [1978] BVerfGE 49, 89 
BVerfG, ‘Untersuchungsgegenstand’ [1978] BVerfGE 49, 70 
BVerfG, ‘Eurocontrol I’ [1981] BVerfGE 58, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Atomwaffenstationierung’ [1984] BVerfGE 68, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Flick-Untersuchungsausschuß’ [1984] BVerfGE 67, 100 
BVerfG, ‘Solange II’ [1986] BVerfGE 73, 339 
BVerfG, ‘Kloppenburg’ [1987] BVerfGE 75, 223 
BVerfG, ‘Lagerung Chemischer Waffen’ [1987] BVerfGE 77, 170 
BVerfG, ‘Wüppesahl’ [1989] BVerfGE 80, 188 
BVerfG, ‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch II’ [1992] BVerfGE 88, 203 
BVerfG, ‘Maastricht’ [1993] BVerfGE 89, 155 
BVerfG, ‘Out-of-Area-Einsätze’ [1994] BVerfGE 90, 286 
BVerfG, ‘Kruzifix’ [1995] BVerfGE 93, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Südumfahrung Stendal’ [1996] BVerfGE 95, 1 
BVerfG, ‘Rechtschreibreform’ [1998] BVerfGE 98, 218 
BVerfG, ‘Bananenmarkt’ [2000] BVerfGE 102, 147 
BVerfG, ‘NATO-Konzept’ [2001] BVerfGE 104, 151 
BVerfG, ‘Wahlprüfung Hessen’ [2001] BVerfGE 103, 111 
BVerfG, ‘Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz’ [2002] BVerfGE 105, 313 
BVerfG, ‘Minderheitsrechte im Untersuchungsausschuß’ [2002] BVerfGE 105, 197 
BVerfG, ‘Kopftuch Ludin’ [2003] BVerfGE 108, 282 
BVerfG, ‘Informationspflichten Der Regierung’ [2004] BVerfGE 110, 199 
BVerfG, ‘Europäischer Haftbefehl’ [2005] BVerfGE 113, 273 
BVerfG, ‘Treibhausgasemissionsberechtigungen (ETS)’ [2007] BVerfGE 118, 79 
BVerfG, ‘Luftraumüberwachung Türkei’ [2008] BVerfGE 121, 135 
BVerfG, ‘Lisbon (Official English Translation)’ [2009] BVerfGE 123, 267 
BVerfG, ‘Lissabon’ [2009] BVerfGE 123, 267 
BVerfG, ‘Überwachung von Bundestagsabgeordneten’ [2009] BVerfGE 124, 161 
BVerfG, ‘Untersuchungsausschuss Geheimgefängnisse’ [2009] BVerfGE 124, 78 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Table of Cases (chronological order) 
 
 
220 
BVerfG, ‘Mangold/ Honeywell’ [2010] BVerfGE 126, 286 
BVerfG, ‘Greek Bailout/ EFSF’ [2011] BVerfGE 129, 124 
BVerfG, ‘Participation of the Bundestag (EFSF)’ [2012] BVerfGE 130, 318 
BVerfG, ‘Duty to Inform the Bundestag (ESM)’ [2012] BVerfGE 131, 152 
BVerfG, ‘ESM/ Fiscal Treaty (Injunction)’ [2012] BVerfGE 132, 195 
BVerfG, ‘Abgeordnetenbeobachtung’ [2013] BVerfGE 134, 141 
BVerfG, ‘Cyprus (Injunction)’ (2 BvQ 17/13 [unreported], 17 April 2013) 
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/
2013/04/qk20130417a_2bvq001713.html> accessed 15 April 2016 
BVerfG, ‘OMT/ Order for Preliminary Reference’ (2014) BVerfGE 134, 366 
BVerfG, ‘ESM/ Fiscal Treaty (Main Action)’ [2014] BVerfGE 135, 317 
Other Materials  
BVerfG, ‘Mündliche Verhandlung in Sachen „OMT-Programm Der Europäischen Zent-
ralbank“’ (Pressemitteilung Nr. 3/2016, 15 January 2016) 
<http://www.bverfg.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/bvg16-
003.html> accessed 15 April 2016 
Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
CJEU, ‘OMT Reference’ (16 June 2015) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1434974260296&uri=CELEX:62014CJ0062> accessed 15 
April 2016 
Cruz Villalón P, ‘OMT Reference - Opinion of the Advocate General’ (14 January 2015) 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1429408819509&uri=CELEX:62014CC0062> accessed 
15 April 2016 
 
  
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
221 
Bibliography 
Albi A, ‘From the Banana Saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond: Could the Post-Communist 
Constitutional Courts Teach the EU a Lesson in the Rule of Law?’ (2010) 47 
Common Market Law Review 791 
——, ‘Erosion of Constitutional Rights in EU Law: A Call for “substantive Co-Operative 
Constitutionalism” - Part 2’ (2015) 9 Vienna Journal of International Constitu-
tional Law 291 
Alder J, Constitutional and Administrative Law (9th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
Anschütz G, Thoma R and Pauly W (eds), Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, vol 1 
(Mohr Siebeck 1932, reprinted 1998) 
Auel K, ‘Adapting to Europe: Strategic Europeanization of National Parliaments’ in 
Ronald Holzhacker and Erik Albæk (eds), Democratic governance and Europe-
an integration: linking societal and state processes of democracy (Edward El-
gar Publishing 2007) 
Barber NW, ‘Prelude to the Separation of Powers’ (2001) 60 The Cambridge Law Jour-
nal 59 
——, ‘Self-Defence for Institutions’ [2013] Cambridge Law Journal 558 
Barendt E, ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’ [1995] Public Law 
599 
Baumbach M, Vertragswandel und Demokratische Legitimation: Auswirkungen moder-
ner Völkerrechtlicher Handlungsformen auf das innerstaatliche Recht (Duncker 
& Humblot 2008) 
Börzel TA and Sprungk C, ‘Undermining Democratic Governance in the Member 
States? The Europeanization of National Decision-Making’ in Ronald 
Holzhacker and Erik Albæk (eds), Democratic governance and European inte-
gration: linking societal and state processes of democracy (Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing 2007) 
Brockmeyer B, ‘Artikel 66’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopf-
auf (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 
2011) 
——, ‘Artikel 110’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopfauf (eds), 
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) 
Calker W, ‘Die Verfassungsentwicklung in den deutschen Einzelstaaten’ in Gerhard An-
schütz, Richard Thoma and Walter Pauly (eds), Handbuch des Deutschen 
Staatsrechts, vol 1 (Mohr Siebeck 1932, reprinted 1998) 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
222 
Calliess C, ‘§ 83: Auswärtige Gewalt’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol IV: Aufgaben des Staates 
(3rd edn, Müller 2006) 
Calliess C and Beichelt T, ‘Auf dem Weg zum Europäisierten Bundestag: Vom Zuschauer 
zum Akteur’ [2013] Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung <http://bertelsmann-
stiftung.org/bst/de/media/xcms_bst_dms_37451_37452_2.pdf> accessed 15 
April 2016 
Carolan E, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2009) 
Classen CD, ‘Artikel 23’ in Hermann von Mangoldt and others (eds), Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz, vol 2: Art. 20 bis 82 (6th edn, Vahlen Verlag 2010) 
Claus L, ‘Montesquieu’s Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation’ (2005) 25 Ox-
ford Journal of Legal Studies 419 
Cornils M, ‘§ 20: Gewaltenteilung’ in Otto Depenheuer and Christoph Grabenwarter 
(eds), Verfassungstheorie (Mohr Siebeck 2010) 
Cryer R, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 
Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Protocol of the 130. plenary session of the 17th Bundestag’ 
(2011) Plenary Protocol 17/130 
<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/searchDocuments/plpr_search_result.
do?selId=448&method=select&offset=0&anzahl=100&sort=4&direction=desc
> accessed 30 May 2015 
Di Fabio U, ‘§ 27: Gewaltenteilung’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol II: Verfassungsstaat (3rd 
edn, Müller 2004) 
Diestelkamp B, ‘Die historischen Wurzeln der deutschen Rechtsstaatskonzeption’ 
(2012) 51 Der Staat 591 
Doukas D, ‘The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Trea-
ty: Not Guilty, but Don’t Do It Again!’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 866 
Fastenrath U, Kompetenzverteilung im Bereich der Auswärtigen Gewalt (CH Beck Ver-
lag 1986) 
Friesenhahn E, ‘Parlament und Regierung im modernen Staat’ in Ernst Friesenhahn and 
Karl Josef Partsch (eds), Parlament und Regierung im modernen Staat/ Die Or-
ganisationsgewalt (Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staats-
rechtslehrer, Band 16, De Gruyter Verlag 1959) 
Gehrig N, Parlament - Regierung - Opposition : Dualismus als Voraussetzung für eine 
parlamentarische Kontrolle der Regierung (CH Beck Verlag 1969) 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
223 
Georgopoulos T, ‘The “Checks and Balances” Doctrine in Member States as a Rule of EC 
Law: The Cases of France and Germany’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 530 
Grewe W, ‘§ 77 Auswärtige Gewalt’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol Band III: Das Handeln 
des Staates (2nd edn, CF Müller Verlag 1996) 
Grimm D, ‘§ 1: Ursprung und Wandel der Verfassung’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirch-
hof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol I: 
Historische Grundlagen (3rd edn, CF Müller Verlag 2003) 
Günther F, Denken vom Staat her: Die bundesdeutsche Staatsrechtslehre zwischen De-
zision und Integration 1949 - 1970 (Oldenbourg 2004) 
Gusy C, ‘Die Weimarer Verfassung als „negative Ordnungsidee “?’ (2011) 5 Journal der 
Juristischen Zeitgeschichte 47 
Hailbronner K, ‘Kontrolle der Auswärtigen Gewalt’ in Kay Hailbronner and Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (eds), Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt (Veröffentlichungen der 
Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Band 56, De Gruyter Verlag 
1997) 
Halberstam D and Möllers C, ‘The German Constitutional Court says “Ja Zu Deutsch-
land!”’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1241 
Hamilton A, Jay J and Madison J, The Federalist (George Wescott Carey and James 
McClellan eds, Liberty Fund 2001) 
Hillgruber C, ‘Artikel 32’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein and Hans Bernhard 
Brockmeyer (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (7th edn, Luchterland Verlag 
1990) 
——, ‘Artikel 23’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopfauf (eds), 
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) 
Hobbes T, Leviathan (1651) 
Hofmann H, ‘Artikel 20’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopfauf 
(eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) 
Hopfauf A, ‘Einleitung’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopfauf 
(eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) 
Huber ER, ‘§ 4: Das Kaiserreich als Epoche verfassungsstaatlicher Entwicklung’ in Josef 
Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland, vol Band I: Historische Grundlagen (3rd edn, CF Müller Verlag 
2003) 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
224 
Jacobson AJ and Schlink B, ‘Constitutional Crisis: The German and American Experi-
ence’ in Arthur J Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink (eds), Weimar : a jurispru-
dence of crisis (University of California Press 2000) 
—— (eds), Weimar : A Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of California Press 2000) 
Jarass HD, ‘Artikel 24’ in Hans D Jarass and Bodo Pieroth (eds), Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar (1st edn, CH Beck Verlag 1989) 
——, ‘Artikel 20’ in Hans D Jarass and Bodo Pieroth (eds), Grundgesetz für die Bundes-
republik Deutschland - Kommentar (12th edn, CH Beck Verlag 2012) 
——, ‘Artikel 23’ in Hans D Jarass and Bodo Pieroth (eds), Grundgesetz für die Bundes-
republik Deutschland - Kommentar (12th edn, CH Beck Verlag 2012) 
Kägi W, ‘Von der klassischen Dreiteilung zur umfassenden Gewaltenteilung’ in Heinz 
Volker Rausch (ed), Zur heutigen Problematik der Gewaltentrennung (Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1969) 
Kielmansegg SG von, ‘Parlamentarische Informationsrechte in der Euro-Rettung: An-
merkung Zum Ersten ESM-Urteil Des BVerfG Vom 19.06.2012’ (2012) 47 Euro-
parecht 654 
Kiiver P, ‘German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Com-
parative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures’’ (2009) 10 
German Law Journal 1287 
Korioth S, ‘Rudolf Smend - Introduction’ in Arthur J Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink 
(eds), Weimar : a jurisprudence of crisis (University of California Press 2000) 
Leisner W, ‘Die Quantitative Gewaltenteilung’ (1969) 22 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 
405 
Locke J, Second Treatise of Government (1690) 
Magill ME, ‘The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law 
Review 1127 
Maurer H, Staatsrecht I: Grundlagen, Verfassungsorgane, Staatsfunktionen (6th edn, 
CH Beck Verlag 2010) 
Menzel E, ‘Die Auswärtige Gewalt der Bundesrepublik’ in Wilhelm Grewe and Eberhard 
Menzel (eds), Die auswärtige Gewalt der Bundesrepublik (Veröffentlichungen 
der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Band 12, De Gruyter Verlag 
1954) 
Möllers C, Die Drei Gewalten: Legitimation der Gewaltengliederung in Verfassungs-
staat, Europäischer Integration und Internationalisierung (Velbrück Wissen-
schaftsverlag 2008) 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
225 
Montesquieu C de S, The Spirit of the Laws, (ed and trans by Anne M Cohler, Basia Car-
olyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge University Press 1989) 
Montesquieu C de SB de, De L’Esprit Des Lois (Firmin Didot frères, fils et cie 1748) 
Murkens JEK, ‘Neither Parochial Nor Cosmopolitan: Appraising the Migration of Consti-
tutional Ideas (Book Review)’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 303 
——, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 BvE 2/08): “We Want Our Identity Back” - the  Re-
vival of National Sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s  
Decision on the Lisbon Treaty’ [2010] Public Law 530 
——, From Empire to Union: Conceptions of German Constitutional Law since 1871 (Ox-
ford University Press 2013) 
Ossenbühl F, ‘Aktuelle Probleme der Gewaltenteilung’ (1980) 33 Die Öffentliche Ver-
waltung 545 
Ottmann H, Geschichte des politischen Denkens: Die Neuzeit, vol 3/1: Von Machiavelli 
bis zu den großen Revolutionen (Metzler Verlag 2006) 
——, Geschichte des politischen Denkens: Die Neuzeit, vol 3/2: Das Zeitalter der Revo-
lutionen (Metzler Verlag 2008) 
Pauly W, ‘Die neue Sachlichkeit der Staatsrechtslehre in der Demokratie’ in Gerhard 
Anschütz, Richard Thoma and Walter Pauly (eds), Handbuch des Deutschen 
Staatsrechts, vol 1 (Mohr Siebeck 1932, reprinted 1998) 
Ratnapala S, ‘John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-Evaluation’ 
(1993) 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence 189 
Roellecke G, ‘§ 2: Beobachtung der Verfassungstheorie’ in Otto Depenheuer and Chris-
toph Grabenwarter (eds), Verfassungstheorie (Mohr Siebeck Verlag 2010) 
Rousseau J-J, Du Contrat Social Ou Principes Du Droit Politique (Garnier 1762) 
Schmidt-Assmann E, Das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht Als Ordnungsidee : Grundlagen 
Und Aufgaben Der Verwaltungsrechtlichen Systembildung (Springer 1998) 
Schönberger C, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones At Sea’ (2009) 10 German 
Law Journal 1201 
Singh MP, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective (2nd edn, Springer 
Verlag 2001) 
Smend R, ‘Constitution and Constitutional Law’ in Arthur J Jacobson and Bernhard 
Schlink (eds), Weimar : a jurisprudence of crisis (University of California Press 
2000) 
Sommermann K-P, ‘Artikel 20’ in Hermann von Mangoldt and others (eds), Kommentar 
zum Grundgesetz, vol 2: Art. 20 bis 82 (6th edn, Vahlen Verlag 2010) 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
226 
Sprungk C, ‘National Parliamentary Scrutiny in the European Union: The German Bun-
destag and the French Assemblée Nationale, Key Players or Side-Shows?’ 
(2003) <http://aei.pitt.edu/7278/> accessed 15 April 2016 
Streinz R, ‘Der Verfassungsstaat als Glied einer Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ (1990) 105 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 949 
——, ‘Artikel 23’ in Michael Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz: Kommentar (3rd edn, CH Beck 
Verlag 2003) 
Tamanaha B, On the Rule of Law History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 
2004) 
Thiele U, Die politischen Ideen: von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Marix Verlag 2008) 
Thoma R, ‘Die Funktion der Staatsgewalt - Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze’ in Gerhard 
Anschütz, Richard Thoma and Walter Pauly (eds), Handbuch des Deutschen 
Staatsrechts, vol 2 (Mohr Siebeck 1932, reprinted 1998) 
Thym D, ‘In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon 
Judgment of the German Constitutional Court’ (2009) 46 Common Market 
Law Review 1795 
Tsatsos TD, Zur Geschichte und Kritik der Lehre von der Gewaltenteilung (Carl Winter 
Universitätsverlag 1968) 
Uhle, ‘Artikel 63’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopfauf (eds), 
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) 
——, ‘Artikel 64’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann and Axel Hopfauf (eds), 
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) 
UK Parliament, ‘Report Strongly Critical of Government and BBC’ (European Scrutiny 
Committee) <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/european-scrutiny-committee/news/scrutiny-reform-
follow-up-and-legacy-report/> accessed 31 March 2016 
Vile MJC, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (2nd edn, Liberty Fund 1998) 
von Aretin JC, Staatsrecht der konstitutionellen Monarchie (Literatur Comptoir 1827) 
von Danwitz T, ‘Der Grundsatz der funktionsgerechten Organstruktur’ (1996) 35 Der 
Staat 329 
Vorländer H, ‘Regiert Karlsruhe mit? Das Bundesverfassungsgericht Zwischen Recht 
Und Politik’ (2011) 61 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen 15 
Waechter K, Geminderte Demokratische Legitimation Staatlicher Institutionen im par-
lamentarischen Regierungssystem: Zur Wirkung von Verfassungsprinzipien 
und Grundrechten auf institutionelle und kompetenzielle Ausgestaltungen 
(Duncker & Humblot 1994) 
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Bibliography 
 
 
227 
Wahl R, ‘§ 2: Die Entwicklung des deutschen Verfassungsstaates bis 1866’ in Josef Isen-
see and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, vol I: Historische Grundlagen (3rd edn, CF Müller Verlag 2003) 
Wootton D, The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers (Hackett Publishing 
Company 2003) 
  
PhD thesis:  Candidate: Beke Zwingmann 
Separation of Powers the 'German' way?  Student no.: 0747270 
Annex 
 
 
228 
Annex  
Provisions of the Grundgesetz - German original 
 
 
Artikel 1 
(1) Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist 
Verpflichtung aller staatlichenGewalt. 
(2) Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich darum zu unverletzlichen und unveräußerlichen 
Menschenrechten als Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens und 
der Gerechtigkeit in der Welt. 
(3) Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und 
Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht. 
 
Artikel 10 
(1) Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis sind unverletzlich. 
(2) Beschränkungen dürfen nur auf Grund eines Gesetzes angeordnet werden. Dient 
die Beschränkung dem Schutze der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung oder 
des Bestandes oder der Sicherung des Bundes oder eines Landes, so kann das Gesetz 
bestimmen, daß sie dem Betroffenen nicht mitgeteilt wird und daß an die Stelle des 
Rechtsweges die Nachprüfung durch von der Volksvertretung bestellte Organe und 
Hilfsorgane tritt. 
 
Artikel 19 
(1) Soweit nach diesem Grundgesetz ein Grundrecht durch Gesetz oder auf Grund 
eines Gesetzes eingeschränkt werden kann, muß das Gesetz allgemein und nicht nur für 
den Einzelfall gelten. Außerdem muß das Gesetz das Grundrecht unter Angabe des 
Artikels nennen. 
(2) In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden. 
(3) Die Grundrechte gelten auch für inländische juristische Personen, soweit sie 
ihrem Wesen nach auf diese anwendbar sind. 
(4) Wird jemand durch die öffentliche Gewalt in seinen Rechten verletzt, so steht ihm 
der Rechtsweg offen. Soweit eine andere Zuständigkeit nicht begründet ist, ist der 
ordentliche Rechtsweg gegeben. Artikel 10 Abs. 2 Satz 2 bleibt unberührt. 
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Artikel 20 
(1) Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat. 
(2) Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. Sie wird vom Volke in Wahlen und 
Abstimmungen und durch besondere Organe der Gesetzgebung, der vollziehenden 
Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung ausgeübt. 
(3) Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende 
Gewalt und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden. 
(4) Gegen jeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle 
Deutschen das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist. 
 
Artikel 23 
(1) Zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas wirkt die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland bei der Entwicklung der Europäischen Union mit, die demokratischen, 
rechtsstaatlichen, sozialen und föderativen Grundsätzen und dem Grundsatz der 
Subsidiarität verpflichtet ist und einen diesem Grundgesetz im wesentlichen 
vergleichbaren Grundrechtsschutz gewährleistet. Der Bund kann hierzu durch Gesetz 
mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates Hoheitsrechte übertragen. Für die Begründung der 
Europäischen Union sowie für Änderungen ihrer vertraglichen Grundlagen und 
vergleichbare Regelungen, durch die dieses Grundgesetz seinem Inhalt nach geändert 
oder ergänzt wird oder solche Änderungen oder Ergänzungen ermöglicht werden, gilt 
Artikel 79 Abs. 2 und 3.  
(1a) Der Bundestag und der Bundesrat haben das Recht, wegen Verstoßes eines 
Gesetzgebungsaktes der Europäischen Union gegen das Subsidiaritätsprinzip vor dem 
Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union Klage zu erheben. Der Bundestag ist hierzu auf 
Antrag eines Viertels seiner Mitglieder verpflichtet. Durch Gesetz, das der Zustimmung 
des Bundesrates bedarf, können für die Wahrnehmung der Rechte, die dem Bundestag 
und dem Bundesrat in den vertraglichen Grundlagen der Europäischen Union 
eingeräumt sind, Ausnahmen von Artikel 42 Abs. 2 Satz 1 und Artikel 52 Abs. 3 Satz 1 
zugelassen werden. 
(2) In Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union wirken der Bundestag und durch den 
Bundesrat die Länder mit. Die Bundesregierung hat den Bundestag und den Bundesrat 
umfassend und zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt zu unterrichten.  
(3) Die Bundesregierung gibt dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme vor 
ihrer Mitwirkung an Rechtsetzungsakten der Europäischen Union. Die Bundesregierung 
berücksichtigt die Stellungnahmen des Bundestages bei den Verhandlungen. Das 
Nähere regelt ein Gesetz.  
(4) Der Bundesrat ist an der Willensbildung des Bundes zu beteiligen, soweit er an 
einer entsprechenden innerstaatlichen Maßnahme mitzuwirken hätte oder soweit die 
Länder innerstaatlich zuständig wären. 
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(5) Soweit in einem Bereich ausschließlicher Zuständigkeiten des Bundes Interessen 
der Länder berührt sind oder soweit im Übrigen der Bund das Recht zur Gesetzgebung 
hat, berücksichtigt die Bundesregierung die Stellungnahme des Bundesrates. Wenn im 
Schwerpunkt Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder, die Einrichtung ihrer Behörden oder 
ihre Verwaltungsverfahren betroffen sind, ist bei der Willensbildung des Bundes 
insoweit die Auffassung des Bundesrates maßgeblich zu berücksichtigen; dabei ist die 
gesamtstaatliche Verantwortung des Bundes zu wahren. In Angelegenheiten, die zu 
Ausgabenerhöhungen oder Einnahmeminderungen für den Bund führen können, ist die 
Zustimmung der Bundesregierung erforderlich.  
(6) Wenn im Schwerpunkt ausschließliche Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder auf 
den Gebieten der schulischen Bildung, der Kultur oder des Rundfunks betroffen sind, 
wird die Wahrnehmung der Rechte, die der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als 
Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union zustehen, vom Bund auf einen vom Bundesrat 
benannten Vertreter der Länder übertragen. Die Wahrnehmung der Rechte erfolgt 
unter Beteiligung und in Abstimmung mit der Bundesregierung; dabei ist die 
gesamtstaatliche Verantwortung des Bundes zu wahren.  
(7) Das Nähere zu den Absätzen 4 bis 6 regelt ein Gesetz, das der Zustimmung des 
Bundesrates bedarf. 
 
Artikel 24 
(1) Der Bund kann durch Gesetz Hoheitsrechte auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen 
übertragen.  
(1a) Soweit die Länder für die Ausübung der staatlichen Befugnisse und die Erfüllung 
der staatlichen Aufgaben zuständig sind, können sie mit Zustimmung der 
Bundesregierung Hoheitsrechte auf grenznachbarschaftliche Einrichtungen übertragen. 
(2) Der Bund kann sich zur Wahrung des Friedens einem System gegenseitiger 
kollektiver Sicherheit einordnen; er wird hierbei in die Beschränkungen seiner 
Hoheitsrechte einwilligen, die eine friedliche und dauerhafte Ordnung in Europa und 
zwischen den Völkern der Welt herbeiführen und sichern.  
(3) Zur Regelung zwischenstaatlicher Streitigkeiten wird der Bund Vereinbarungen 
über eine allgemeine, umfassende, obligatorische, internationale 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit beitreten.  
 
Artikel 32 
(1) Die Pflege der Beziehungen zu auswärtigen Staaten ist Sache des Bundes.  
(2) Vor dem Abschlüsse eines Vertrages, der die besonderen Verhältnisse eines 
Landes berührt, ist das Land rechtzeitig zu hören.  
(3) Soweit die Länder für die Gesetzgebung zuständig sind, können sie mit 
Zustimmung der Bundesregierung mit auswärtigen Staaten Verträge abschließen.  
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Artikel 38 
(1) Die Abgeordneten des Deutschen Bundestages werden in allgemeiner, 
unmittelbarer, freier, gleicher und geheimer Wahl gewählt. Sie sind Vertreter des 
ganzen Volkes, an Aufträge und Weisungen nicht gebunden und nur ihrem Gewissen 
unterworfen. 
(2) Wahlberechtigt ist, wer das achtzehnte Lebensjahr vollendet hat; wählbar ist, 
wer das Alter erreicht hat, mit dem die Volljährigkeit eintritt. 
(3) Das Nähere bestimmt ein Bundesgesetz. 
 
Artikel 51 
(1) Der Bundesrat besteht aus Mitgliedern der Regierungen der Länder, die sie 
bestellen und abberufen. Sie können durch andere Mitglieder ihrer Regierungen 
vertreten werden. 
(2) Jedes Land hat mindestens drei Stimmen, Länder mit mehr als zwei Millionen 
Einwohnern haben vier, Länder mit mehr als sechs Millionen Einwohnern fünf, Länder 
mit mehr als sieben Millionen Einwohnern sechs Stimmen. 
(3) Jedes Land kann so viele Mitglieder entsenden, wie es Stimmen hat. Die Stimmen 
eines Landes können nur einheitlich und nur durch anwesende Mitglieder oder deren 
Vertreter abgegeben werden. 
 
Artikel 59 
(1) Der Bundespräsident vertritt den Bund völkerrechtlich. Er schließt im Namen des 
Bundes die Verträge mit auswärtigen Staaten. Er beglaubigt und empfängt die 
Gesandten.  
(2) Verträge, welche die politischen Beziehungen des Bundes regeln oder sich auf 
Gegenstände der Bundesgesetzgebung beziehen, bedürfen der Zustimmung oder der 
Mitwirkung der jeweils für die Bundesgesetzgebung zuständigen Körperschaften in der 
Form eines Bundesgesetzes. Für Verwaltungsabkommen gelten die Vorschriften über 
die Bundesverwaltung entsprechend.  
 
Artikel 65 
Der Bundeskanzler bestimmt die Richtlinien der Politik und trägt dafür die Verant-
wortung. Innerhalb dieser Richtlinien leitet jeder Bundesminister seinen 
Geschäftsbereich selbständig und unter eigener Verantwortung. Über 
Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den Bundesministern entscheidet die 
Bundesregierung. Der Bundeskanzler leitet ihre Geschäfte nach einer von der 
Bundesregierung beschlossenen und vom Bundespräsidenten genehmigten 
Geschäftsordnung. 
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Artikel 67 
(1) Der Bundestag kann dem Bundeskanzler das Mißtrauen nur dadurch 
aussprechen, daß er mit der Mehrheit seiner Mitglieder einen Nachfolger wählt und 
den Bundespräsidenten ersucht, den Bundeskanzler zu entlassen. Der Bundespräsident 
muß dem Ersuchen entsprechen und den Gewählten ernennen. 
(2) Zwischen dem Antrage und der Wahl müssen achtundvierzig Stunden liegen. 
 
Artikel 68 
(1) Findet ein Antrag des Bundeskanzlers, ihm das Vertrauen auszusprechen, nicht 
die Zustimmung der Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Bundestages, so kann der 
Bundespräsident auf Vorschlag des Bundeskanzlers binnen einundzwanzig Tagen den 
Bundestag auflösen. Das Recht zur Auflösung erlischt, sobald der Bundestag mit der 
Mehrheit seiner Mitglieder einen anderen Bundeskanzler wählt. 
(2) Zwischen dem Antrage und der Abstimmung müssen achtundvierzig Stunden 
liegen. 
 
Artikel 79 
(1) Das Grundgesetz kann nur durch ein Gesetz geändert werden, das den Wortlaut 
des Grundgesetzes ausdrücklich ändert oder ergänzt. Bei völkerrechtlichen Verträgen, 
die eine Friedensregelung, die Vorbereitung einer Friedensregelung oder den Abbau 
einer besatzungsrechtlichen Ordnung zum Gegenstand haben oder der Verteidigung 
der Bundesrepublik zu dienen bestimmt sind, genügt zur Klarstellung, daß die 
Bestimmungen des Grundgesetzes dem Abschluß und dem Inkraftsetzen der Verträge 
nicht entgegenstehen, eine Ergänzung des Wortlautes des Grundgesetzes, die sich auf 
diese Klarstellung beschränkt.  
(2) Ein solches Gesetz bedarf der Zustimmung von zwei Dritteln der Mitglieder des 
Bundestages und zwei Dritteln der Stimmen des Bundesrates. 
(3) Eine Änderung dieses Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in 
Länder, die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den 
Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig. 
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Provisions of the Grundgesetz - English translation562 
 
Article 1  
[Human dignity –Legally binding force of basic rights] 
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of 
all state authority. 
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary as directly applicable law. 
 
Article 10  
[Privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications] 
(1) The privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications shall be inviolable. 
(2) Restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law. If the restriction serves to 
protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or 
of a Land, the law may provide that the person affected shall not be informed of the 
restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by 
agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature. 
 
Article 19  
[Restriction of basic rights – Legal remedies] 
(1) Insofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to 
a law, such law must apply generally and not merely to a single case. In addition, the 
law must specify the basic right affected and the Article in which it appears. 
(2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected. 
(3) The basic rights shall also apply to domestic artificial persons to the extent that 
the nature of such rights permits. 
(4) Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse 
to the courts. If no other jurisdiction has been established, recourse shall be to the 
ordinary courts. The second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 10 shall not be 
affected by this paragraph. 
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 ‘Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Translated by Prof. Christian Tomuschat, David P. 
Currie and Donald P. Kommers’ <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html> acces-
sed 15 April 2016. 
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Article 20  
[Constitutional principles – Right of resistance] 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.  
(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people 
through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and 
judicial bodies.  
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the 
judiciary by law and justice.  
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this 
constitutional order, if no other remedy is available 
 
Article 23  
[European Union] 
(1) With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany 
shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to 
democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of 
subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially 
comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer 
sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the 
European Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable 
regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or 
supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79. 
(1a)563 The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall have the right to bring an action 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union to challenge a legislative act of the 
European Union for infringing the principle of subsidiarity. The Bundestag is obliged to 
initiate such an action at the request of one fourth of its Members. By a statute 
requiring the consent of the Bundesrat, exceptions from the first sentence of paragraph 
(2) of Article 42, and the first sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 52, may be 
authorised for the exercise of the rights granted to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
under the contractual foundations of the European Union. 
(2) The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Länder shall participate in 
matters concerning the European Union. The Federal Government shall keep the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, comprehensively and at the earliest possible 
time. 
(3) Before participating in legislative acts of the European Union, the Federal 
Government shall provide the Bundestag with an opportunity to state its position. The 
Federal Government shall take the position of the Bundestag into account during the 
negotiations. Details shall be regulated by a law. 
(4) The Bundesrat shall participate in the decision-making process of the Federation 
insofar as it would have been competent to do so in a comparable domestic matter, or 
insofar as the subject falls within the domestic competence of the Länder. 
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 Added with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
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(5) Insofar as, in an area within the exclusive competence of the Federation, 
interests of the Länder are affected, and in other matters, insofar as the Federation has 
legislative power, the Federal Government shall take the position of the Bundesrat into 
account. To the extent that the legislative powers of the Länder, the structure of Land 
authorities, or Land administrative procedures are primarily affected, the position of 
the Bundesrat shall be given the greatest possible respect in determining the 
Federation’s position consistent with the responsibility of the Federation for the nation 
as a whole. In matters that may result in increased expenditures or reduced revenues 
for the Federation, the consent of the Federal Government shall be required. 
(6) When legislative powers exclusive to the Länder concerning matters of school 
education, culture or broadcasting are primarily affected, the exercise of the rights 
belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany as a Member State of the European 
Union shall be delegated by the Federation to a representative of the Länder 
designated by the Bundesrat. These rights shall be exercised with the participation of, 
and in coordination with, the Federal Government; their exercise shall be consistent 
with the responsibility of the Federation for the nation as a whole. 
(7) Details regarding paragraphs (4) to (6) of this Article shall be regulated by a law 
requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. 
 
Article 24  
[Transfer of sovereign powers – System of collective security] 
(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international 
organisations. 
(1a) Insofar as the Länder are competent to exercise state powers and to perform 
state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer 
sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions in neighbouring regions. 
(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of 
mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its 
sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among 
the nations of the world. 
(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to 
agreements providing for general, comprehensive and compulsory international 
arbitration. 
 
Article 32  
[Foreign relations] 
(1) Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the Federation. 
(2) Before the conclusion of a treaty affecting the special circumstances of a Land, 
that Land shall be consulted in timely fashion. 
(3) Insofar as the Länder have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with 
foreign states with the consent of the Federal Government. 
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Article 38  
[Elections] 
(1) Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal 
and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by 
orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience. 
(2) Any person who has attained the age of eighteen shall be entitled to vote; any 
person who has attained the age of majority may be elected. 
(3) Details shall be regulated by a federal law. 
 
Article 51  
[Composition – Weighted voting] 
(1) The Bundesrat shall consist of members of the Land governments, which appoint 
and recall them. Other members of those governments may serve as alternates. 
(2) Each Land shall have at least three votes; Länder with more than two million 
inhabitants shall have four, Länder with more than six million inhabitants five, and 
Länder with more than seven million inhabitants six votes. 
(3) Each Land may appoint as many members as it has votes. The votes of each Land 
may be cast only as a unit and only by Members present or their alternates. 
 
Article 59  
[Representation of the Federation for the purposes of international law] 
(1) The Federal President shall represent the Federation for the purposes of inter-
national law. He shall conclude treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation. 
He shall accredit and receive envoys. 
(2) Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to 
subjects of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the form of a 
federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal law. 
In the case of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal 
administration shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
Article 65  
[Power to determine policy guidelines – Department and collegiate responsibility] 
The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines 
of policy. Within these limits each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his 
department independently and on his own responsibility. The Federal Government shall 
resolve differences of opinion between Federal Ministers. The Federal Chancellor shall 
conduct the proceedings of the Federal Government in accordance with rules of 
procedure adopted by the Government and approved by the Federal President. 
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Article 67  
[Vote of no confidence] 
(1) The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only 
by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the 
Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply 
with the request and appoint the person elected.  
(2) Forty-eight hours shall elapse between the motion and the election.  
 
Article 68  
[Vote of confidence] 
(1) If a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not supported by 
the majority of the Members of the Bundestag, the Federal President, upon the 
proposal of the Federal Chancellor, may dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one 
days. The right of dissolution shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag elects another 
Federal Chancellor by the vote of a majority of its Members.  
(2) Forty-eight hours shall elapse between the motion and the vote. 
 
Article 79  
[Amendment of the Basic Law] 
(1) This Basic Law may be amended only by a law expressly amending or 
supplementing its text. In the case of an international treaty regarding a peace 
settlement, the preparation of a peace settlement, or the phasing out of an occupation 
regime, or designed to promote the defence of the Federal Republic, it shall be 
sufficient, for the purpose of making clear that the provisions of this Basic Law do not 
preclude the conclusion and entry into force of the treaty, to add language to the Basic 
Law that merely makes this clarification. 
(2) Any such law shall be carried by two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag and 
two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. 
(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into 
Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid 
down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible. 
 
